The Malayan Emergency – Last Colonial Victory?
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Colonial on Tuesday, January 17, 2012
Members of B Company 2 RAR about to go on a patrol in Perak in 1956. A
Daimler Ferret armoured car has accompanied the patrol to its setting-off point
in a rubber plantation. The patrol is responding to reports of communist guerrillas
in the nearby jungle. Patrolling in search of guerrillas was the main task of
the Australian Army during the Malayan Emergency. [AWM HOB/56/0751/MC]
In June 1948 a state of emergency was proclaimed in Malaya
in response to Communist guerrilla activity. Problems had been developing for a
considerable time. The British had imported Chinese and Indian labour to work
in the tin mines and rubber plantations. They became a majority of the
population – a fact deeply resented by Malays. The Chinese had suffered high
unemployment in the 1930s, and had then been victimised by the Japanese after
their conquest of Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party was in fact
overwhelmingly (95 per cent) Chinese. They were determined to fight a
restoration of British imperial power. The Communists’ main support was in the
countryside. Barely scraping a living on the fringes of the jungle were perhaps
600,000 Chinese squatters. Their poverty and insecurity made them an ideal
recruiting ground for guerrillas. Their strategy was simple – and potentially
war-winning. They would paralyse the economy, by attacking rubber plantations
and tin mines. The British would eventually cut their losses and leave.
But the fact that the guerrillas were Chinese shaped
Britain’s response. Within China the Communists were in the ascendant, with the
Guomindang regime collapsing. How great were their ambitions in Asia? Also,
Communist inspired guerrillas were challenging colonial rule throughout the
region. From London this all appeared part of a clearly orchestrated Communist
strategy, intended to conquer all of Asia.
Guerrilla warfare in the jungle was a real challenge to
British forces. They soon realised that air power had little value. Relying on
bombs, napalm and defoliants was an exercise in futility. They could only
harass the guerrillas. But ground operations would demand huge numbers of
troops. Besides, every civilian killed by a stray shot would merely add to
their enemies. Firepower, it was quickly recognised, was no solution. The guerrillas
would have to be defeated politically.
The British developed a counter-insurgency strategy that
eventually proved remarkably effective. Indeed Malaya was the only guerrilla
war of its kind where the guerrillas were clearly defeated. Firstly a process
of political reform, answering the demands of nationalists was introduced. This
led, in 1957, to Malayan independence under a pro-western government. Also the
British recognised that it was vital for them to be upholding the law.
Emergency laws were drawn up which were drastic enough for the security forces
to act effectively. But they were also clear enough so that the security forces
were seen to act within the law themselves. Police work was seen as crucial.
Good intelligence was more important than actually killing guerrillas. Generous
surrender terms were offered. Cash rewards were available to those who
surrendered weapons or offered information. Guerrillas could also surrender and
request deportation to China without facing any questioning.
The most vital element in Britain’s counter-insurgency
strategy, however, was their drive to win over the civil population. Winning
‘hearts and minds’, and depriving the guerrillas of popular support was a
fundamental requirement of British strategy. The section of the population the
British most urgently needed to win over were the 600,000 squatters who
provided the guerrillas with most of their support. The strategy the British
adopted to achieve this was both novel and ambitious. They decided to resettle
the entire squatter population.
Separating the guerrillas from their supporters was an
obvious step to make. It would deny the guerrillas supplies, recruits and
intelligence. But the British did not consider any form of internment for the
squatters. To win the squatters’ support they would have to provide very real
material improvements in the squatters’ lives, far beyond anything the
guerrillas could promise. The British provided rehousing, in new villages. Once
there the squatters gained a degree of security of land tenure they had never
before known. Citizenship rights were extended. In material terms they had
luxuries such as electricity and safe water. Teachers and nurses were provided
if they were available. Welfare officers, often Australian and New Zealander
volunteers, protected their interests. The new villagers were given a degree of
self-government, and, crucially, the protection of the security forces that
allowed them to exercise it without fear of guerrilla reprisal. Eventually they
could be given responsibility for their own protection.
By such tactics the areas in which the guerrillas could
operate became ever more constricted. A band of guerrilla-free territory was
driven across Malaya, leaving those in the south totally isolated. By the
mid-1950s the guerrillas were clearly losing. They were never entirely
destroyed. A safe haven in Thailand sustained guerrilla activity in the north.
But they were no longer a serious threat. By July 1960 the emergency was
declared over.
The British success was due to a number of factors. That the
guerrillas were ethnically Chinese and had virtually no Malay support was one.
More importantly was the very early recognition that firepower could not
succeed alone. The British fought a political battle that was extremely
expensive and required enormous patience to gain results. It also required the
creation of a representative Malayan state that was responsive to popular
needs. Success against Communist guerrillas was possible: but not a quick
victory, and certainly not a purely military victory.
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