China during the Period of the Warring States.
Posted by Mitch Williamson in China on Monday, November 7, 2011
From the fifth to the third centuries B.C.E., China was locked in a
time of civil strife known as the Period of the Warring States. This map shows
the Zhou dynasty capital at Luoyang, along with the major states that were
squabbling for precedence in the region. The state of Qin would eventually
suppress its rivals and form the first unified Chinese empire, with its capital
at Xianyang (near modern Xian).
During the last two centuries of the Zhou dynasty (the
fourth and third centuries B.C.E.), the authority of the king became
increasingly nominal, and several of the small principalities into which the
Zhou kingdom had been divided began to evolve into powerful states that
presented a potential challenge to the Zhou ruler himself. Chief among these
were Qu (Ch’u) in the central Yangtze valley, Wu in the Yangtze delta, and Yue
(Yueh) along the south-eastern coast. At first, their mutual rivalries were in
check, but by the late fifth century B.C.E., competition intensified into civil
war, giving birth to the so-called Period of the Warring States. Powerful
principalities vied with each other for preeminence and largely ignored the now
purely titular authority of the Zhou court. New forms of warfare also emerged
with the invention of iron weapons and the introduction of the foot soldier.
Cavalry, too, made its first appearance, armed with the powerful crossbow.
Eventually, the relatively young state of Qin, located in
the original homeland of the Zhou, became a key player in these conflicts.
Benefiting from a strong defensive position in the mountains to the west of the
great bend of the Yellow River, as well as from their control of the rich
Sichuan plains, the Qin gradually subdued their main rivals through conquest or
diplomatic maneuvering. In 221 B.C.E., the Qin ruler declared the establishment
of a new dynasty, the first truly unified government in Chinese history.
The Art of War
With the possible exception of the nineteenth- century
German military strategist Karl von Clausewitz, there is probably no more
famous or respected writer on the art of war than the ancient Chinese thinker
Sun Tzu. Yet surprisingly little is known about him. Recently discovered
evidence suggests that he lived in the fifth century B.C.E., during the chronic
conflict of the Period of Warring States, and that he was an early member of an
illustrious family of military strategists who advised Zhou rulers for more
than two hundred years. But despite the mystery surrounding his life, there is
no doubt of his influence on later generations of military planners. Among his
most avid followers in our day have been the revolutionary leaders Mao Zedong
and Ho Chi Minh, as well as the Japanese military strategists who planned the
attacks on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor.
The following brief excerpt from his classic, The Art of
War, provides a glimmer into the nature of his advice, still so timely today.
Selections from Sun
Tzu
Sun Tzu said:
‘‘In general, the method for employing the military is this:
. . . Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the
pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the
true pinnacle of excellence. . . .
‘‘Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the
enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army;
and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
‘‘This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only
when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault
wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building
earthworks will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot
overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm
over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops,
and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from
attacking [fortified cities].
‘‘Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates
other people’s armies without engaging in battle, captures other people’s
fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys others people’s states
without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim
of ‘preservation.’ . . .
‘‘In general, the strategy of employing the military is
this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack
them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the
enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you
can avoid him. . . .
‘‘Thus there are five factors from which victory can be
known:
‘‘One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight,
will be victorious.
‘‘One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers
will be victorious.
‘‘One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will
be victorious.
‘‘One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be
victorious.
‘‘One whose general is capable and not interfered with by
the ruler will be victorious.
‘‘These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory. . . .
‘‘Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows
himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know
the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with
defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated
in every engagement.’’
The Allied Airmen WWII
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Air Warfare
Painting by Gil Cohen.
In World War II airplanes, crews, and the paratroopers and
gliders that they transported proved of incalculable importance. In 1940 Great
Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) saved the nation in its heroic resistance to
German attacks on London, causing Churchill to remark, “Never have so many owed
so much to so few.” In the dark days after Pearl Harbor, an attack on Tokyo,
Japan, by a small force of American planes led by Gen. Jimmy Doolittle raised
American morale. On D day in June 1944,Allied control of the skies may well
have made the difference between the success and failure of the Normandy
invasion.
In the European theater the Allied air forces operated both independently
of and in cooperation with ground and sea forces. Independently they attacked
the enemy’s communication and supply systems. They machine-gunned trains and
bombed bridges, ports, and railroad tracks and yards. They bombed industrial
targets supplying the German military in an effort to cut off such supplies as
oil, roller bearings, and electrical power.
As the war dragged on they extended their attacks on
factories to the areas around them where their workers lived; thereby, Allied
leaders theorized, they would destroy working-class morale. Thus they justified
bombing cities, a practice earlier forsworn by both the Allies and the Axis.
