War and Game

Spontaneous, suggested or enforced enlistment?
In theory, the Waffen-SS was forced because of its status to recruit only volunteers. In reality, an increasing number of men were pressured into joining the Waffen-SS during the conflict. The question is, therefore, when and by what means the SS overrode its own principles and broke both German and, in the case of foreigners, international laws by enlisting non-volunteers. Contrary to preconceived ideas, the pressure on “volunteers” did not evolve in a linear fashion during the conflict. The application of coercion fluctuated, depending both on SS needs and on available manpower. As early as spring 1940, when the SS wanted to complete its “Death’s Head” regiments, civil SS members, teenagers of the Patrol Service and the Hitler Youth, and even members of the SA were pressured to enlist in the Waffen-SS.41 A rise in enforced enlistments occurred again one year later, just before the invasion of Russia, when the SS had to fill up its active and reserve units, in the form of a “20,000 men campaign” within a period of seven weeks.42

The transformation of the Waffen-SS into a mass army in the years 1942–3 certainly marked a clear breach of earlier practices.43 From this point onwards, coercion was no longer applied only to men who were more or less closely connected with a SS or Nazi organization, but also to common conscripts. The recruiting methods did not change, but the population affected by them did.44

The increasing scarcity of manpower in the Reich also contributed to this evolution. The growing need for soldiers, particularly due to the Wehrmacht’s losses in Russia, obliged the army to enlist ever younger age groups. From the end of 1942, the number of age groups available for enlistment was reduced to only one (year class 1925), while there had been three at the beginning of the year. Consequently, constraint took on a cyclic form: each time a new age group was available to be enlisted, the SS and Wehrmacht had no difficulty in finding a certain number of enthusiastic young volunteers. But these volunteers did not suffice. For the Wehrmacht, the problem was easily solved by conscription. The SS, however, had to increase the pressure on the passive members of each age group to fill its ranks.

With regard to enlistment, the SS was not as powerful within the Reich as is believed in current secondary literature. A number of cases prove that it was possible to avoid enlistment in the SS, at least by enlisting in the Wehrmacht.45 The existence of complaints proves, also, that it was possible to oppose an arbitrary decision. In February 1943, for example, 2,500 teenagers who had been coerced to enlist in the Waffen-SS were released and handed over to the police.46

Enforcement sometimes took radical forms, including the death penalty at times. Still, this was only possible by consent of both Hitler and the Wehrmacht high command.47 On the other hand, the SS found in the army an increasingly dangerous competitor for recruits, since in summer 1943 the army started to use the same methods as the SS, only on a larger scale.48 The figures speak for themselves: enforcement did not lead to an increase in SS enlistments. In fact, the number of new recruits in the Waffen-SS diminished in 1944 in favour of recruitment into the army.49 Nonetheless, since both air and sea were controlled by Allied forces, the course of the war necessitated the dispatch of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine soldiers to ground-battle units. If the Army (Heer) received the greatest part of them, the Waffen-SS received, for its part, about 40,000 men, because Himmler had meanwhile been designated Chief of Army reserve, after the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944, and so could give some advantages to “his” Waffen-SS. As these men had no choice, it is hard to say whether or not they accepted their transfer willingly. Some of them were satisfied; 50 others protested in vain – not always for political reasons, but also due to being “loathe to become common infantry.”51 Hence, as has recently been shown by the case of the German Nobel prize winner Günter Grass, who confessed to having belonged to the Waffen-SS after having volunteered for the submarines, towards the end of the war it became increasingly difficult to make a distinction between real volunteers and others.52

This is also true for the Volksdeutsche. While the SS took much care to stress the voluntary character of the enlistment of “ethnic” Germans at the beginning of the war,53 it began to use more forceful tactics when it failed to achieve its recruiting objectives in 1942, at the time of the formation of the “Prinz Eugen” division with men of the former Yugoslavia. Himmler even decreed the conscription of the Balkans’ Volksdeutsche from 17 to 50 years old, “if necessary to 55 years old”. They had, according to him, the duty to serve “not by formal law, but by the brazen law of their Volkstum”.54

