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China during the Period of the Warring States.





From the fifth to the third centuries B.C.E., China was locked in a time of civil strife known as the Period of the Warring States. This map shows the Zhou dynasty capital at Luoyang, along with the major states that were squabbling for precedence in the region. The state of Qin would eventually suppress its rivals and form the first unified Chinese empire, with its capital at Xianyang (near modern Xian).

During the last two centuries of the Zhou dynasty (the fourth and third centuries B.C.E.), the authority of the king became increasingly nominal, and several of the small principalities into which the Zhou kingdom had been divided began to evolve into powerful states that presented a potential challenge to the Zhou ruler himself. Chief among these were Qu (Ch’u) in the central Yangtze valley, Wu in the Yangtze delta, and Yue (Yueh) along the south-eastern coast. At first, their mutual rivalries were in check, but by the late fifth century B.C.E., competition intensified into civil war, giving birth to the so-called Period of the Warring States. Powerful principalities vied with each other for preeminence and largely ignored the now purely titular authority of the Zhou court. New forms of warfare also emerged with the invention of iron weapons and the introduction of the foot soldier. Cavalry, too, made its first appearance, armed with the powerful crossbow.

Eventually, the relatively young state of Qin, located in the original homeland of the Zhou, became a key player in these conflicts. Benefiting from a strong defensive position in the mountains to the west of the great bend of the Yellow River, as well as from their control of the rich Sichuan plains, the Qin gradually subdued their main rivals through conquest or diplomatic maneuvering. In 221 B.C.E., the Qin ruler declared the establishment of a new dynasty, the first truly unified government in Chinese history.

The Art of War
With the possible exception of the nineteenth- century German military strategist Karl von Clausewitz, there is probably no more famous or respected writer on the art of war than the ancient Chinese thinker Sun Tzu. Yet surprisingly little is known about him. Recently discovered evidence suggests that he lived in the fifth century B.C.E., during the chronic conflict of the Period of Warring States, and that he was an early member of an illustrious family of military strategists who advised Zhou rulers for more than two hundred years. But despite the mystery surrounding his life, there is no doubt of his influence on later generations of military planners. Among his most avid followers in our day have been the revolutionary leaders Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, as well as the Japanese military strategists who planned the attacks on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor.

The following brief excerpt from his classic, The Art of War, provides a glimmer into the nature of his advice, still so timely today.

Selections from Sun Tzu
Sun Tzu said:
‘‘In general, the method for employing the military is this: . . . Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. . . .
‘‘Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
‘‘This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earthworks will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from attacking [fortified cities].
‘‘Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people’s armies without engaging in battle, captures other people’s fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys others people’s states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of ‘preservation.’ . . .
‘‘In general, the strategy of employing the military is this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. . . .
‘‘Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known:
‘‘One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.
‘‘One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious.
‘‘One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.
‘‘One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.
‘‘One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious.
‘‘These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory. . . .
‘‘Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.’’

The Allied Airmen WWII


Painting by Gil Cohen.


In World War II airplanes, crews, and the paratroopers and gliders that they transported proved of incalculable importance. In 1940 Great Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) saved the nation in its heroic resistance to German attacks on London, causing Churchill to remark, “Never have so many owed so much to so few.” In the dark days after Pearl Harbor, an attack on Tokyo, Japan, by a small force of American planes led by Gen. Jimmy Doolittle raised American morale. On D day in June 1944,Allied control of the skies may well have made the difference between the success and failure of the Normandy invasion.

In the European theater the Allied air forces operated both independently of and in cooperation with ground and sea forces. Independently they attacked the enemy’s communication and supply systems. They machine-gunned trains and bombed bridges, ports, and railroad tracks and yards. They bombed industrial targets supplying the German military in an effort to cut off such supplies as oil, roller bearings, and electrical power.

As the war dragged on they extended their attacks on factories to the areas around them where their workers lived; thereby, Allied leaders theorized, they would destroy working-class morale. Thus they justified bombing cities, a practice earlier forsworn by both the Allies and the Axis. This promise was first violated by Germany in repeated attacks on Warsaw, Poland, in 1939; Rotterdam in the Netherlands in 1940; and such British cities as London and the industrial city of Coventry in 1940. In fact in the ETO, bombing of cities proved not to be cost-effective, inflicting extremely heavy losses on the raiders and failing to destroy enemy morale; it also deprived the Allies of the high moral ground important to their own understanding of why they were fighting.

