War and Game

The Ottoman army of the Tanzimat period was, against all pessimistic observations and analysis, obviously superior to its predecessors in all aspects (except for the cavalry corps), but it was still in the midst of rapid modernization and reorganization. Some corps and units modernized relatively well, whereas others remained more or less the same. The new military regulations in effect following the famous Tanzimat imperial edict played an important role in improving the conditions of the rank and file, remedying some of the widespread abuses and restructuring the Ottoman military. Starting with the Rýza Pasha Reforms of 1843, the chaotic mass of units organized under five field army commands, excluding the African provinces, were named after areas they were based in—Hassa, Dersaadet (Istanbul), Anadolu (Anatolia), Rumeli (Rumelia), and Arabistan (Arabia but actually Syria only)—and drew soldiers from their respective provinces. The number of field armies was increased to six with the addition of the Army of Baghdad and the Second Army was relocated and renamed as Army of Şumnu in 1848. The others renamed according to the city location of their command posts, but still their old names were used interchangeably with the new ones: Hassa, Manastýr (Bitola)-Rumeli, Erzurum- Anadolu, and Şam (Damascus)-Arabistan.

With the establishment of field armies and changes in the recruitment system, the regular part of the army was renamed the Asakir-i Nizamiye-i Şahane (literally imperial regular soldiers or commonly known as Nizam troops), and the reserve component was renamed as the Asakir-i Redif-i Şahane (imperial reserve soldiers), which retained the moniker Redif. To support the dual Nizam-Redif architecture, a new conscription system was formulated with the enactment of the Kura Nizamnamesi in 1846. According to this new law, the eligible male population of the provinces would assemble in front of an official council, would undergomedical and physical check-ups, and would be divided by lot. The unlucky citizens would be inducted into Nizam units, whereas the lucky ones would be classified as Redif and continue to take part in annual lots until passing the age of 26. The Nizam soldiers were obligated for a five-year duration of active service, to be followed by seven years in the reserve. So, in theory, Redif units consisted of experienced veteran Nizam soldiers and inexperienced and partially trained men.

The field army commanders had both Nizam and Redif units under their commands, thereby abolishing the previous parallel but separate command structure. According to the logic of the new regulations, the Nizam troops could be deployed to any part of the empire depending on the circumstances, whereas the Redifs were allocated for duties in and around their home provinces. However, the Crimean War would show the fallacy of this optimistic thinking, during which the available Redif units of Rumelia were sent to the Caucasus to alleviate the hemorrhage of combat losses.

The magnificent façade of newly constructed barracks barely disguised the infancy of and lack of an effective command and control structure of the field armies. At all of the army headquarters, administrative and logistics elements were missing and existed on paper only. Trained officers remained, especially at the level of senior commanders and staff officers, a rarity, even after the arrival of several hundred Hungarian and Polish refugee officers and later a small number of British military advisors. Not surprisingly, the administration and high command paid limited attention to following a standardized field army structure and both the Danubean and the Caucasian fronts during the Crimean War were organized around specific commanding generals and the geographic alignment of fortresses.

The new regulations of the Tanzimat period clearly improved the conditions of the Ottoman soldiers, but at the same time, like the façades of the new barracks, camouflaged most of the major problems and shortcomings. Many peasant soldiers were absolutely alien to basics of military life like discipline, timetables, and personal hygiene. The administration had difficulty assigning officers to the Nizam units and had almost no trained officers left to man the Redif units. Similarly, the training of Redifs remained anarchic and haphazard in some provinces or, worse, amounted to nothing at all in others.

The provincial nature of conscription also affected the combat value of the respective units. Thanks to constant warfare and rebellions, Rumelian and western Anatolian units, which were also lucky to have most of the trained and experienced officers, were battle-hardened. This was not so for the Syrian and Iraqi units in which most of their officers and soldiers had no military experience whatsoever. Moreover, Turkish-speaking officers there had difficulty communicating with their Arabic-speaking soldiers in addition to experiencing cultural problems.

Overall, the Ottoman army had a nominal combat strength of 480,000, including volunteers and units from African provinces of Egypt, Libya (Trablusgarb), and Tunis. The 123,000 Nizamiye (regular) soldiers were well trained, especially the artillery corps, and more or less properly equipped. They were superior to the Russians in several respects; for example, more than 12 elite battalions (Şişhaneci) were armed with Minié rifles (the Russians had none and were unready for their deadly effects).

However, the effectiveness of Redif soldiers and the Başibozuks remained problematic, and their combat value was very limited even under ideal conditions. In the confusion of war, the misidentification of these forces was the reason why western military observers encountered difficulty in describing the complicated and often conflicting combat performance of regulars and others in the Army of the Danube and the Army of the Caucasus.

Tang Taizong (T’ang T’ai-tsung), meaning “Grand Ancestor of the Tang,” is the title of the second ruler and real founder of the Tang (T’ang) dynasty in China (618–909). Born Li Shimin (Li Shih-min), he was the second son of Li Yuan, the duke of Tang, who was an important governor under the Sui dynasty. Taizong’s achievements and the policies that he laid down would make the dynasty the most powerful, successful, and prosperous since the Han dynasty. The Li family was descended from Li Guangli (Li Kuang-li), a famous general under Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty. As most aristocratic families in northern China, it had intermarried with nomads who had settled in the region; Taizong’s mother, the empress Dou (Tou), came from a powerful Turkic clan.

In 617 the Sui dynasty was collapsing and revolts were widespread. Eighteen-year-old Li Shimin maneuvered his father to revolt and played a leading part in defeating numerous other contenders to establish him on the throne of the new Tang dynasty in 618. Li Yuan is known in history as Tang Gaozu (T’ang Kao-tsu), meaning “High Ancestor of the Tang.” As second son, Shimin was the object of jealousy of his older brother, the crown prince, who planned to murder him. In a final showdown in 624 the crown prince was killed, Shimin became crown prince and de facto ruler, and two years later Gaozu retired and Shimin ascended the throne.

Brilliant and precocious, he had by his late teens mastered the Confucian Classics and literature, had gained experience in administration and martial skills, and had led men into battle. A dashing and fearless leader who placed himself at the forefront of cavalry charges and who excelled in hand-to-hand combat, he boasted that he had personally killed over 1,000 enemies before taking the throne. Taizong was immediately confronted with a crisis along the northern frontier. Taking advantage of China’s internal chaos the Eastern Turks had launched massive annual expeditions along the borders beginning in 623, to plunder and also to instigate revolts against the new dynasty. The one in 626 reached within a few miles of the capital Chang’an (Ch’ang-an). Only three weeks on the throne Taizong, who was a man of imperial and intimidating bearing, led his men to confront the enemy and secured their retreat with a combination of bravado and bribes. His long-term response was to train and bolster his army, which allowed him to launch a massive six-pronged offensive with 720 miles separating the easternmost and westernmost columns in 629.