This unilateral decision complicated the matter rather than resolving it. It was, in fact, very hard to enforce, for many reasons. Himmler’s main chiefs of staff were opposed: for the chief of SS recruitment, the results would be counterproductive, because enlistment into the SS would be seen as a punishment; for the military chief of staff, the results on the battlefield would be poor with such conscripts; finally, it would be impossible to publish this decision, for propaganda and diplomatic reasons.55 Consequently, the issue of general conscription for the Volksdeutsche remained unresolved until the end of the war.56 In itself, it had no more importance. As the SS judge in Himmler’s office wrote in February 1945, “the SS and police courts had always taken care of the Reichsführer’s point of view, even without such legal basis, and [...] used it as fundament of their decisions with all consequences which proceeded from it.”57

During the war, the SS paid much more attention to the voluntary character of enlistments of “Germanic” foreigners in the occupied countries than of Germans in the Reich. More than the will to adhere to the international laws of war, the racial conceptions of the SS can explain this choice. The SS, for example, respected its engagements and liberated its “Germanic” volunteers who had enlisted for a short six-month service. Even men who wanted to go home before the end of this period were released in March 1941.58 In October 1942, more than 20 per cent of the “Germanic” SS volunteers had been released from armed service since the beginning of the war, while 2,404 out of 10,821,509 had been killed (4.7 per cent).59 Of course, there were cases of constraint, especially from 1943 onwards.60 But these remained at a very low level. And, although Himmler considered introducing conscription in the “Germanic” countries, he did not do so.61 By contrast, the SS dealt otherwise with “non-Germanic” volunteers. In fact, it rounded up the young male inhabitants of some countries when it needed men, for example in Zagreb when the Bosnian Division was set up in summer 1943.62 Men were also rounded up to fill the ranks of the Second SS Armoured Corps in Ukraine, in spring 1944.63 Such operations were not, however, a “Waffen-SS exclusivity”.64 Finally, conscription was introduced in 1944 in Bosnia, Estonia, and Latvia.65

Conclusion
To sum up, it has become clear that the profiles of the Waffen-SS volunteers are much more complex than is usually believed. Even more important, independently of their profiles or their motivations, these volunteers came to serve as an example after which the Reichsführung SS and the government intended to model the Wehrmacht. In the competition created by the Nazi leaders between the “conservative” German army and the “revolutionary” Waffen-SS, the latter gradually became the model of reference regarding efficiency on the battlefields – or so, at least, it was successfully represented by propaganda.

The ideological conviction of these “new types of political combatants” was declared as more important than their professional value. Furthermore, through the successful enlistment of foreigners, the Waffen-SS gave the illusion that patriotism was henceforth transcended by ideological education. Given this example, the German Army was intended by the government to evolve in the same direction. The army’s Volksgrenadier- Divisionen, which were set up under the aegis of the SS even before the attempt on Hitler in July 1944, and later the Volkssturm were means of copying this ideological “success”. They were a direct extension of the social model of the Waffen-SS to the regular army, and by the end to a whole society at war.

Notes
I would like to thank Karen Weilbrenner for proofreading the English.
1. For a general perspective: G. H. Stein (1967) La Waffen-S.S., American edn 1966 (Paris); B. Wegner (1997) Hitlers politische Soldaten. Die Waffen-SS, 1933.1945, 5th edn (Schoningh); J. L. Leleu (2007) La Waffen-SS. Soldats politiques en guerre (Paris).
2. B. Wegner (1997); G. C. Boehnert (1978) A Sociography of the SS Officer Corps, 1925.1939 (Ph.D., University of London), V; H. F. Ziegler (1989) Nazi Germany’s New Aristocracy. The SS Leadership, 1925.1939 (Princeton/ New Jersey), XX. A sociological study about NCOs and all ranks of the Kommandostab Reichsfuhrer-SS units is available in M. Cuppers (2005) Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsfuhrer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939.1945 (Darmstadt).