This promise was first violated by Germany in repeated attacks on Warsaw,
Poland, in 1939; Rotterdam in the Netherlands in 1940; and such British cities
as London and the industrial city of Coventry in 1940. In fact in the ETO,
bombing of cities proved not to be cost-effective, inflicting extremely heavy
losses on the raiders and failing to destroy enemy morale; it also deprived the
Allies of the high moral ground important to their own understanding of why
they were fighting.
While the British bombed at night, the Americans conducted
daylight raids. These were enabled by the accuracy of the Norden bombsight and
the heavier armament that protected American bombers, theoretically allowing
them to make their raids in daytime even before fighter escorts had the range
to accompany them all the way to the targets. However, the American fliers took
such heavy losses that these raids were called off in August 1943 until
long-range escort fighters could be manufactured to protect the bombers. By the
spring of 1944 these were ready, and raids resumed with considerably more
effect. During the autumn, winter, and spring of 1944–45, between them the RAF
and the U.S. Army Air Force, strengthened by the development of new fighters, paralyzed
German economic life.
Besides these independent operations, Allied airmen
cooperated with the other services. With naval forces they attacked enemy
ships. For ground forces they mapped areas to reveal enemy presence and
fortifications; acted as spotters to direct artillery fire; attacked
communications centers and ammunition dumps; and responded to calls from the
ground to destroy machine-gun nests. One infantryman after another has attested
to the value of air support and protection.
Most airmen recognized their own good fortune in living
comfortably at their bases while the infantry trudged and battled through fair
weather and foul, often without the comfort of hot food, warm dry clothing, and
bathing facilities. On the other hand, the terrible flak (antiaircraft ground
fire, or ack-ack) along the European coasts and over the cities they bombed and
the enemy fighters that attacked them on missions early in the war subjected
them to levels of stress that could not be sustained indefinitely. Accordingly,
a system was worked out to send those who flew in the bombers back to the
United States after a certain number of missions, although the need for air
personnel more than once raised the prescribed number, from 25 to 30 to 35 to
50.52 Thereafter they were assigned in North America on noncombat duty.
10. Panzer-Division – Early WWII
Posted by Mitch Williamson in German on Sunday, November 6, 2011
At the time of the Polish campaign, not being quite up to full
strength, the division was placed in the reserve. Every single Panzer Division
actually formed the spearhead of its own corps and army. 4. Armee, which later
included 10. Panzer Division, attacked south of Danzig and advanced to the
north of Warsaw. It played a decisive role in May-June 1940. Attached to
XIX.A.K. (mot.) then to XIV. A.K. (mot.) with Gruppe von Kleist, it passed
through Luxembourg and Belgium, crossing the Meuse at Wadelincourt and reaching
the Channel coast. It remained in France until February 1941, when it was sent
home to Germany.
Composition: 1939
(after the Polish campaign): 10. Schützen-Brigade (Schützen-Rgt. 69,
Schützen-Rgt. 86), 4. Panzer-Brigade (Pz.Rgt. 7, Pz.Rgt. 8), Art.Rgt. (mot.)
90, Pz.Jag.Abt. 90, Pz.Pi.Btl. 49, Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 90, Pz.Nachr.Abt. 90,
Div.Nachsch.Fhr. 90.
Commanders:
Gen.Maj. Georg Gawantka (1.May.-14.July.1939), Gen.Lt. Ferdinand Schaal
(July.1939-2.August.1941).
History: 10.
Pz.Div. was raised in Prague on 1 April 1939. It was composed of men drawn
from, among others, 20. and29. Inf.Div. (mot.). It then comprised the following
units: Inf.Rgt. (mot.) 86, Pz.Rgt. 8, II./Art.Rgt. (mot.) 29, l/Aufkl. Rgt. 8,
Pi.Btl. 49, Pz.Nachr.Abt. 90, Pz.Div.Nachsch.Fhr. 90.
The Stab of 10. Panzer Division had begun forming on 1 April
1939 in Prague, and was still forming in September when it was put at the head
of a provisional formation that included, amongst others, Panzer Regiment 8 and
Infanterie Regiment 86 (mot). At the end of the Polish campaign, it was sent
back to Prague in late September, and on 11 October the division absorbed Panzer
Regiment 7 (already part of Panzerverband Kempf, another provisional unit) and
the Stab of Panzer Brigade 4 (both Panzer Regiments were organized according to
the revised war establishments of 21 February 1940). On 1 November 1939 - three
days after the creation of Schützen Brigade 10 II./ Infanterie
Regiment 69 (mot) was attached to the division from the 20. Infanterie Division
and, merged with III./IR 86 (which became I./IR 69), formed the new Infanterie
Regiment 69. Both IR 69 and 86 were renamed as the Schützen Regiment on 1 April 1940,
when Aufklarungs Abteilung 90 was formed as well from I./AufkHirungs Regiment
8, while two weeks later Pionier Bataillon 49 (formerly corps troops)
eventually became part of the division. Other units had already been formed in
late 1939: Artillerie Regiment 90 (formed on 28 October 1939 using II./AR 29,
with schwere Artillerie Abteilung 105 attached from 9 January 1940,
subsequently renamed III./AR 90 on 1 February 1941), Panzerjager Lehr Abteilung
(formed as Panzer Abwehr Abteilung 90 on 18 November 1939, expanded to three
companies and renamed Panzerjager Lehr Abteilung on 1 April 1940, only to
revert to the old designation on 14 February 1941), Nachrichten Abteilung 90
(formed on 27 October 1939 from the Nachrichten Kompanie 90) and the divisional
services (formed between the summer and autumn of 1939). In May 1940 the
division had the Luftwaffe Flak Abteilung 71 and the 1.(H)/Staffel 71 attached.
