War and Game

The 1990s opened with a second Iraqi invasion, this time of Kuwait. A far smaller and weaker target than Iran, oil-rich Kuwait rapidly fell on 2 August 1990, and, six days later, Saddam Hussein declared Kuwait Iraq’s nineteenth province. The response defined high-spectrum warfare for the following decade. Concerned about the impact of Iraqi expansion in the centre of the world’s oil production, George H. Bush, the US President, rapidly began diplomatic and military preparations for conflict, and Iraq’s failure to press on ensured that the initiative thereafter rested with its opponents. On 3 August two US carrier groups were ordered towards the region and, on 8 August, in response to a Saudi request for ground troops two days earlier, the first US troops arrived. The build-up of coalition forces in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, forces benefiting from the availability of Saudi oil and bases, was matched by a blockade intended to hit Iraqi trade, especially oil exports.

Iraq’s refusal to meet a UN deadline for withdrawal, led, on 17 January 1991, to the start of a major air offensive. Although aircraft from twelve countries were involved, the US was central to the offensive, which worked because of the rapid success in overcoming the sophisticated Iraqi anti-aircraft system; Saddam had used French and Soviet technology to produce an integrated system in which computers linked radars and missiles. Iraq’s heavily outnumbered air force did not intervene in force; instead the MIG-29s flew to Iran where they were added to the air force. The air offensive benefited from state-of-the-art US weaponry: F-117A Stealth bombers able to minimize radar detection bombed Baghdad – one of the most heavily defended cities in the world – and did so with impunity, while the US made effective use of guided bombs. Thermal imaging laser-designation systems were employed to guide the bombs to their target, and pilots launched bombs into the ‘cone’ of the laser beam in order to score a direct hit. The use of stealth and precision meant that it was possible to employ a direct air assault aimed at overcoming the entire Iraqi air-system, rather than an incremental roll-back campaign. The destruction of the air-defence system, with only one aircraft lost (to an Iraqi MIG-29) on the first night, was a triumph, not only for weaponry but also for planning, that made full use of the opportunities presented by the weapons, while also out-thinking the Iraqis, for example by getting them to bring their radars to full power, and thus exposing them to attack. As a result of the subsequent air assault, Iraqi ground forces were short of supplies, their command and control system was heavily disrupted, so that they could not ‘understand’ the battle, and their morale was low.

In February 1991, Iraq was driven from Kuwait in a swift campaign in which the Iraqis were out-generalled and out-fought by coalition forces that benefited not only from superior technology, but also from their ability to maintain a high-tempo offensive while executing a well-conceived plan that combined air and land forces. Allied (Coalition) fighting quality, unit cohesion, leadership and planning, and Iraqi deficiencies in each, all played a major role in ensuring victory. The Iraqis had surrendered mobility by entrenching themselves to protect their conquest of Kuwait. The US employed satellite surveillance, Patriot antimissile missiles against Iraqi attacks, and Cruise missiles and guided bombs to provide precise bombardment. In the ground war, which began at 4 am on 24 February, the Iraqis were defeated with heavy casualties, while their opponents lost few men, the US suffering 143 battle fatalities, 33 from ‘friendly fire’. Predictions that Iraqi entrenchments would be difficult to take, and that the Iraqis would force attritional warfare on the coalition, causing heavy casualties, proved mistaken. While the Iraqis were attacked on the direct route to Kuwait City, their right flank was outmanoeuvred by a rapid US advance to the west which put tremendous pressure on the Iraqis as the outflanking US forces turned, on 27 February, to attack them and destroyed much of the Iraqi army. The following morning, President Bush ordered a ceasefire, with the Iraqis, in 100 hours of non-stop combat, having lost over 50,000 dead, as well as 81,000 prisoners and nearly 4,000 tanks.

Despite the rapid victory, the US doctrine of AirLand Battle proved more difficult to execute in practice than to advance in theory, and to train for, not least due to the problems of synchronizing air and land forces under fast-moving combat conditions. However, compared to earlier conflicts, such as the Linebacker ii air offensive on North Vietnam in December 1972, there was unified control over air operations – a single air manager (the Joint Force Air Component Commander), target acquisition and accuracy were effective, and the pace of the air attack was maintained; even if some of the high-tech weaponry, such as the Patriot missile and British runway-cratering bombs, did less well than was claimed at the time. In addition, important parts of the Allied military did not use weaponry that was available. For example, the US used 9,300 precision-guided munitions, but most of their aircraft were not equipped or their pilots trained for their use and, instead, employed unguided munitions, which made up 90 per cent of the aerial munitions used. This was despite the extensive and effective use of precision-guided munitions in the Linebacker I and II campaigns in Vietnam in 1972. Similarly, although the US had developed stealth aircraft, most of their aircraft lacked this capability.

The conflict also saw Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel, and, although they did not achieve their desired aim of bringing Israel into the war, and thus jeopardizing Arab support for the USA, especially from Saudi Arabia and Syria, they underlined Israeli vulnerability. Concerned that, as a result of its inaction, their deterrence had been lessened, the Israeli government wished to take reprisals, but, aside from discouraging weather conditions, the Israelis were affected by US opposition to such action. The USA did, however, provide Israel with satellite information and Patriot batteries. The need to counter the military and, even more, the political threat from Scud missiles dramatized the implications of the spread of weaponry. American anti-missile doctrine had long focused on Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles, but the Scuds indicated that short-range anti-missile defences and doctrine were also necessary, and drew attention to the problems of relying on the Patriot missiles for that purpose.
For the US and British navies, the war marked the major change that followed the end of the Cold War. In place of a doctrine focused on defeating Soviet naval forces in a struggle for maritime routes, came littoral force-projection and amphibious capability at the expense of a state, Iraq, with no real naval power.

The failure to keep military objectives and political goals in harmony, however, helped ensure that the Gulf War did not lead to the hoped-for overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The US decision to end the offensive was taken in haste, in a war that was very high-tempo, without an adequate consideration of how to translate the outcome of the campaign into a durable post-war settlement. This was linked to military factors, specifically the persistence of ‘friction’ and ‘fog’: ‘At the operational level, it is clear that Schwarzkopf lost track of the position of his forces and Iraqi troops at a critical point in the battle’.

A failure to distinguish victory from operational success helped ensure that the wrong decisions were taken when ‘battlefield commanders were allowed to improvise decisions that should have been made at the highest political levels’. The civilian leadership permitted the decision to end the war to be governed by military considerations, specifically the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but the major goal, in fact, was political: the need to create a stable post-war situation in the Gulf, and the military pre-conditions for such stability were ultimately a political judgement. Secretary of State James Baker, however, offered little guidance during meetings held to discuss whether it was time to end the war.

Instead, after the coalition ceased its advance, Hussein was able to use his forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guard and its artillery and tanks, to smash a rebellion by the country’s Shia majority, causing heavy casualties and destroying Shia shrines in Karbala and Najaf. In contrast, in Operation Provide Comfort, a multi-service, multinational task force protected the Kurds in northern Iraq from action by Hussein’s forces. The war was followed by the long-term use of Allied airpower to try to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its military, an expensive commitment that had only limited success; not least because policing Iraqi ‘no-fly zones’ was easier than influencing developments on the ground.
The understandable focus on the US contribution to the war, which included over half a million military personnel, has led to an underestimation of its impact on other states. For all those militaries that took part, the war raised issues of force-projection, logistics, and interoperability, although the last was eased by the experience of many in cooperation through NATO. The contribution of those that did not send forces into the combat zone, but did provide financial support and/or indirect military help by freeing coalition units for operations, principally Germany and Japan, was important, although it also raised questions about their future military role.