3. For bibliographical accounts about Berger, see G. Rempel gGottlob Berger . eEin Schwabengeneral der Tatf h, in R. Smelser and E. Syring (eds.) (2000) Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf, 30 Lebenslaufe (Paderborn), p. 45.59; J. Scholtysek (1997) gDer .Schwabenherzogh. Gottlob Berger, Obergruppenfuhrerf in M. KiƒÀener, J. Scholtysek Die Fuhrer der Provinz. NS-Biographien aus Baden und Wurttemberg (Konstanz), p. 77.110. See also H. Hohne (1995) Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS, 1st edn 1967 (Augsburg), p. 420.
4. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 118f. See too G. Rempel (1971) The Misguided Generation: Hitler Youth and SS, 1933.1945 (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin).
5. Ibid., p. 129.135 and chapter 6. 6. G. Aly and K. H. Roth (2000) Die restlose Erfassung. Volkszahlen, Identifizieren, Aussondern im Nationalsozialismus, 1st edn 1984 (Frankfurt/Main), p. 19.
7. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (later BABL), NS 19/370: Der Reichsfuhrer-SS, 11.6.1944.
8. BABL, NS 19/3987 (fol. 13): gAuf dem Weg zum germanischen Reichh, Ansprache des Chef des SS-Hauptamtes [Tagung auf der Plassenburg, 26.2.1944.1.3.1944]; NS 19/2859: Reichskommissar fur die Festigung dt. Volkstums/Hauptamt VoMi an Reichsfuhrer-SS/Pers.Stab, IX/13/III/22 g.Rs., betr: Unterstutzung der z.Zt. unter rumanisch-sowjetischem Bereich lebenden Deutschen in Rumanien, 26.9.1944.
9. L. Tilkovszky (1974) gDie Werbeaktionen der Waffen-SS in Ungarnh, Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, XX, 1.2, 137.181, p. 180.
10. Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Prague (later VHA), SS-Nachrichten-Stelle gNordwesth, 9/3: Fernschreiben (FS) 2216, SS-Standartenfuhrer Jungclaus an Reichsfuhrer-SS, 14.2.1941, 11.00 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle gNWh, 10/3: FS 2604, Erganzungs-Stelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 28.2.1941, 11.35 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle gNWh 12/4: FS 2958, Erganzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 13.3.1941, 16.25 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle gNWh 14/5: FS 3531: Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Ausbildungs-Bataillon Sennheim, 7.4.1941, 17.30 Uhr. M. P. Gingerich (1997) “Waffen SS Recruitment in the ‘Germanic Lands’, 1940–1941”, The Historian, 59, 826.
11. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 177–78, 186–89.
12. BABL, NS 19/1735 (fol. 37–39): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an den Reichsführer-SS, Betr: Germanische Freiwillige, 28.7.1943; NS 19/3987 (fol. 12–13): “Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich”. Ansprache des Chefs des SS-Hauptamtes [Tagung auf der Plassenburg, 26.2.1944–1.3.1944].
13. See G. Stein (1967), chap. 6, p. 155 (the numbers given by Stein are nevertheless wrong).
14. G. Stein (1967); p. 155–164. F. Steiner (1958) Die Freiwilligen. Idee und Opfergang (Göttingen). The total of Dutch SS soldiers is derived from their number in January 1944 and the recruitments during the year 1944. See BABL, NS 19/2429 (fol. 126): SS-Obergruppenführer Rauter an Reichsführer-SS, betr: SS-Werbungen 1944, 11.1.1945, 19.45 Uhr. P. Pierik (2001) From Leningrad to Berlin. Dutch Volunteers in the Service of the German Waffen-SS 1941–1945. The Political and Military History of the Legion, Brigade and Division Known as “Nederland” (Soesterberg), p. 56f.
15. BABL, NS 19/1480: Reichsführer-SS an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 23.3.1944. See too J. R. Stovall (1976) Gottlob Berger and Waffen-SS Recruiting Policies (Ph.D., Boulder, University of Colorado), p. 101f.
