Land Battle for Guadalcanal, (August 1942–February 1943) Part II
Posted by Mitch Williamson in WWII on Sunday, January 29, 2012
The lack of a harbor compounded U.S. supply problems, as did
Japanese aircraft attacks. Allied “coast watchers” on islands provided early
warning to U.S. forces of Japanese air and water movements down the so-called
Slot of the Solomons. The battle on Guadalcanal became a complex campaign of
attrition. The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather vessels in
driblets. American land-based air power controlled the Slot during the day, but
the Japanese initially controlled it at night, as was evidenced in the 8 August
Battle of Savo Island. Concern over the vulnerability of the U.S. transports
led to their early removal on the afternoon of 9 August along with most of the
heavy guns, vehicles, construction equipment, and food intended for the Marines
ashore. The Japanese sent aircraft from Rabaul, while initially U.S. land-based
aircraft flying at long range from the New Hebrides provided air cover for the
Marines as fast destroyer transports finally brought in some supplies. American
possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance. U.S. air strength there
gradually increased to about 100 planes.
At night the so-called Tokyo Express—Japanese destroyers and
light cruisers—steamed down the Slot and into the sound to shell Marine
positions and to deliver supplies. The latter effort was haphazard and never
sufficient; often, drums filled with supplies were pushed off the ships to
drift to shore. One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific War was the failure of
the Japanese to exploit the temporary departure of the U.S. carrier task force
on 8 August by rushing in substantial reinforcements.
Actions ashore were marked by clashes between patrols of
both sides. Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao, who had arrived with his battalion on
Guadalacanal in early August, planned a large-scale attack that took little
account of U.S. Marine dispositions. His unit was effectively wiped out in the
21 August 1942 Battle of the Tenaru River. Ichiki’s men refused to surrender,
and they and their commander were killed in the fighting. Marine losses were 44
dead and 71 wounded; the Japanese lost at least 777 killed. From 12 to 14
September, strong Japanese forces attempted to seize U.S. Marine positions on
Lunga Ridge overlooking Henderson Field from the south. The Japanese left 600
dead; American casualties were 143 dead and wounded. Both sides continued
building up their strength ashore as naval and air battles raged over and off
Guadalcanal.
From 23 to 25 October, the Japanese launched strong land
attacks against Henderson Field. Fortunately for the Marine defenders, the
attacks were widely dispersed and uncoordinated. In these engagements, the
Japanese suffered 2,000 dead, while U.S. casualties were fewer than 300.
Immediately after halting this Japanese offensive, Vandegrift began a six week
effort to expand the defensive perimeter beyond which the Japanese could not
subject Henderson to artillery fire. Meanwhile, Admiral Kondo Nobutake’s
repositioning of vessels and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey’s instructions to
Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet resulted in the 26
October Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Fighting on land continued on Guadalcanal. On 8 December,
Vandegrift turned command of the island over to U.S. Army Major General
Alexander M. Patch, who organized his forces into the XIV Corps, including the
2nd Marine Division, replacing the veteran 1st Marine Division, which was
withdrawn, and the 25th Infantry Division. At the beginning of January 1943,
Patch commanded 58,000 men, whereas Japanese strength was then less than
20,000.
Ultimately, the Americans won the land struggle for
Guadalcanal thanks to superior supply capabilities and the failure of the
Japanese to throw sufficient resources into the battle. The Americans were now
well fed and well supplied, but the Japanese were desperate, losing many men to
sickness and simple starvation. At the end of December, Tokyo decided to
abandon Guadalcanal.
Meanwhile, on 10 January, Patch began an offensive to clear
the island of Japanese forces, mixing Army and Marine units as the situation
dictated. In a two-week battle, the Americans drove the Japanese from a heavily
fortified line west of Henderson Field. At the end of January, the Japanese
were forced from Tassafaronga toward Cape Esperance, where a small American
force landed to prevent them from escaping by sea. Dogged Japanese perseverance
and naval support, however, enabled some defenders to escape. The Japanese invested
in the struggle 24,600 men (20,800 troops and 3,800 naval personnel). In daring
night operations during 1–7 February 1943, Japanese destroyers evacuated 10,630
troops (9,800 army and 830 navy).
The United States committed 60,000 men to the fight for the
island; of these, the Marines lost 1,207 dead and the army 562. U.S. casualties
were far greater in the naval contests for Guadalcanal; the U.S. Navy and
Marines lost 4,911 and the Japanese at least 3,200. Counting land, sea, and air
casualties, the struggle for Guadalcanal had claimed 7,100 U.S. dead and
permanently missing. The Japanese advance had now been halted, and MacArthur
could begin the long and bloody return to the Philippine Islands.
References
Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific. New York:
Viking, 1996. Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the
Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Hough, Frank O., Verle E.
Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of Marine Corps Operation in World War II:
Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963.
Miller, John, Jr. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific:
Guadalcanal, the First Offensive. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1949. Mueller, Joseph N. Guadalcanal 1942: The Marines Strike Back. London:
Osprey, 1992. Tregaskis, Richard. Guadalcanal Diary. New York: Random House,
1943.
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