A combination of superior Tang tactics and internal disaffection among the Turkic tribes resulted in a one-sided Tang victory at the battle at Iron Mountain in which some 10,000 nomads were killed and more than 100,000 surrendered. This campaign ended the Eastern Turkish Khanate and established Chinese dominion over the Mongolian steppes. Taizong was acknowledged “Heavenly Khan” by the Turks, the first Chinese ruler to hold that title. The surrendered Turks were treated with kindness; many were settled along the Ordos region of the Yellow River and other borderland areas. Thousands of others settled in Chang’an and served the dynasty. Peace would reign in the northern borders for 100 years.

Other campaigns broke the power of the Western Turks; established Chinese power throughout Chinese Turkistan, across the Pamirs into Afghanistan to the border of Persia; and also brought Tibet under Chinese suzerainty. The marriage of a Tang princess to the Tibetan ruler, the first of several throughout the dynasty, would bring Chinese culture to that land. In 648 a Chinese force, with Tibetan assistance, crossed into India and brought an Indian rebel who had assassinated King Harsha Vardhana of India (Taizong and Harsha had diplomatic exchanges thanks to the Chinese Buddhist monk Xuanzang’s [Hsuan-tsang’s] journey to India) to Chang’an for punishment. Taizong also sent two expeditions to Korea in the 640s but failed to bring the king of Koguryo to heel. Taizong rode six horses to battle. Relief carvings of all six, with accompanying inscriptions detailing their names and deeds, decorate the entrance to his mausoleum.

Taizong was a rationalist and believed that men, not heaven, determined the course of history. He was conscientious and hardworking, was concerned with the welfare of the people, and respected the opinion and sought the criticism of his advisers. He surrounded himself with able ministers. Wei Cheng was the most fearless of his critics, yet never suffered from his blunt rebukes of the emperor. Taizong called Wei his mirror for showing up all his blemishes and mourned Wei’s death as a great loss to good government. Because the basic institutions of the Tang were already in place when he ascended the throne, Taizong’s task was to consolidate, rationalize, and improve where necessary.
He halted the growth of the bureaucracy, redrew the empire’s administrative units, and continued the codification of the laws but lightened many punishments. His economic policies led to recovery and prosperity after the wars that marked the end of the Sui dynasty and led to surpluses that financed his military expansion. He established a network of granaries that provided against natural disasters and stabilized the prices. He also extended and improved the militia system begun by his father.

Taizong’s last years were marred by poor health; the death of his wife, the Empress Zhangsun (Chang-sun), who had been his wise and able adviser; the demotion of his heir for plotting against him; and rivalry among his other sons for the succession. He finally settled on a younger son by the empress, who would be known as Emperor Gaozong (Kao-tsung). But in death his reputation would grow and he would be acknowledged one of the greatest rulers of all Chinese history. His reign came to represent exemplary civil government, unrivaled military might, and unmatched cultural brilliance.

Further reading: Adshead, S. A. M. T’ang China, the Rise of the East in World History. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004; Graff, David A. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900. London: Routledge, 2002; Wechsler, Howard J. Mirror to the Son Of Heaven: Wei Cheng at the Court of T’ang T’aitsung. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974.

Admiral Graf Spee (German Navy, Pocket Battleship, 1936)
German pocket battleship in World War II. Commissioned on 6 January 1936, Admiral Graf Spee constituted one of the three capital ships of the Deutschland-class. Constructed under post–World War I restrictions, Admiral Graf Spee had unique characteristics. She was designed to be “stronger than anything faster and faster than anything stronger.” She soon acquired the name “pocket battleship” because of her relatively small maximum displacement of 16,200 tons. She had a crew of 1,124 men. Notwithstanding limitations in size, her eight 9-cylinder diesel engines could drive her at 26 knots. She mounted 6 × 11-inch main guns in two turrets, 8 × 5.9-inch guns, antiaircraft batteries, and torpedo tubes.

In September 1939 Admiral Graf Spee prowled the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean sea lanes, having been deployed prior to the war’s beginning. Her mission was to disrupt British shipping and divert units of the Royal Navy from the North Atlantic. But Captain Hans Langsdorff, her commander, was under orders to avoid contact with British naval units. Cornered in December by the British cruisers Achilles, Ajax, and Exeter, Admiral Graf Spee suffered damage and put in at Montevideo, Uruguay, for repairs. Rather than lose her in battle, the ship was scuttled. The order was carried out off Montevideo on 17 December 1939. Admiral Graf Spee’s crew, minus Captain Langsdorff, who committed suicide, were interned for the duration.

Exeter (British Navy, Heavy Cruiser, 1930)
One of two York-class heavy cruisers, the last built for the Royal Navy. The York ships were an attempt to improve on the 10,000-ton Treaty cruisers, the displacement of which was specified in the 1922 Washington Treaty. They differed only slightly in design, carrying two fewer 8-inch guns and with a structure that was 1,600 tons lighter.

The York-class ships were 575′ × 58′ × 16.4′ (average draft). The two are generally considered half-sisters, as they differed markedly in appearance. Standard displacement was 8,555 tons, and full displacement was 10,645 tons. Their geared steam turbines drove them at a maximum speed of 32 knots. They were armed with 6 × 8-inch guns (two turrets forward, one aft). Secondary armament consisted of 4 × 4-inch, later 8 × 4-inch guns. Antiaircraft armament was 16 × 40 mm and 2 × .50 caliber machine guns. They also had 6 × 21″ torpedo tubes located above water in two triple mounts (the tubes were removed in 1938), and they carried two Fairey IIIF catapult-launched aircraft and had a crew size of 850–950 men.

Built at Devonport Dockyard, Plymouth, the Exeter was launched in July 1929 and completed at the end of 1930, six months after her half-sister, the York, which was sunk off Crete in May 1941. Exeter took part in the Battle of the River Plate on 13 December 1939, then served in the Pacific off Java in January and February 1942. She was sunk on 1 March 1942, in a battle between Japanese cruisers and destroyers north of Bawean Island after the 27 February Battle of Java Sea.