Mediterranean Ships
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Naval on Saturday, November 5, 2011
Ships were integral to
the Crusades. Most Crusaders gathered on the coast of southern France and
embarked at Marseilles. Since their warfare was dependent on horses and they
could not easily buy or train them on the other side of the journey, they had
to get ships with stables built below the deck. Travel was uncomfortable;
knights traveled with retinues of servants and squires, and the ship was too
crowded to afford sleeping quarters for all of them. Although this 15th-century
painting imagines the voyages in a cheerful way, the actual conditions must
have been squalid. Horses needed some rest periods on islands in order to
regain their health.
The Romans had used two basic kinds of ship. Galleys were
their warships, and they used cargo ships known as round ships. During the
Middle Ages, both types were adopted and improved on century by century. Early
Byzantine dominance was challenged by new Muslim navies in the seventh century.
Although the Arabs had been sailing the Indian Ocean in Indian-style ships,
their Mediterranean fleets were in the same style as the Roman and Byzantine
ships, since they bought surplus ships and hired local crews.
Roman warships were galleys that moved by means of both sail
power and the muscle power of dozens of men at the oars. The basic Roman galley
had been developed into larger versions—the bireme and the trireme— that used
two or three levels of oarsmen, with several men on each oar. An even-larger
galley had used five levels of oarsmen. Throughout the Middle Ages and even
into the 18th century, Mediterranean warships continued to be galleys, most of
them using both oars and sails.
One important development formed the principal warship of
the Byzantine Empire—a dromon. There were three variations of the dromon. The
smallest, the ousiakon, carried a company of 100 men (an ousia ). It was a
two-banked galley. The men on the lower bank only rowed; the men on the upper bank
rowed but were also the fighters in battles with other ships. The pamphylos was
a little larger; it carried a crew of more nearly 150. The true dromon carried
a crew of about 200, with 150 oarsmen on two banks of oars and 50 marines (fighting
men). These larger dromons had a raised tower near the mast, where the marines
could stand to shoot arrows or throw spears or other projectiles. Most dromons
also carried either a powerful catapult, which could throw a 20- or 25-pound
object more than 250 feet, or a pressurized siphon flamethrower that propelled
liquid Greek fire onto the enemy ship’s deck. Greek fire was an incendiary
substance that continued to burn even when it hit water.
Venice created its own version of the dromon while it was
under Byzantine rule. It was called the galeagrossa, and it was put to both
commercial and military use. In the Mediterranean, the two purposes ran
together. Merchant ships needed defense, and navies had to carry cargo. Sailors
learned to fight. Venice’s Arsenal built galleys that eventually challenged the
cogs’ dominance in bringing Flanders wool to the Mediterranean.
Mediterranean ships, beginning with Greek fishing boats and
including the massive dromon, developed a new type of sail during the Byzantine
era. Roman sails had been square, but square sails moved a ship only in the
direction the wind was blowing; adjustments allowed some variation but not
much. Lateen sails were triangular, not square. They were hung from a yard
(crossbar) that was fixed partway up the mast at a slant. A long, narrow
triangle of sailcloth hung down almost to the deck. This shape creates a baggy
lower part of the sail that traps the wind and funnels it up to the narrow top,
creating a substantial amount of lift when a ship is sailing with the wind. It
could be angled to let a ship steer a course that was not directly with the
wind or almost against the wind. By the ninth century, the ships of the
Mediterranean were generally lateen rigged and capable of working their way
windward. The triangular sails were huge, and the yards they were fastened to
were made of large tree trunks. The square sail eventually made a comeback
around the 1300s, partly because of the amount of manpower needed to swing
lateen rigging around. The square sail caught more wind and enabled the ship to
move faster.
Mediterranean ships were not only different in having galleys
of oars and lateen sails; they were constructed in a completely different
manner from Baltic and North Atlantic ships. Viking ships and the cogs of
northern waters were clinker-built: outer shell first, with overlapped strakes,
and then construction of the inner framework. The method of construction in
southern waters was just the opposite. They built the framework first, with
beams and ribs, and then covered the framework with planking. Boats built this
way are called carvel-built. Three medieval shipwrecks show advances in
construction methods over several centuries.