While the British bombed at night, the Americans conducted daylight raids. These were enabled by the accuracy of the Norden bombsight and the heavier armament that protected American bombers, theoretically allowing them to make their raids in daytime even before fighter escorts had the range to accompany them all the way to the targets. However, the American fliers took such heavy losses that these raids were called off in August 1943 until long-range escort fighters could be manufactured to protect the bombers. By the spring of 1944 these were ready, and raids resumed with considerably more effect. During the autumn, winter, and spring of 1944–45, between them the RAF and the U.S. Army Air Force, strengthened by the development of new fighters, paralyzed German economic life.

Besides these independent operations, Allied airmen cooperated with the other services. With naval forces they attacked enemy ships. For ground forces they mapped areas to reveal enemy presence and fortifications; acted as spotters to direct artillery fire; attacked communications centers and ammunition dumps; and responded to calls from the ground to destroy machine-gun nests. One infantryman after another has attested to the value of air support and protection.

Most airmen recognized their own good fortune in living comfortably at their bases while the infantry trudged and battled through fair weather and foul, often without the comfort of hot food, warm dry clothing, and bathing facilities. On the other hand, the terrible flak (antiaircraft ground fire, or ack-ack) along the European coasts and over the cities they bombed and the enemy fighters that attacked them on missions early in the war subjected them to levels of stress that could not be sustained indefinitely. Accordingly, a system was worked out to send those who flew in the bombers back to the United States after a certain number of missions, although the need for air personnel more than once raised the prescribed number, from 25 to 30 to 35 to 50.52 Thereafter they were assigned in North America on noncombat duty.

10. Panzer-Division – Early WWII




At the time of the Polish campaign, not being quite up to full strength, the division was placed in the reserve. Every single Panzer Division actually formed the spearhead of its own corps and army. 4. Armee, which later included 10. Panzer Division, attacked south of Danzig and advanced to the north of Warsaw. It played a decisive role in May-June 1940. Attached to XIX.A.K. (mot.) then to XIV. A.K. (mot.) with Gruppe von Kleist, it passed through Luxembourg and Belgium, crossing the Meuse at Wadelincourt and reaching the Channel coast. It remained in France until February 1941, when it was sent home to Germany.

Composition: 1939 (after the Polish campaign): 10. Schützen-Brigade (Schützen-Rgt. 69, Schützen-Rgt. 86), 4. Panzer-Brigade (Pz.Rgt. 7, Pz.Rgt. 8), Art.Rgt. (mot.) 90, Pz.Jag.Abt. 90, Pz.Pi.Btl. 49, Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 90, Pz.Nachr.Abt. 90, Div.Nachsch.Fhr. 90.

Commanders: Gen.Maj. Georg Gawantka (1.May.-14.July.1939), Gen.Lt. Ferdinand Schaal (July.1939-2.August.1941).

History: 10. Pz.Div. was raised in Prague on 1 April 1939. It was composed of men drawn from, among others, 20. and29. Inf.Div. (mot.). It then comprised the following units: Inf.Rgt. (mot.) 86, Pz.Rgt. 8, II./Art.Rgt. (mot.) 29, l/Aufkl. Rgt. 8, Pi.Btl. 49, Pz.Nachr.Abt. 90, Pz.Div.Nachsch.Fhr. 90.

The Stab of 10. Panzer Division had begun forming on 1 April 1939 in Prague, and was still forming in September when it was put at the head of a provisional formation that included, amongst others, Panzer Regiment 8 and Infanterie Regiment 86 (mot). At the end of the Polish campaign, it was sent back to Prague in late September, and on 11 October the division absorbed Panzer Regiment 7 (already part of Panzerverband Kempf, another provisional unit) and the Stab of Panzer Brigade 4 (both Panzer Regiments were organized according to the revised war establishments of 21 February 1940). On 1 November 1939 - three days after the creation of Schützen Brigade 10 II./ Infanterie Regiment 69 (mot) was attached to the division from the 20. Infanterie Division and, merged with III./IR 86 (which became I./IR 69), formed the new Infanterie Regiment 69. Both IR 69 and 86 were renamed as the Schützen Regiment on 1 April 1940, when Aufklarungs Abteilung 90 was formed as well from I./AufkHirungs Regiment 8, while two weeks later Pionier Bataillon 49 (formerly corps troops) eventually became part of the division. Other units had already been formed in late 1939: Artillerie Regiment 90 (formed on 28 October 1939 using II./AR 29, with schwere Artillerie Abteilung 105 attached from 9 January 1940, subsequently renamed III./AR 90 on 1 February 1941), Panzerjager Lehr Abteilung (formed as Panzer Abwehr Abteilung 90 on 18 November 1939, expanded to three companies and renamed Panzerjager Lehr Abteilung on 1 April 1940, only to revert to the old designation on 14 February 1941), Nachrichten Abteilung 90 (formed on 27 October 1939 from the Nachrichten Kompanie 90) and the divisional services (formed between the summer and autumn of 1939). In May 1940 the division had the Luftwaffe Flak Abteilung 71 and the 1.(H)/Staffel 71 attached.