Harwood, Sir Henry (1888–1950)
British admiral. Born in London on 19 January 1888, Henry Harwood entered the HMS Britannia Royal Navy training college in 1903, going on to specialize in torpedo warfare. As a lieutenant, he served with the Grand Fleet in World War I. After the war he became fleet torpedo officer in the Mediterranean. Promoted to commander in 1921 and to captain in 1937, he served in a variety of peacetime assignments and was an instructor at the Naval War College (1934–1936). In 1936 he became commodore of the South America Division of the American and West Indies Station, a post he was still holding at the outbreak of World War II in September 1939.

In the cruiser Exeter, Harwood led the search for the German commerce-raiding pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee, commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, which had left its home port in August. Harwood positioned his cruiser squadron where it was able to intercept the Admiral Graf Spee on 12 December. Aware that the German raider had sunk her last victim while en route for the South Atlantic, Harwood’s centrally located position off the River Plate was the only logical point of rendezvous for his three cruisers.

In the resulting engagement, Harwood divided the fire of his opponent by separating his squadron into two units and attacking simultaneously from different directions. These attacks inflicted sufficient damage on the Admiral Graf Spee to lead Langsdorff to take her into Montevideo Harbor. Fooled into believing that a reinforced British squadron awaited, Langsdorff subsequently scuttled his ship and then committed suicide.

For his success Harwood was immediately awarded a knighthood and promoted to rear admiral. He then served as assistant chief of the naval staff. In April 1942 he succeeded Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham as commander in chief in the Mediterranean, a post for which he was generally considered to lack the necessary expertise. Most certainly this posting was an unhappy experience. Harwood inherited a crisis situation in which the navy had few active ships and the Royal Air Force had insufficient aircraft to provide air cover. Unable to mount an offensive strategy, Harwood was criticized by, among others, General Bernard Montgomery, but he retained the support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In the end, Harwood held the post only 10 months, giving it up in early 1943 because of ill health. He served out the war on the Orkneys station, before being invalided out of the navy in October 1945 with the rank of admiral. He died in Goring-on-Thames on 9 June 1950.

Langsdorff, Hans (1894–1939)
German naval officer. Born 20 March 1894, in Bergen, Hans Langsdorff served with distinction in the German Navy during World War I and remained in that service following the war. Promoted to captain in January 1937, in November 1938 he took command of the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee.

When World War II began, in September 1939, Langsdorff and his ship were already at sea. The Admiral Graf Spee had left German waters for the South Atlantic on 21 August. Langsdorff’s first combat orders were to attack merchant shipping, and he was immediately successful. In less than three months in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, his ship sank nine British merchantmen totaling more than 50,000 tons.


On 13 December the Admiral Graf Spee was off the mouth of the River Plate, Uruguay, when crewmen sighted masts on the horizon. Believing this was a merchant convoy, Langsdorff steamed in for the kill. Instead the German ship encountered cruisers HMS Ajax, HMNZS Achilles, and HMS Exeter. The ensuing engagement lasted nearly two hours, when Langsdorff broke contact and steamed to Montevideo to effect repairs. He was allowed a stay of only 72 hours, which was later extended. During this time, Langsdorff and an honor guard went ashore to bury 37 dead crewmen.

The deadly saga came to an end on 17 December. HMS Cumberland arrived, but she replaced the Exeter, which limped away to the Falkland Islands. Langsdorff, however, believed British propaganda that a far superior force lay in wait, and he decided to scuttle his ship. The Admiral Graf Spee steamed out, the crew abandoned her, and the ship was scuttled in the mouth of the River Plate.

Langsdorff took a hotel room ashore. It was there that he committed suicide on 20 December 1939. He was given a hero’s funeral in Buenos Aires, and the surviving crew members were interned in Argentina.

Destruction of the French Fleet in Basque Roads by Thomas Sutherland after a painting by Thomas Whitcombe, 1817.

Successful Royal Navy action against the French navy using fireships. In the spring of 1809, a squadron of French warships sailed from Brest and anchored off the Basque and Aix Roads, near Rochefort. The squadron’s commander, Vice Admiral Zacharie Allemand, had a strong force of 11 ships of the line and four frigates. The powerful English Channel squadron under Admiral of the Fleet Lord James Gambier subsequently pursued the French up to the port and then stood off, being content to blockade them. Gambier’s reluctance to attack resulted from his understanding that the Basque and Aix Roads anchorage was strongly protected by forts, shoals, and treacherous tides. Moreover, the entire harbor was obstructed by a strong boom fastened to the sea floor. The Admiralty, however, could not allow such a strong French presence to remain astride British lines of communication to Portugal and the Mediterranean, and it was determined to remove them.

In April 1809 the Admiralty informed Gambier that it had dispatched Captain Lord Thomas Cochrane, recently returned from the Mediterranean, with orders to conduct an operation against the French with fireships under Gambier’s direction.

Cochrane quickly discounted the strength of the forts, as they were manned by conscripts. He then concocted a scheme using a combination of explosive ships and fireships to attack the French fleet at anchor. Gambier, a cautious leader, evinced no enthusiasm for the plan and initially refused to attack. On the night of 11 April 1809, however, the combination of a favorable wind and an incoming tide changed his mind. Accordingly, Cochrane captained the first fireship, an old transport crammed with gunpowder and grenades, right up to the harbor boom before evacuating it. This ship and a second fire vessel cleared the approach with mighty detonations, after which some 35 fire vessels followed the current into the bay. Allemand had anticipated Cochrane’s move by stripping his ships of their top sails, and anchoring them line-abreast in the harbor. Nevertheless, the French captains panicked during the attack and many cut their ship cables and tried to maneuver out of the way. In the ensuing confusion, most of the French ships of the line ran aground and several were severely damaged in collisions. Ironically, owing to premature release, the fireships themselves did relatively little damage.

On the morning of the 12th Cochrane took the frigate HMS Imperieuse (38 guns) into the harbor and saw nearly the whole French squadron either grounded or in disarray. He signaled frantically and repeatedly for Gambier to bring up the fleet and destroy the helpless French ships before they could be refloated. Gambier, still reluctant to risk his ships, delayed for several hours before sending in reinforcements. These eventually captured three ships of the line, but the bulk of Allemande’s fleet was refloated and survived. Thanks to Gambier’s indecision, the Battle of Basque and Aix Roads was something of a lost opportunity, but it was still a striking victory over a strongly positioned enemy.

References
Clowes, William Laird. The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present. Vol. 5. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1899. Reprint, London: Chatham Publishing, 1997.