16. See, for instance, the case of the SS brigade (then division) “Wallonie” at the end of the war. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin-Mitte (later PA/AA), Inl II/D, R 100658 (n.f.): A.A./Pol II (Inf II c), betr:Flämisch- Wallonische Befreiungskomitees und die Lage in Belgien, 18.12.1944. E. De Bruyne (1994) Dans l’étau de Degrelle. Le Service du Travail Wallon 1944–1945 ou de l’usine à la Waffen-SS (Jalhay); E. De Bruyne (1998) Le recrutement dans les Stalags et Oflags en faveur de la Légion Wallonie, Housse, dact., 41 p.
17. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 179–86.
18. M. P. Gingerich (1997), p. 829. 19. J. L. Leleu (2007), chapter 3.
20. Ibid., chapter 8.
21. Ibid., p. 224–25.
22. We only know the number of candidates in Bavaria in 1941. BABL, NS 31/145 (fol. 9): Ergänzungsstelle Süd (VII) an SS-Hauptamt/II, betr:Rassische Statistik für 1941, 14.7.1942.
23. BABL, NS 19/218 (fol. 84–85): Arbeit des Ergänzungsamtes, 5.6.1942.
24. BABL, NS 19/3517 (fol. 154): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 43/41 g, betr: HJ/Luftwaffe, 26.2.1941.
25. BABL, NS 19/1863 (fol. 23): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an Stabsführer des SS-Oberabschnittes Süd, 4.5.1940; NS 19/2651 (fol. 24–25): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Chef des SS-Personalhauptamtes, 536/43 g, betr.: Beförderungen, 29.1.1943.
26. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 201f.
27. Age of roll-call for the young conscripts in the Services varied considerably during the war (officially from 22 to 16). At the beginning (i.e. August 1939), age groups born in 1918 and 1919 were called. But, between February 1941 and October 1942, four age groups born between 1921 and 1924 were incorporated in order to prepare for the war against Russia and then to fill the losses of the army on the Eastern Front. See B. R. Kroener (1988) “Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1942”, in B. R. Kroener et al. (eds.) Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen, 1. Halbband: 1939– 1941 (Stuttgart), 693–986, p. 727.
28. BABL, NS 19/3517 (fol. 245): Einberufungen bei der Waffen-SS im Jahr 1940.
29. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg im Breisgau (later BAMA), RH 20-7/105: Bericht über die Fahrt des Chefs des Generalstabes in Bereich des LXXXVII. A.K. u. XXV. A.K. v. 27–29.3.1943, 30.3.1943, § II, p. 3. H. Heiber (ed.) (1962) Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945 (Stuttgart), p. 335 (26.7.1943).
30. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA (later NARA), RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 9 SS Div “Hohenstaufen”. A statistical Survey, 15/16.1.1945, p. 4; RG 165/Entry 179/Box 719: PWIS (H)/LDC/219 & 223; Box 721: PWIS (H)/LF/397.
31. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa (PAC), RG 24, C 17, vol. 13651: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 236, 21.2.1945, § II, p. 2. See too NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 62 VG Div, a statistical survey, 6/7.1.1945, p. 3. Service Historique de la Défense-Terre, Vincennes (later SHD-Terre), 7 P 149-3, Front Ouest: Situation des forces allemandes au 31.1.1945 (annexe 1). B. R. Kroener (1999) “Menschenbewirtschaftung, Bevölkerungsverteilung und personelle Rüstung in der zweiten Kriegshälfte 1942–1944”, in B. R. Kroener et al. (eds.) Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen, 2. Halbband: 1942– 1944/45, (Stuttgart), 777–1001, p. 997f.
32. M. Cüppers (2005), p. 83f.
33. SA = Sturmabteilung (Storm Group); NSKK = Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahr-Korps (National Socialist Motor Corps). BABL, NS 31/299 (fol. 2): Oberste SA-Führung/Hauptamt Führung, Briefb. Nr. 11159, 28.10.1939; Ausführungsbestimmungen zur Anordnung des Stellvertreters des Führers v. 19.1.1940, betr: Ergänzung der Waffen-SS (Auszug); NS 19/3901: Reichsführer-SS, SS-Befehl, 27.11.1939; ibid., 13.12.1939; NS 19/1863: Lieber Pg. Hess !, Lieber Pg. Dr. Ley !, 26.1.1940; NS 31/366 (fol. 81–83): Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS/I an alle Ergänzungsstellen, betr: Einstellung von Werkscharmännern und Politischen Leitern, 16.1.1940; NS 19/3510 (fol. 149–151): Mob-Personal-Bestand der NSDAP, ihrer Gliederungen und angeschlossenen Verbände, 5.2.1940; NS 19/3521 (fol. 282): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an Reichsführer-SS, 45/40 g.K., betr: Übersichtsliste, 2.4.1940; NS 19/218 (fol. 74): Arbeit des Ergänzungsamtes, 5.6.1942.
34. NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 9 SS Div “Hohenstaufen”, 15/16.1.1945, p. 2 ; Box 64: ibid., 12 VG Div, 1/2.3.1945, p. 2.
35. Der Reichsführer SS – SS-Hauptamt (1943) Dich ruft die SS (Berlin-Grünewald and Leipzig), p. 6f.
36. BABL, NS 19/3520 (fol. 23): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an alle Leiter der Ergänzungsstellen, 13/40 g., 1.2.1940.
37. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (later BAKO), Plakate 3/25/13, 3/25/20, 3/25/22, 3/25/25.
38. BAKO, Plakat 3/25/11. BABL, NS 31/154 (fol. 105): Ein Wille: Sieg! For more details and examples of some placards, see J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 232–41 and colour inset after p. 304.
39. Ibid., p. 255–60.
40. Franz Hellebaut to Léon Degrelle, in E. De Bruyne (1991), Les Wallons meurent à l’Est : La Légion Wallonie et Léon Degrelle sur le Front russe 1941– 1945 (Brussels), p. 130. See too A. Luyckx (1946–1947) “La répression de l’incivisme en Belgique. Aspects judiciaire, pénitentiaire et social. Les porteurs d’armes”, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 843–55.
41. See the reports of the XXth Military District (Wehrkreis) of Danzig (Gdansk) dated of 10th and 18th June 1940, in BAMA, RH 14/44 (fol. 141–168). BABL, NS 19/979: Oberster SA-Führer/Stabschef an Stellvertreter des Führers, betr: Übertritt zur SS, 26.6.1940. Tribunal Militaire International (vol. XLII), SS-28, p. 481. B. R. Kroener (2005), “Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet”: Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm. Eine Biographie (Paderborn), p. 907/n 144.
42. BABL, NS 19/3517: Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, Aktion 20.000 Mann, 1. Meldung, 14.5.1941; 2. Meldung, 20.5.1941; 3. Meldung, 24.5.1941; NS 19/3518: Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, betr: 20.000 Mann-Aktion (Zusammenstellung der Einberufungen 15.4.41–9.6.41), 6.6.1941; NS 19/3518 (fol. 151–165); NS 19/2652 (fol. 2–3): NSDAP/Gauleitung Halle-Merseburg/Gauleiter, Schnellbrief an Reichsverteidigungskommissar Dresden, 27.5.1941. B. Wegner (1997), p. 275/n 57, 276/n 64. P. Witte et al. (1999) Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42 (Hamburg), p. 428/ n52.
43. B. Wegner (1997), p. 277.
44. J. L. Leleu (1999) 10. SS-Panzer-Division “Frundsberg” (Bayeux), p. 10–13. H. Höhne (1995), p. 338–40. G. Rempel (Januar 1980) “Gottlob Berger and the Waffen-SS Recruitment, 1939–1945”, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 27, 107–22, p. 114–15.
45. BABL, NS 31/148 (fol. 8): betr: Angehörige der Allgemeine SS, die eine Dienstleistung in der Waffen-SS ablehnen, 31.7.1941; NS 19/3665 (fol. 56): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 228/41 g.K., betr: Besprechung OKW, 8.12.1941. H. Buchheim (1994), “Befehl und Gehorsam” in H. Buchheim et al. (eds.) Anatomie des SS-Staates, 6th edn (Munich), p. 213– 320, here p. 314–18.
