China during the Period of the Warring States.
Posted by Mitch Williamson in China on Monday, November 7, 2011
From the fifth to the third centuries B.C.E., China was locked in a
time of civil strife known as the Period of the Warring States. This map shows
the Zhou dynasty capital at Luoyang, along with the major states that were
squabbling for precedence in the region. The state of Qin would eventually
suppress its rivals and form the first unified Chinese empire, with its capital
at Xianyang (near modern Xian).
During the last two centuries of the Zhou dynasty (the
fourth and third centuries B.C.E.), the authority of the king became
increasingly nominal, and several of the small principalities into which the
Zhou kingdom had been divided began to evolve into powerful states that
presented a potential challenge to the Zhou ruler himself. Chief among these
were Qu (Ch’u) in the central Yangtze valley, Wu in the Yangtze delta, and Yue
(Yueh) along the south-eastern coast. At first, their mutual rivalries were in
check, but by the late fifth century B.C.E., competition intensified into civil
war, giving birth to the so-called Period of the Warring States. Powerful
principalities vied with each other for preeminence and largely ignored the now
purely titular authority of the Zhou court. New forms of warfare also emerged
with the invention of iron weapons and the introduction of the foot soldier.
Cavalry, too, made its first appearance, armed with the powerful crossbow.
Eventually, the relatively young state of Qin, located in
the original homeland of the Zhou, became a key player in these conflicts.
Benefiting from a strong defensive position in the mountains to the west of the
great bend of the Yellow River, as well as from their control of the rich
Sichuan plains, the Qin gradually subdued their main rivals through conquest or
diplomatic maneuvering. In 221 B.C.E., the Qin ruler declared the establishment
of a new dynasty, the first truly unified government in Chinese history.
The Art of War
With the possible exception of the nineteenth- century
German military strategist Karl von Clausewitz, there is probably no more
famous or respected writer on the art of war than the ancient Chinese thinker
Sun Tzu. Yet surprisingly little is known about him. Recently discovered
evidence suggests that he lived in the fifth century B.C.E., during the chronic
conflict of the Period of Warring States, and that he was an early member of an
illustrious family of military strategists who advised Zhou rulers for more
than two hundred years. But despite the mystery surrounding his life, there is
no doubt of his influence on later generations of military planners. Among his
most avid followers in our day have been the revolutionary leaders Mao Zedong
and Ho Chi Minh, as well as the Japanese military strategists who planned the
attacks on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor.
The following brief excerpt from his classic, The Art of
War, provides a glimmer into the nature of his advice, still so timely today.
Selections from Sun
Tzu
Sun Tzu said:
‘‘In general, the method for employing the military is this:
. . . Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the
pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the
true pinnacle of excellence. . . .
‘‘Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the
enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army;
and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
‘‘This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only
when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault
wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building
earthworks will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot
overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm
over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops,
and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from
attacking [fortified cities].
‘‘Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates
other people’s armies without engaging in battle, captures other people’s
fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys others people’s states
without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim
of ‘preservation.’ . . .
‘‘In general, the strategy of employing the military is
this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack
them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the
enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you
can avoid him. . . .
‘‘Thus there are five factors from which victory can be
known:
‘‘One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight,
will be victorious.
‘‘One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers
will be victorious.
‘‘One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will
be victorious.
‘‘One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be
victorious.
‘‘One whose general is capable and not interfered with by
the ruler will be victorious.
‘‘These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory. . . .
‘‘Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows
himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know
the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with
defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated
in every engagement.’’
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