James Gambier, First Baron Gambier (1756–1833)
British admiral. Born 13 October 1756 in New Providence, Bahamas, when his father was serving as lieutenant governor of that colony, at age 11 James Gambier was entered on the books of the Yarmouth, which was commanded by his uncle, future Vice Admiral James Gambier (1723–1789). Made lieutenant in 1777, Gambier was quickly promoted to command the bomb vessel Thunder.

Captured by the French, Gambier was soon exchanged and took command of the Raleigh, participating in the relief of Jersey in 1779 and the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1780 during the 1775–1783 War of American Independence. He was on half pay until 1793, when he took command of the Defence (74 guns). During this command, Gambier became particularly well known for promoting religion and morality among his men.

At the Battle of the Glorious First of June (1794) Gambier was among the first to break the French line, earning him a gold medal. Promoted to rear admiral in 1795, he served as an Admiralty commissioner first in 1795–1801 and again in 1804–1806 and 1807–1809. In 1806 he was governor and commander in chief on the Newfoundland station.

Gambier commanded the bombardment of Copenhagen on 2–5 September 1807, taking the Danish Navy. Raised to the peerage, he returned to the Admiralty until he took command of the Channel Fleet. In the Battle of Basque and Aix Roads on 11–12 April 1809, Gambier disagreed with Captain Thomas Cochrane’s audacious plan to attack the French fleet with fireships and gave it only nominal support. To clear his name from Cochrane’s public charges against him, Gambier requested a court-martial and was honorably acquitted.

Gambier remained in command of the fleet until 1811, after which he had no further active naval service. In 1814, he was one of the commissioners negotiating at Ghent a treaty of peace with the United States, ending the War of 1812. In his later years, he continued his interest in promoting Evangelical Anglicanism and religion among seaman. In 1824 the Episcopal Bishop of Ohio in the United States made contact with Gambier, and he became one of the founders of Kenyon College. Its seat, the town of Gambier, Ohio, is named for him. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in 1830, Lord Gambier died at Iver House, Iver, Buckinghamshire, on 19 April 1833.

References
Chatterton, Georgina. Memorials Personal and Historical of Admiral Lord Gambier, G.C.B. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1861.
Laughton, John K. “James, Lord Gambier.” In Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Leslie Stephen, 20: 393–395. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1889.

French admiral. Born 1 May 1762, at Port-Louis, Morbihan, France, Zacharie Allemand in March 1774 became an apprentice on the India Company vessel Superbe on a voyage to China. He then volunteered for the French navy, and from February 1779 to December 1783 served on the Sévère, participating in Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez’s East Indian campaign.

Three times wounded in the 20 June 1783 Battle of Cuddalore, Allemand was appointed lieutenant. He continued serving in the French navy in Asia until he returned to France in 1786. He then served in the Antilles and off the North American coast from 1787 to 1788 and at Brest from 1788 to 1790. He supported the French Revolution of 1789 and served in the Atlantic and then in the Antilles (1791–1792). Promoted commander in 1792, he took command of the Sans-souci in the English Channel.

Promoted to captain in January 1793, Allemand commanded the frigate Carmagnole, in which he took the English frigate Thames. He commanded the Duquesne during 1794–1797 and cruised against British merchant shipping. With a small squadron he attacked and captured Sierra Leone in September 1794, burning and sinking a large number of English, Spanish, and Portuguese vessels. He then took command of the Censeur.

Promoted to commodore in 1796, Allemand that same year seized an English convoy, which he brought into Cádiz. He then sailed off Labrador, followed by St. Pierre and Miquelon, attacking English shipping. Stripped of his command in March 1797 for having abused his authority, he returned to sea in March 1799 in command of the Tyrannicide in Vice Admiral Eustache de Bruix’s squadron and participated in the latter’s brilliant Atlantic and Mediterranean campaign in 1799–1800. During 1801–1802 he commanded the Aigle in the expedition to San Domingo. He then served ashore at Brest and Rochefort.

In 1805, with his flag in the Majestueux, Allemand undertook a long (160-day) mission in the Atlantic with a squadron of five ships of the line and five frigates, taking several important English prizes, including the Calcutta (50 guns), a brig, a corvette, and a number of merchantmen. His success in eluding the British squadrons that were searching for him led to the nickname of the “invisible squadron.”

Promoted to rear admiral in January 1806 and vice admiral in March 1809, he was made a count of the empire in August 1810. During 1809–1811 he commanded the French Mediterranean Squadron. He had charge of defensive dispositions at Basque and Aix Roads, but should not be blamed for what followed, thanks to precise orders from Napoléon. The English attacked with fireships during 11–12 April 1809, in the course of which a number of Allemand’s ships of the line were burned or captured.
In 1811–1813 Allemand commanded the Atlantic Squadron. Forced to retire in August 1814—a consequence of his irascible nature and problems getting along with subordinates—Allemand died at Toulon on 2 March 1826.

References
Clowes, William Laird. The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present. Vols. 4 and 5. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1899, 1900.
Jenkins, E. H. A History of the French Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973.

Czar of Russia who created the Imperial Russian navy. Peter was born on 30 May 1672 in Moscow to Czar Alexsei Mikhailovich and his second wife Natalia Naryshkina. He assumed the throne in April 1682 but faced opposition from the family of his father’s first wife and did not reign unchallenged until September 1689.

In his youth Peter was exposed to western culture and expressed a great interest in all things military, especially naval technology. His passion for the sea and a strong Russian navy became a key part of the reform program that he instituted during his reign.

In 1697 Peter visited the great dynastic states of western Europe, where he learned about the most modern maritime technology. He returned home in 1698 and firmly committed himself to reforming Russia. Although part of his plan was the introduction of western culture and more efficient government machinery, the czar’s paramount concern was modernizing the army and creating a navy utilizing the newest technology. Peter considered these necessary if he was to pursue the expansionist foreign policy that he desired.

The czar used the contacts he had made during his European travels to solicit the services of western European, particularly English, shipwrights and engineers in constructing Russia’s first true navy. The new ships participated in the Great Northern War against Sweden during 1700–1721. Peter’s goal here was to secure an ice-free port in the Baltic Sea for trade with the West, which Russia sorely needed as it had no major harbor accessible during the winter months. Russia’s victory in the war gave rise to the Baltic port of St. Petersburg, which became the capital of Russia until 1917.