Mediterranean Ships




Ships were integral to the Crusades. Most Crusaders gathered on the coast of southern France and embarked at Marseilles. Since their warfare was dependent on horses and they could not easily buy or train them on the other side of the journey, they had to get ships with stables built below the deck. Travel was uncomfortable; knights traveled with retinues of servants and squires, and the ship was too crowded to afford sleeping quarters for all of them. Although this 15th-century painting imagines the voyages in a cheerful way, the actual conditions must have been squalid. Horses needed some rest periods on islands in order to regain their health.

The Romans had used two basic kinds of ship. Galleys were their warships, and they used cargo ships known as round ships. During the Middle Ages, both types were adopted and improved on century by century. Early Byzantine dominance was challenged by new Muslim navies in the seventh century. Although the Arabs had been sailing the Indian Ocean in Indian-style ships, their Mediterranean fleets were in the same style as the Roman and Byzantine ships, since they bought surplus ships and hired local crews.

Roman warships were galleys that moved by means of both sail power and the muscle power of dozens of men at the oars. The basic Roman galley had been developed into larger versions—the bireme and the trireme— that used two or three levels of oarsmen, with several men on each oar. An even-larger galley had used five levels of oarsmen. Throughout the Middle Ages and even into the 18th century, Mediterranean warships continued to be galleys, most of them using both oars and sails.

One important development formed the principal warship of the Byzantine Empire—a dromon. There were three variations of the dromon. The smallest, the ousiakon, carried a company of 100 men (an ousia ). It was a two-banked galley. The men on the lower bank only rowed; the men on the upper bank rowed but were also the fighters in battles with other ships. The pamphylos was a little larger; it carried a crew of more nearly 150. The true dromon carried a crew of about 200, with 150 oarsmen on two banks of oars and 50 marines (fighting men). These larger dromons had a raised tower near the mast, where the marines could stand to shoot arrows or throw spears or other projectiles. Most dromons also carried either a powerful catapult, which could throw a 20- or 25-pound object more than 250 feet, or a pressurized siphon flamethrower that propelled liquid Greek fire onto the enemy ship’s deck. Greek fire was an incendiary substance that continued to burn even when it hit water.

Venice created its own version of the dromon while it was under Byzantine rule. It was called the galeagrossa, and it was put to both commercial and military use. In the Mediterranean, the two purposes ran together. Merchant ships needed defense, and navies had to carry cargo. Sailors learned to fight. Venice’s Arsenal built galleys that eventually challenged the cogs’ dominance in bringing Flanders wool to the Mediterranean.

Mediterranean ships, beginning with Greek fishing boats and including the massive dromon, developed a new type of sail during the Byzantine era. Roman sails had been square, but square sails moved a ship only in the direction the wind was blowing; adjustments allowed some variation but not much. Lateen sails were triangular, not square. They were hung from a yard (crossbar) that was fixed partway up the mast at a slant. A long, narrow triangle of sailcloth hung down almost to the deck. This shape creates a baggy lower part of the sail that traps the wind and funnels it up to the narrow top, creating a substantial amount of lift when a ship is sailing with the wind. It could be angled to let a ship steer a course that was not directly with the wind or almost against the wind. By the ninth century, the ships of the Mediterranean were generally lateen rigged and capable of working their way windward. The triangular sails were huge, and the yards they were fastened to were made of large tree trunks. The square sail eventually made a comeback around the 1300s, partly because of the amount of manpower needed to swing lateen rigging around. The square sail caught more wind and enabled the ship to move faster. 



Mediterranean ships were not only different in having galleys of oars and lateen sails; they were constructed in a completely different manner from Baltic and North Atlantic ships. Viking ships and the cogs of northern waters were clinker-built: outer shell first, with overlapped strakes, and then construction of the inner framework. The method of construction in southern waters was just the opposite. They built the framework first, with beams and ribs, and then covered the framework with planking. Boats built this way are called carvel-built. Three medieval shipwrecks show advances in construction methods over several centuries.