46. BABL, NS 19/229 (fol. 3 & 5): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 931/43 g, betr: Nachersatz, 11.2.1943; SS-Hauptamt/II an Reichsführer-SS, 12.2.1943, 12.40 Uhr; NS 19/3871 (fol. 32): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 390/43 g.K., betr: Vortrag General Schmundt bei Reichsführer-SS, 18.4.1943. See too VHA, SS-Ausb.Btl. z.b.V., 11/3: SS-SSFührungshauptamt/ V/IE (A/VIII) an SS-Ausbildungs-Bataillon z.b.V., SS-Tr. Üb.Pl. “Heidelager”, II/3854/43 g, betr: Beschwerden gegen Einberufung, 29.5.1943.
47. G. Weisenborn (2000) Une Allemagne contre Hitler, 1st edn 1953 (Paris), p. 150f. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 712: M.I.19(a)/PWIS/366, Report on the interrogation of SS-Mann S. Alfred of “SS-Reichsführer”, -.4.1944; RG 165/Entry 179/Box 719: PWIS (H)/LDC/108, Consolidated Report on 21 Alsatians of SS PGR 4 “DF”, 13.7.1944. SHD-Terre, 10 P 141, chemise 1re Armée Française/2e bureau/Section PG (États numériques): Direction du Service des PG de la Zone Avant de l’Armée, n°361, Note de service concernant les Alsaciens et les Lorrains incorporés de force dans les Waffen “SS”, 8.3.1945.
48. BABL, NS 19/4 (fol. 57): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 5199/43 g, betr: Untersuchung des Jhrg. 1927 (später 28 u. 29), 17.8.1943.
49. B. R. Kroener (1999), p. 858.
50. As in this case described by a US intelligence report: “PW[,] a former G[erman] A[ir] F[orce] man[,] volunteered for the SS because he admired both the SS and Himmler.” NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First US Army, Prisoner of War Report, 20/21.1.1945 (#12).
51. SHD-Terre, 10 P 142-2: Mobile Field Interrogation Unit N° 2, PW Intelligence Bulletin N° 2/26, 12.1.1945, § 12, p. 16.
52. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 716: Mobile Unit N° 1 Field Interrogation Detachment, Prisoner of War Intelligence Bulletin 1/14, 4.12.1944; ibid. 1/19, 26.12.1944, p. 8. PAC, RG 24, C 17, vol. 13648: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 153, 30.11.1944, § II, p. 6. SHD-Terre, 10 P 141, chemise 1er CA/EM/2e bureau: 1re Armée Française/EM/2e bureau/ Section PG, Compte Rendu N° 240, 9.4.1945. A. Míšková and V. Šustek (2000) Josef Pfitzner. A Protektorátní Praha V Letech 1939–1945, Tome 1: Deník Josefa Pfitznera : Úøední korespondence Josefa Pfitznera sKarlem Hermannem Frankem (Prague), p. 197 (7.10.1944).
53. BABL, NS 31/366 (fol. 120): Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS/II, betr: Untersuchung der Volksdeutschen aus den russischen Umsiedlungsgebieten auf Tauglichkeit für die Waffen-SS und Allgemeine SS, 2.10.1940.
54. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 2–6 & 9): Leiter der Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle an Reichsführer-SS, 18.6.1942; Reichsführer-SS an SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, AR 36/24/42, 13.7.1942 (cit.); Reichsführer-SS, AR 36/41/42, Lieber Lorenz, 10.8.1942. V. O. Lumans (Sept. 1989) “The Military Obligations of the Volksdeutsche in Eastern Europe toward the Third Reich”, East European Quarterly, XXIII:3, 305–25, p. 312.
55. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 26–28 & 34): SS-Führungshauptamt/B 12f/V/IIb (1) an Pers.Stab/Reichsführer-SS, II/3817/43 g, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen, 27.5.1943; Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS/ Pers.Stab, 3706/43 g, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen im Südosten, 16.6.1943; Hauptamt SS-Gericht an SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS, Ia 155 35/42, betr: Völkische Wehrdienstpflicht von Volksdeutschen ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit, 11.11.1943. P. Witte et al. (1999), p. 351/n 67, 534/n 2. G. Stein (1967), p. 186.
56. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 1 & 29): SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS an Hauptamt SS-Gericht, 198/43, betr: Völkische Wehrdienstpflicht von Volksdeutschen ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit, 19.6.1943; Aktenvermerk für SS-Obf. Bender, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen aus dem Südost-Raum, 14.2.1945.
57. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 64): SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS an SS-Standartenführer Dr. Brandt, II-1318/4[5], betr: Wehrpflicht der Deutschen aus den Volksgruppen, 19.2.1945.
58. VHA, SS-Nachr.Stelle “NW”, 10/3: Spruch 2458, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an SS-Hauptamt/SS-Ergänzungsamt, 22.2.1941, 14.45 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle “NW”, 11/4: FS 2826, SS-Standartenführer Jungclaus an Reichsführer-SS, 6.3.1941, 18.50 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle “NW”, 12/4: FS 3046, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 18.3.1941, 18.15 Uhr; FS 3065, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 19.3.1941, 9.30 Uhr.
59. The SS respected in the same way its volunteers who enlisted into its “Germanic legions” (these legions were composed of “Germanic” foreigners who presented a good “racial value” for the SS, but did not conform to its strict physical requirements – such as minimum height – and therefore could not be SS members). So at the same time, October 1942, 2,154 of the 9,773 volunteers serving in the “Germanic legions” had been released (22.0%) and 747 killed (7.6%). BABL, NS 31/455 (fol. 34): SS-Hauptamt/VI, Statistische Aufstellung über zur Waffen-SS und Legion eingestellte, entlassene und gefallene germanische Freiwillige, Stand: 30.10.42, 14.12.1942.
60. Facing the accusations, the SS-Hauptamt of course denied such doings. PA/ AA, Inl II/D, R 100658 (n.f.): Königl. Schwedisches Konsulat Düsseldorf/ Niederländische Schutzmachtangelegenheit an Kgl. Schwedische Gesandtschaft/Abt. B, 193/12a, 11.3.1943; SS-Hauptamt/Germanische Leitstelle/Amtsgruppe D, Herrn Konsul Dr. Ashton, A.A., 2.4.1943; Königl. Schwedische Gesandtschaft/Abteilung B an A.A., B N 167/3, Mi/J, Verbalnote, 9.6.1944; SS-Hauptamt/Amtsgruppe D/D II 2 an A.A., betr: Werbung von Niederländern für die Waffen-SS, 8.11.1944.
61. BABL, NS 19/3650: Reichsführer-SS an SS-Obergruppenführer Rauter, 23.2.1945. N.K.C.A In ’t Veld (1976) De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-Archieven 1935–1945 (’S-Gravenhage, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie/M. Nijhoff), 2 vol., 1692 p., vol. II, p. 1481 (doc. 647).
62. BABL, NS 19/2117 (fol. 2–3): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 2042/43 g.K., betr: Reise nach Kroatien, 13.7.1943; NS 19/2601 (fol. 169): 13.SS-Div., Flugblattentwurf Nr.2. BAMA, MSg 175/55: 13e Division de Montagne “Handschar” des Waffen SS, p. 2. M. D. Grmek and L. L. Lambrichs (1998) Les révoltés de Villefranche: Mutinerie d’un bataillon de Waffen-SS à Villefranche-de-Rouergue, septembre 1943 (Paris), p. 158–60, 166. G. Lepre (1997) Himmler’s Bosnian Division. The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943– 1945 (Atglen), p. 37. H. Sundhausen (1971) “Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien, 1941–1945”, Südost-Forschungen, 30, 176–196, p. 193.
63. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 716: Mobile Unit N° 1 Field Interrogation Detachment, Prisoner of War Intelligence Bulletin 1/19, 26.12.1944, § 4, p. 7.
64. PAC, RG 24, C 17, vol. 13645: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 27, 26.7.1944, § II, p. 2.
65. BABL, NS 33/31 (fol. 10): Rede des SS-Obergruppenführers Jüttner auf der SS-Führer-Tagung in Prag am 13. April 1944, p. 9. PA/AA, Inl II g, R 100998, 2577 (fol. 393393): 13.SS-Div./Ic 77/44 g.K., Richtlinien für die Sicherung des Landfriedens in Bosnien, 9.3.1944.