The Russian navy was founded in the seventeenth century. According to legend, the sight of foreign ships in the Russian port of Arkhangelsk in 1693, and the memory of a small boat built by his father, inspired Tsar Peter I (Tsar, 1682–1725) to make Russia a naval power. Not until 1696, however, when Ottoman naval forces thwarted his attempts to capture Azov, did Peter (known as Peter the Great) act on this ambition. Within two years he had assembled 86 warships and about 500 galleys on the Sea of Azov. Under Swiss command and manned largely by Greeks, this force blockaded Azov. It proved useful largely as a decoy; while the Turks destroyed the fleet, Russian ground forces captured the fortress.

Peter built on this ignominious beginning. In 1698 he hired over 700 shipbuilders and carpenters from Holland and England to build a new fleet. In 1701 he founded a school for mathematics, physics, and navigation in Moscow, which would become the Russian Naval Academy. Two Russian warships were launched the following year, and Peter laid the keel for a 26-gun warship. Russian ships soon appeared on the Neva River, on Lake Ladoga, and on Lake Peipus.

Progress was slow. The naval school and most Russian ships had to be staffed with foreigners because of a lack of trained Russian seamen. In 1713 only 9 of 81 officers in the Baltic Fleet were Russian; over a quarter were British. To make up for inexperience, Russian naval commanders developed the so-called mosquito strategy: Only when Russian forces outnumbered the opponent by 50 percent would they attack.

Victories were few and far between. Yet the Russian navy made its first “overseas action” at Abo, Sweden, in 1713 and claimed its first “deep-sea victory” at the Battle of Oesel Island in 1719. At Peter’s death in 1725, the Russian navy numbered at least 34 ships of the line and nearly 800 galleys. If not yet of great power, the navy was at least a force with which to be reckoned.

Not all of Peter’s reform program was successful, but the naval portion certainly was. The Russian navy was no longer a ragtag collection of poorly equipped, rotting vessels. By 1724 the Russian navy comprised 34 ships of the line, 15 frigates, and 114 other vessels, all manned by 28,000 men.
Peter died on 8 February 1725, in St. Petersburg, the city that his navy had helped to make a reality.

References
Hughes, Lindsey. Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Phillips, Edward J. The Founding of Russia’s Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688–1714. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995.
Riasanovsky, Nicholas. The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Soviet (1st Belorussian Front's) Actions East of Warsaw in August-September 1944

No Eastern Front action has generated more heated controversy then Soviet operations east of Warsaw in August and September 1944, at the time of the Warsaw Uprising against the Nazis by the Polish Home Army. Western historians have routinely blamed the Soviets for deliberately failing to assist the Poles, and in essence, aiding and abetting destruction of the Polish rebels by the German Army for political reasons. Soviet historians have countered that every attempt was made to provide assistance but that operational considerations precluded such help. No complete single Soviet volume exists which recounts in detail these operations on the approaches to Warsaw. The historian is forced to reconstruct events by referring to a host of fragmentary sources. Ironically, German archival materials, in particular Second Army records and other materials (and probably the records of Ninth Army, captured by the Soviets and unavailable to Western historians), help to justify the Soviet argument.

Operational details about Soviet combat on the approaches to Warsaw can be reconstructed from fragmentary Soviet and German archival sources (see map 15). On 28 July 1994, Maj. Gen. A. I. Radzievsky's 2d Tank Army, which had been turned north from the Magnuszew region to strike at Warsaw, with three corps abreast, engaged German 73d Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division 40 kilometers southeast of Warsaw. A race ensued between Radzievsky, who was seeking to seize the routes into Warsaw from the east, and the Germans, who were attempting to keep these routes open and maintain possession of Warsaw. The nearest Soviet forces within supporting range of Radzievsky were 47th Army and 11th Tank and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps, then fighting for possession of Seidlce, 50 kilometers to the east. On 29 July Radzievsky dispatched his 8th Guards and 3d Tank Corps northward in an attempt to swing northeast of Warsaw and turn the German defender's left flank, while his 16th Tank Corps continued to fight on the southeastern approaches to the city's suburbs.

Although 8th Guards Tank Corps successfully fought to within 20 kilometers east of the city, 3d Tank Corps ran into a series of successive panzer counterattacks orchestrated by Field Marshal W. Model, new commander of Army Group Center. Beginning on 30 July, the Hermann Goering and 19th Panzer Divisions struck the overextended and weakened tank corps north of Wolomin, 15 kilometers northeast of Warsaw. Although the corps withstood three days of counterattacks, on 2 and 3 August, 4th Panzer Division and SS Panzer Division Viking joined the fight. In three days of intense fighting, 3d Tank Corps was severely mauled, and 8th Guards Tank Corps was also severely pressed. By 5 August 47th Army forces had arrived in the region, and 2d Tank Army was withdrawn for rest and refitting. The three rifle corps of 47th Army were now stretched out along a front of 80 kilometers from south of Warsaw to Seidlce and were unable to renew the drive on Warsaw or to the Narew River. German communications lines eastward to Army Group Center, then fighting for its life north and west of Brest, had been damaged but not severed.

Meanwhile, on 1 August the Polish Home Army had launched an insurrection in the city. Although they seized large areas in downtown Warsaw, the insurgents failed to secure the four bridges over the Vistula and were unable to hold the eastern suburbs of the city (Praga). During the ensuing weeks, while the Warsaw uprising progressed and ultimately failed, the Soviets continued their drive against Army Group Center northeast of Warsaw. For whatever motive, 1st Belorussian Front focused on holding firmly to the Magnuszew bridgehead, which was subjected to heavy German counterattacks throughout mid-August, and on driving forward across the Bug River to seize crossings over the Narew River necessary to facilitate future offensive operations. Soviet 47th Army remained the only major force opposite Warsaw until 20 August, when it was joined by 1st Polish Army. Soviet forces finally broke out across the Bug River on 3 September, closed up to the Narew River the following day, and fought their way into bridgeheads across the Narew on 6 September. On 13 September lead elements of two Polish divisions assaulted across the Vistula River into Warsaw but made little progress and were evacuated back across the river on 23 September.

Political considerations and motivations aside, an objective consideration of combat in the region indicates that, prior to early September, German resistance was sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, were it intended. Thereafter, it would have required a major reorientation of military efforts from Magnuszew in the south or, more realistically, from the Bug and Narew River axis in the north in order to muster sufficient force to break into Warsaw. And once broken into, Warsaw would have been a costly city to clear of Germans and an unsuitable location from which to launch a new offensive.