A carvel-built hull from the seventh century found in the
eastern Mediterranean, off the coast of Turkey, shows the basic construction
method. The builders laid the keel first, then added high, curved endposts.
They fastened planks alongside the keel, joined by mortise and tenon and pinned
by trenails (wooden pegs that swell when wet to tighten the construction). They
added planking up to the waterline, nailed to a framework, and set crossbeams
from side to side to bind the hull together. These crossbeams protruded through
the hull. At the stern, the crossbeams were a good place to hang a steering
rudder on each side of the hull. In the middle of the ship, crossbeams helped
support the mast. This particular ship was about 67 feet long and could carry
more than 65 tons of cargo. When it sank, it was carrying 900 containers
(amphorae) of wine. It also carried 11 anchors.
Another wreck along Turkey was dated by coins to the 11th
century. The cargo was mostly glassware, and this ship also carried a large
number of anchors. The carvel construction was more advanced by the 11th
century. The framework was laid out, then curved timber ribs were added and
planking was nailed on with iron spikes. The alternating of the scarphed joints
contributed to the strength of the hull, as there was no continuous line of
joints across the ship. A third wreck from the estuary of the Po River was
dated to about 1300 and was 65 feet long. A new method made the ship strong
enough to hold two masts. They used frames attached to floors that crossed the
keel and were then secured to a timber bolted to the keel for extra strength.
In the years after 1000, the role of the ship changed
dramatically. Commerce was increasing, merchants were becoming wealthy, and
ships were increased in size to hold more cargo. After Crusaders set up a
Christian kingdom in Jerusalem, there was a great surge of Christian pilgrims
wanting to visit Jerusalem. All these factors created demand for larger ships.
The Crusades spurred a great deal of shipbuilding to
transport knights and horses from Marseille or Venice to the Holy Land. At first,
Crusaders rented any ships they could find, but by the Third Crusade of the
13th century, more were required. King Louis IX of France contracted with
merchants in Genoa, Venice, and Marseille to provide custom-built ships for his
two Crusades, in 1248 to 1254. These were substantial vessels, several with
three decks. The horses were led into the ship through a door that was then
caulked shut to keep water out when the ship went out to sea.
In the 15th century, the Baltic and Mediterranean traditions
began to mix. The Hanseatic League had extended its reach into ports in the
Mediterranean, and Venetian galleys were trading directly in Flanders. One
early hybrid was the buss, a wide, carvel-built cargo fishing ship built in the
Netherlands. Using the buss, Dutch sailors could stay out at sea longer. The
buss sailed with the fishing boat; it was a floating fish-processing plant. The
pair of vessels could stay out for several weeks and return with its catch
salted while fresh.
The ultimate round ship of the late Middle Ages was the
three-masted, full-rigged, ocean-going carrack. The carrack’s precursor was the
cog, the clinker-built cargo carrier of the Hanseatic League. In Mediterranean
shipyards, the cog had been modified and refined; it was no longer clinkerbuilt
but was now carvel-built. Its sails also blended the best of north and south.
The carrack was large and heavy. Huge ribs formed the hull
and supported multiple decks, a high sterncastle, and an even higher (though
smaller) forecastle. The ship’s tiller passed through a port to move the
sternpost rudder. The edge-to-edge planking of the ship was caulked with oakum
and tar or pitch to help keep seawater out. For the same reason, the ship was
constructed with few hatches and no companionway (a stairway leading from the
deck to the cabins below). Its three masts were the main mast and foremast,
both square rigged, and the lateen-rigged mizzenmast, which rose from the
sterncastle. Later versions of the carrack included another small sail—the
spritsail on the bowsprit. Improvement in managing the ropes made the huge
sails easier to handle, and multiple sails gave versatility to managing the
course of the ship.
A large merchant carrack could carry 1,000 tons of cargo in
its hold as it moved around the whole length of the Mediterranean and to and
from the Baltic. Its great size made it an expensive ship, and it was expensive
too in that it required a large crew. There were smaller carracks, too, such as
the 100-ton Santa Maria, the ship that carried Christopher Columbus to the
islands of Central America.
Columbus’s other ships, the Niña and the Pinta, were
caravels, not carracks. The caravel was a fast sailing ship developed in
Portugal around 1440. It carried two or three masts, with either lateen sails
or a mixture of square and lateen. The caravel had excellent sailing
characteristics and did not need the large crew that was necessary on a
carrack. It could move at a relatively fast pace; records show that on the
return trip from America in 1493, the Niña and Pinta had at least one day when
they covered nearly 200 miles of ocean. Caravels were generally the ships of
choice for the voyages of exploration that marked the end of the 15th century
and continued into the 16th century.