A carvel-built hull from the seventh century found in the eastern Mediterranean, off the coast of Turkey, shows the basic construction method. The builders laid the keel first, then added high, curved endposts. They fastened planks alongside the keel, joined by mortise and tenon and pinned by trenails (wooden pegs that swell when wet to tighten the construction). They added planking up to the waterline, nailed to a framework, and set crossbeams from side to side to bind the hull together. These crossbeams protruded through the hull. At the stern, the crossbeams were a good place to hang a steering rudder on each side of the hull. In the middle of the ship, crossbeams helped support the mast. This particular ship was about 67 feet long and could carry more than 65 tons of cargo. When it sank, it was carrying 900 containers (amphorae) of wine. It also carried 11 anchors.

Another wreck along Turkey was dated by coins to the 11th century. The cargo was mostly glassware, and this ship also carried a large number of anchors. The carvel construction was more advanced by the 11th century. The framework was laid out, then curved timber ribs were added and planking was nailed on with iron spikes. The alternating of the scarphed joints contributed to the strength of the hull, as there was no continuous line of joints across the ship. A third wreck from the estuary of the Po River was dated to about 1300 and was 65 feet long. A new method made the ship strong enough to hold two masts. They used frames attached to floors that crossed the keel and were then secured to a timber bolted to the keel for extra strength.

In the years after 1000, the role of the ship changed dramatically. Commerce was increasing, merchants were becoming wealthy, and ships were increased in size to hold more cargo. After Crusaders set up a Christian kingdom in Jerusalem, there was a great surge of Christian pilgrims wanting to visit Jerusalem. All these factors created demand for larger ships.

The Crusades spurred a great deal of shipbuilding to transport knights and horses from Marseille or Venice to the Holy Land. At first, Crusaders rented any ships they could find, but by the Third Crusade of the 13th century, more were required. King Louis IX of France contracted with merchants in Genoa, Venice, and Marseille to provide custom-built ships for his two Crusades, in 1248 to 1254. These were substantial vessels, several with three decks. The horses were led into the ship through a door that was then caulked shut to keep water out when the ship went out to sea.

In the 15th century, the Baltic and Mediterranean traditions began to mix. The Hanseatic League had extended its reach into ports in the Mediterranean, and Venetian galleys were trading directly in Flanders. One early hybrid was the buss, a wide, carvel-built cargo fishing ship built in the Netherlands. Using the buss, Dutch sailors could stay out at sea longer. The buss sailed with the fishing boat; it was a floating fish-processing plant. The pair of vessels could stay out for several weeks and return with its catch salted while fresh.

The ultimate round ship of the late Middle Ages was the three-masted, full-rigged, ocean-going carrack. The carrack’s precursor was the cog, the clinker-built cargo carrier of the Hanseatic League. In Mediterranean shipyards, the cog had been modified and refined; it was no longer clinkerbuilt but was now carvel-built. Its sails also blended the best of north and south.

The carrack was large and heavy. Huge ribs formed the hull and supported multiple decks, a high sterncastle, and an even higher (though smaller) forecastle. The ship’s tiller passed through a port to move the sternpost rudder. The edge-to-edge planking of the ship was caulked with oakum and tar or pitch to help keep seawater out. For the same reason, the ship was constructed with few hatches and no companionway (a stairway leading from the deck to the cabins below). Its three masts were the main mast and foremast, both square rigged, and the lateen-rigged mizzenmast, which rose from the sterncastle. Later versions of the carrack included another small sail—the spritsail on the bowsprit. Improvement in managing the ropes made the huge sails easier to handle, and multiple sails gave versatility to managing the course of the ship.

A large merchant carrack could carry 1,000 tons of cargo in its hold as it moved around the whole length of the Mediterranean and to and from the Baltic. Its great size made it an expensive ship, and it was expensive too in that it required a large crew. There were smaller carracks, too, such as the 100-ton Santa Maria, the ship that carried Christopher Columbus to the islands of Central America.

Columbus’s other ships, the Niña and the Pinta, were caravels, not carracks. The caravel was a fast sailing ship developed in Portugal around 1440. It carried two or three masts, with either lateen sails or a mixture of square and lateen. The caravel had excellent sailing characteristics and did not need the large crew that was necessary on a carrack. It could move at a relatively fast pace; records show that on the return trip from America in 1493, the Niña and Pinta had at least one day when they covered nearly 200 miles of ocean. Caravels were generally the ships of choice for the voyages of exploration that marked the end of the 15th century and continued into the 16th century.