This skeletal portrayal of events outside of Warsaw demonstrates that much more needs to be revealed and written about these operations. It is certain that additional German sources exist upon which to base an expanded account. It is equally certain that extensive documentation remains in Soviet archival holdings. Release and use of this information can help answer and lay to rest this burning historical controversy.

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6 SA Armoured Division command staff in Bologna. Left to Right: Maj-Gen Poole, Brig. Furstenburg, Maj-Gen Theron.1945

As part of the Allied push into the Apennine Mountains and the German Gothic Line, the Six South African Armoured Division came under American command, relieved an American division, and crossed the Arno River west of Florence in early September 1944 with little resistance from the withdrawing Germans. In addition to the British guards, an Indian infantry battalion, a British antiaircraft unit converted into an infantry battalion, and a Newfoundland artillery field regiment were attached to the division. General Poole had three armored regiments, nine infantry battalions, and four artillery regiments at his disposal. From mid-September onward the South Africans experienced their heaviest fighting of the war, attacking prepared defensive positions—complete with mines, wire, and concrete pillboxes—often manned by fanatical Waffen SS troops. In addition, mountain conditions meant that it was difficult to maintain supply and soldiers were not prepared for increasingly cold weather. From mid- to late October South African infantry, particularly First City/Cape Town Highlanders (FC/CTH), Witwatersrand Rifles/De la Rey Regiment (WR/DLR), Royal Natal Carabineers, and Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment, carried out the division’s largest attack in Italy. With massive artillery support, they captured a series of mountain strongholds including Monte Stanco, Campiaro, Monte Pezza, and Monte Salvaro blocking the Allied advance on Bologna. At the end of this drive the division entered a period of static winter operations in which it reorganized. A battalion of SAAF antiaircraft gunners converted to infantry was absorbed by the division’s existing units, and with the departure of the Guards Brigade, a new formation, the 13th South African Motorized Brigade, was created under Brigadier J. B. Bester.

In early April 1945 the South African Division, now 18,000 strong, relieved American units on the line in preparation for an Allied push into the Po Valley. The offensive began in mid-April with a massive aerial bombardment of German mountain positions that included the use of napalm. The 12th South African Motorized Brigade would play the central role in capturing the division’s main objective, a cluster of three heavily fortified mountains: Sole, Caprara, and Abelle. On April 15, infantrymen of FC/CTH assaulted Monte Sole, destroying ten German machinegun nests before taking the summit. The WR/DLR had a tough fight up Monte Caprara and, at dawn on April 16, made a desperate bayonet charge up a steep slope that routed the Germans. After this action one WR/DLR company was left with just 17 men. South African tanks were then able to move up the saddle between the two mountains where they supported two companies of FC/CTH in a successful assault on Monte Abelle. Throughout these assaults Cape Corps soldiers worked as stretcher bearers. South African possession of these mountains, retained despite German counterattack, facilitated the advance of nearby American units.

Within two days the Germans were in full retreat from the Apennines. In this operation the South African Division had lost 70 men killed and another 308 wounded and total enemy casualties were estimated at 500. Pursuing the Germans, the South Africans rounded up thousands of prisoners and sometimes encountered desperate delaying actions. When the war ended in early May the division was located southeast of Milan. During the Italian campaign, the South African division has lost 711 killed, 2,675 wounded, and 157 missing. As they waited for repatriation, South African soldiers in Italy provided security and engineers repaired the railway between Florence and Bologna as well as a 12-kilometer long tunnel on the route between Turin and Paris. Though exact figures vary, it appears that around 9,000 South African service personnel lost their lives in the Second World War.

Whoever claimed that war was men’s work had never come across the likes of vengeful Caterina Sforza, the terrifying Jinga Mbandi or ace spy Pearl Witherington.

These are just a few of the feisty, fearsome and formidable fighting women whose acts of courage, daring and self-sacrifice have set alight theatres of war across the world for thousands of years.
While 21st century society wrings its hands over the rights and wrongs of women fighting on the front line, history tells us that they have always been there in some form or other, whether taking part in military campaigns or leading their countries into war.

As the world prepares to celebrate International Women’s Day on March 8, Warrior Women, a magnificent new book by author Rosalind Miles and historian Robin Cross, restores their wartime heroics to a rightful place of honour and prominence by painting vivid portraits of over 100 outstanding women across 3,000 years of history.

From the ‘silver-sworded, man-loving, male child-killing Amazons’ to Colonel Martha McSally, the first female pilot in the US Air Force to fly in combat, women have often proved themselves cool and courageous under fire.

Some, like Cleopatra, Joan of Arc and Elizabeth I, are familiar names but others like Susan Travers, the only woman to have joined the French Foreign Legion, are lesser known but just as thrilling.
As far back as 1049 BC, the legendary Delilah acted as the first ‘honey-trap’ operative when she ensnared Samson for the Philistines and in 61 AD Boudicca, dubbed the ‘Killer Queen’ of Britain by the Romans, cried ‘death before slavery’ as she took on the invaders.

In the second century, the Vietnamese Tru’ung Sisters led a famous rebellion against the Chinese Han Dynasty while swashbuckling swordswoman Tomoe Gozen, ‘a warrior worth a thousand, ready to confront a demon or a god’, was a senior samurai officer in the Japanese Genpei War of 1180-85.
Austrasian warrior queen Brunhilde paid the ultimate price for 40 years of bravery and skill during the Frankish wars of the 6th century - her enemies literally pulled her to pieces by stringing her between four horses.

The religious struggles following the 7th century birth of Islam produced Salaym Bint Malhan who, although pregnant, fought in the ranks of Muhammad with swords and daggers strapped round her swollen belly.

A woman not to be crossed was Caterina Sforza, daughter of the 15th century Duke of Milan, who took revenge on the ringleader of her husband’s killers by having him dragged round a square by a horse and then disembowelled and dismembered while still alive.

One of the most extraordinary women warriors was Jinga Mbandi, the 17th century queen of what is now Luanda, the capital of Angola, which was then being exploited by Portuguese slavers. Jinga is reported to have sat on the back of a crouching slave to assert her rights as queen during talks with the Portuguese governor and then executed the slave, explaining that she never used the same chair twice.
In more recent times, Second World War spy Pearl Witherington, a brilliant agent with the British Special Operations Executive, took command of over 3,000 men of the French Resistance in the field and was so feared by the Germans that they put a bounty of one million francs on her head.

Brimming with fascinating histories and an amazing collection of colour pictures and illustrations, Warrior Women is a big, beautifully produced book which tells the awe-inspiring and revealing story of some unforgettable female fighters.

(Quercus, hardback, £20)

The British warship Renown attacks Admiral d’Estaing’s dismasted flagship Languedoc in the Atlantic, 13 August 1778.

By Charles P. Neimeyer

During February 1778, the new Franco-American alliance was announced, and it immediately changed the entire complexion of the war. Now the British not only had to guard against American forces surrounding the island but also against the possibility of a French invasion fleet arriving off the harbor mouth with little or no notice. Moreover, British intelligence had determined that the French fleet at Toulon had sortied from its base and, under the command of the Comte d’Estaing, was somewhere in the Atlantic. In addition, French privateers were now capturing British ships in the English Channel, thus forcing the recall of many Royal Navy ships to home waters.

Perhaps taking the advice of Captain Mackenzie that the cause of many administrative problems was idle soldiers in Newport, General Pigot on 25 May 1778 ordered a large 600-man raid on the towns of Warren and Bristol, located immediately to the north of the island of Rhode Island and largely believed to be the primary base for American raiding parties on the island.

Burning numerous boats and skiffs found gathered along the shoreline, the soldiers also set fire and pillaged the two towns at will. Believing that the house of Mrs. Peleg Anthony had been set on fire by militia as a signal, the soldiers attacked townspeople who arrived to put out the fire. According to Newport diarist Fleet Greene, “the inhabitants, without respect of persons, were greatly abused, knocked down, and beat. Wearing apparel of all sorts, necklaces, rings, and paper money, taken as plunder at Bristol and Warren, were offered for sale by the soldiers” in Newport.

But the true revelation of the raid was not the plunder. Rather, it was the large amount of barges and other landing craft that had been gathered by the Americans for a possible assault to retake the town of Newport. The British feared that with the help of the French fleet, the Americans might seriously threaten the British hold on Newport.

And indeed on 29 July 1778, Admiral d’Estaing and the French fleet sailed into Narragansett Bay and quickly forced their way past the British batteries at the harbor entrance. Anchoring just out of range, d’Estaing’s force waited in the bay to consult with their American allies, now under command of Continental Army Maj. Gen. John Sullivan. Newport resident Mary Almy, a woman of Tory sympathy, stated that most townspeople assumed that the fleet in sight must be that of Admiral Howe. However, by 10 a.m. it was determined that the ships were French and the news “threw us into the greatest consternation.” She added that now “the merchant looks upon his full store as nothing worth. The shopkeeper with a distressed countenance locks and bars the shop, not knowing what is for the best. . . . Heavens! with what spirit the army undertook the old batteries; with what amazing quickness did they throw up new ones.” Almy spent the night comforting her frightened children and was busy burying her “papers and plate in the ground.” Two days later, Mary Almy was shocked to see the British burning their now trapped frigates and observed at Coddington’s Cove the HMS Kingfisher and two galleys furiously ablaze and stated that she spent this day, “trembling, crying and hiding.” By 3 August, she noted that American troops were landing at Howland’s Ferry opposite the north end of the island.

Two days later, she observed that “at night [the British] ordered all the sailors into town, if possible to keep some order with them.” But apparently this did not take place as she noted that “every sailor was equipped with a musket that could get one; he that could not, had a billet of wood, an old broom, or any club they could find. They all took care to save a bottle of spirits, which they call kill grief; some fiddling, some playing jewsharps. . . . By dark the bottles were exhausted, and they so unruly that we were obliged to be safely housed that night.”

The appearance of the French had clearly caused great consternation among the townspeople. Almy noted that orders had been given that upon the appearance of the American army on the island, houses within three miles of the town were to be burned; all livestock on the island except a single cow per family were to be driven into town. All the wells outside of Newport were ordered filled and blocked. Her up-island relatives fled into Newport with all their belongings. She wrote, “Heavens! what a scene of wretchedness before this once happy and flourishing island.” On 7 August, the French shelled part of the town. Almy described a scene of sheer pandemonium: “the women shrieking, the children falling down.” Taking her children with her, Mary Almy ran with them to a house outside of town she thought might be safe from the shelling, lying flat on the ground until a broadside had passed overhead and then jumping up and running until the sound of the next salvo. The following evening was equally frightening, as the British set fire to their ships in the harbor that had not been sunk, and a brisk wind put the town in danger. Almy wrote, “to attempt to describe the horrors of that night, would pronounce me a fool, for no language could put it in its proper colors. Fire and sword had come amongst us and famine was not afar off, for the want of bread was great.” Fleet Greene concurred with Mary Almy and noted that in addition to the loss of livestock, “all carriages, carts, wheelbarrows, shovels, pickaxes, &c, are taken from the inhabitants.” The next day, “a number of trees were cut down at Portsmouth and Middletown and put in the road to obstruct the Provincials march.” Three days after that he recorded, “The army continues to lay waste the island, cutting down orchards and laying open fields, and numbers of the inhabitants without the lines are ordered to move from their houses that they may be taken down.”

On 9 August 1778, the Americans landed over six thousand troops on the north end of the island and the soldiers manning the British and Hessian outposts had fled to the safety of their lines in town. However, on this very same day, a small fleet from New York under the command of Admiral Howe arrived off Narragansett Bay to challenge that of Admiral d’Estaing. And while d’Estaing had originally planned to land approximately five thousand troops to assist their American allies, he now weighed anchor without landing any of them and prepared to engage Howe in a decisive sea battle. Passing the British forts guarding Newport, the French encountered “a very smart fire,” which they returned. As a result, Fleet Greene reported, “Great numbers of shot went through the houses in the town, but no other damage is done.”

However, despite the best laid plans of the Americans and French, the weather turned against both fleet commanders. In fact, a hurricane had likely moved up from the Caribbean. For three days the storm tossed and damaged both fleets and widely scattered them. Several of the largest French ships, including d’Estaing’s flagship Languedoc, were totally dismasted. While Howe was able to retreat to New York City with its extensive shipyards and repair facilities, d’Estaing limped back into Narragansett Bay with Newport’s yards still in enemy hands. Thus he decided to leave the environs of Newport for American-held Boston to refit his damaged fleet. This decision, of course, left the Americans alone in their quest to liberate Newport. Even so, the American ranks, now swelled with local militia, still outnumbered the British and Hessian forces. Ominously, after d’Estaing decided to depart for Boston, Sullivan’s militia began to dissipate. Still, the Americans pressed the British into their outer Newport fortifications and began exchanging cannon fire. However, with militiamen departing his force daily, Sullivan decided that, now that the French no longer controlled the bay, his best move was to retreat off the island before he was trapped by British warships whose return from New York was anticipated. Indeed on 27 August 1778, three British frigates, the Sphinx, the Nautilus, and the Vigilant, dropped anchor in Newport. They formed the vanguard of a relief force coming from New York.

On 29 August 1778, Private Döhla noticed that the Americans no longer returned cannon fire launched at their lines on nearby Honeyman Hill. Pigot ordered an immediate counterattack by two thousand men to see if he could catch or damage the American army as it tried to retreat off the island. During a day-long battle with American forces, which had anticipated an attack, Pigot’s regiments were repulsed and the Americans held their ground. The Hessians, in particular, suffered heavy casualties in the fighting. Sullivan was able to move his forces completely off the island the following evening. Fleet Greene reported two days after the battle that the British and Hessian troops further plundered the up-island inhabitants so that “some families are destitute of a bed to lie on.”

While recriminations flew back and forth as to who was to blame for the Franco-American failure to take vulnerable Newport, life for the troops in the town and on the island returned to mind-numbing routine once again. In fact, the British increased their troop strength there to over nine thousand men. In October 1778, Captain Mackenzie observed, “We are left at present in a Strange situation: Two of the three passages [in Narragansett Bay] are entirely open to the enemy. The winter advancing, & no provision made for the supplying the Garrison with firing [wood]. . . . No Barracks provided, no materials to fit up any, nor any Straw for the troops either while in the field, or when they come into quarters.” Fleet Green noted that the dearth of winter firewood forced many residents to leave town because the British refused to allow the locals to buy wood or have it brought in from the countryside.

The National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia, opened a large, new museum facility on 19 June 2010. The opening ceremony, held after an infantry school graduation, featured retired General Colin Powell as the keynote speaker. The event was attended by some six thousand guests. The museum is now open daily, and there is no admission charge.

Six of the museum’s ultimate eight galleries have opened. These depict the role of infantrymen in four periods of the nation’s history from 1898 to the present, pay homage to the family members of infantrymen, and describe the history of Fort Benning and its relationship with the Columbus community. A 100-yard-long gently inclining ramp exhibiting cast figures of infantrymen and three vehicles in which infantrymen deployed to battle—a World War II glider, a Huey helicopter, and a Bradley fighting vehicle—signifies the infantry’s role in taking the last hundred yards of any engagement. The Grand Hall includes a glass-enclosed space containing plaques dedicated to each of the infantry recipients of the Medal of Honor. The museum also includes a Ranger Hall of Honor and an IMAX theater.

Tip of the Spear: U.S. Army Small- Unit Action in Iraq, 2004–2007, edited by Jon T. Hoffman, presents descriptions of eight small but intense military engagements in Iraq written by four historians at the Center of Military History, the historian of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps, and two officer coauthors who served in Iraq with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, one of the units whose story is told. Mark J. Reardon, a retired armor officer who is now a civilian historian, contributed three of the chapters. The volume relates episodes of U.S. soldiers’ combat with Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite militiamen in the suburbs of Baghdad, at Fallujah in the west, and at Najaf and three other locations south of Baghdad. Half of the encounters described took place in 2004, with the remainder equally representing actions occurring in 2006 and 2007. A twelve-page introduction summarizes the course of the war from April 2003 to January 2007. This 201-page book has been issued in paperback as CMH Pub 70–113–1. Hoffman is chief of the Center’s Contemporary Studies Branch.

Army publication account holders may obtain these items from the Directorate of Logistics–Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, MO 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. Individuals may also order the materials from the U.S. Government Printing Office via its Web site at http:// bookstore.gpo.gov. Tip of the Spear: U.S. Army Small-Unit Action in Iraq, 2004–2007, may be purchased for $22.

The Entente had been unable to help Serbia and Montenegro, and so had lost its hold on the central Balkan region. The defeat of Serbia in 1915 gave the Central alliance temporary mastery over the Balkans, opening up a land route to Istanbul, thus allowing the Germans to re-supply the Ottoman empire for the rest of the war. By early 1916, only Greece and Rumania remained neutral.

The key event in 1916 was Rumania’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente. Offered the Austro-Hungarian regions of Transylvania and Bukovina, and spurred on by the success of the summer 1916 Brusilov offensive, Rumania entered the war on 27 August 1916. This would prove to be her undoing as her 800,000- strong army had little modern weaponry, a poor domestic arms industry, a badly trained officer corps and supply lines dependent on imports from Russia. When Rumania’s army went into action on 27–28 August 1916, the Brusilov offensive had lost momentum. Exposed to possible attacks from Bulgaria in the south and Austria-Hungary in the west, the Rumanians deployed their First, Second and Fourth Armies along the Carpathian Mountain passes and invaded Transylvania, while their Third Army took up positions along the river Danube and in the Dobrudja facing Bulgaria. A rapid response by the Austro-Hungarians, stiffened by German, Bulgarian and Ottoman reinforcements, checked the Rumanians in Transylvania, before they launched a counter-attack.

In early September 1916, Central alliance forces led by the German general August von Mackensen advanced from the south into the Dobrudja, taking the towns of Cernavoda and Constanpa, threatening the Rumanian capital, Bucharest. Another German-led force, commanded by Erich von Falkenhayn, penetrated the Vulcan pass in the Carpathians and engaged Rumanian forces along the river Argerel in late November and early December 1916. Meanwhile, on 23 November, Mackensen switched his focus of operations to Wallachia, crossing the Danube at Sistove (Svishtov) and turning the Rumanian positions facing Falkenhayn along the river Alt (Olt). On 6 December 1916, Mackensen and Falkenhayn’s forces entered Bucharest. As with the Serbs in 1915, the Rumanians were forced into a hasty retreat, this time to the safety of Russian-held Moldavia. The front then stabilised along the river Sereth (Siret). The lack of a coordinated Entente strategy contributed to Rumania’s rapid defeat. An Anglo-French attack from Salonika to help Rumania faltered and, once again, an ally in the Balkans was defeated. The remnants of the Rumanian army, with French help, rebuilt itself into a fighting force of some 500,000 men and counter-attacked in the summer of 1917, culminating in the battle of Mărăşeşti in August 1917. Rumanian forces simply could not sustain such battles and, with the news of the Russian revolution, Rumania entered peace talks with the Central alliance culminating in the Treaty of Bucharest (7 May 1918), a harsh settlement that turned Rumania into a vassal state. On 10 November 1918, with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria effectively defeated, Rumanian forces again took the field, thus staking Rumania’s claim at the peace talks.