War and Game

Richard III's usurpation drove many Yorldsts to support Henry Tudor, the hitherto hopeless last Lancastrian. The 1483 rebellion was easily suppressed. In 1485, Henry Tudor's rapid march made Richard fight before his muster was complete. But at Bosworth he was betrayed by the nobles who backed him in 1483. The invasion of the 'Yorkist' imposter Lambert Simnel in 1487 did not seriously trouble Henry VII, since he attracted little support. Stoke, the last battle of the Wars of the Roses, has the reputation of a close run affair. It was not. Henry VII was not betrayed by his partisans, unlike Richard III.


After the murder of Henry VI in the Tower, and the death of his heir Edward in 1471, Edward IV enjoyed twelve years of peace. He died prematurely in 1483, leaving as heir the twelve year-old Edward V. Edward IV had made his brother Richard the greatest noble in the north, a power he now used to usurp the throne, causing a new civil war. During August 1483, former servants of Edward IV, his widow's family, and the duke of Buckingham (who was instrumental in Richard's usurpation), accepted that Edward V was dead, and plotted to make an obscure Lancastrian exile, Henry Tudor, king. There were risings across southern England in October, but in Wales, Buckingham attracted no support and Richard encountered little resistance. By the time Henry was proclaimed king in Cornwall the revolt was dead. Richard survived in 1483 because his magnate backers, Norfolk, Northumberland, and Stanley, remained loyal. The surviving Yorkist plotters joined Henry and his Lancastrian companions in Brittany.

During 1484, Richard was based centrally at Nottingham awaiting an invasion which never came, as Henry Tudor was unable to secure foreign backing. This waiting exhausted Richard's resources. Henry Tudor formally landed in Wales on 7 August 1485, with a few hundred mainly Yorkist exiles and 4,000 French mercenaries. They marched rapidly through Wales, seeking to fight before Richard could complete his muster. Henry gained little support, but no attempt was made to stop him either. He was in touch with the Stanley family, who promised to defect. Richard, at Leicester, was also eager for battle as he detected signs of crumbling loyalty.

The battlefield at Bosworth cannot be located precisely, but a broad outline of the fighting is possible. The battle lasted some two hours. Richard's forces considerably outnumbered Henry's army of around 5,000 men. His large vanguard of cavalry, infantry, and archers attacked and was pinned by Henry's smaller vanguard. Richard led his household around the melee to attack Henry's own force, threatening Henry's life. However, Sir William Stanley, waiting on one side, committed his force of 3,000 to crush Richard's isolated troop. According to Henry's court historian, Polydore Vergil, 'king Richard alone was killed fighting manfully in the thickest press of his enemies... his courage was high and fierce and failed him not even at the death which, when his men forsook him, he preferred to take by the sword rather than, by foul flight, to prolong his life'. Richard's death ended the battle. Richard's charge was a desperate gamble rather than a brilliant manoeuvre: he had failed to keep the loyalty of the nobles who brought him to the throne (Lord Stanley and Northumberland, who profited greatly from the usurpation, did not fight) and risked his life before committing his whole army.

Henry VII represented Yorkist legitimism as well as Lancaster, making his position more stable than Richard's, but early in his reign he was vulnerable. In 1487, an impostor was crowned in Ireland as 'Edward VI'. In June, two surviving Ricardians, the earl of Lincoln and Lord Lovel, landed in Lancashire with 2,000 German mercenaries, paid for by Edward IV's sister Margaret of Burgundy, and up to 5,000 Irish levies. Support in Yorkshire was disappointing, despite the region's connections with Richard III, and York refused to admit the ill-disciplined Irish. However, Northumberland failed to deal with the rebels. Henry awaited the support of the Stanleys and precise news of Lincoln's route in the east Midlands, before intercepting the rebels at East Stoke, south-west of Newark. He had a large army, whose vanguard alone sufficed to defeat Lincoln's forces. The poorly equipped Irish were of little threat to Henry, and the German mercenaries were too few in number. Unlike in 1485, this time there was no treachery among the King’s chief supporters. This battle of Stoke marked the end of the Wars of the Roses because it was the last time Henry VII had to fight a pitched battle against a pretender.

In 1469, Edward IV was captured after his former ally Warwick destroyed his forces at Edgecote. He was more alert in 1470, defeating the rebels at 'Losecote field', but Warwick escaped after both sides manoeuvred skilfully. By the end of 1470, Edward was an exile, after Warwick's alliance with Margaret revived the Lancastrian cause. Edward IV invaded in March 1471, seizing the initiative to defeat his enemies separately, forcing battle at Barnet and Tewkesbury, before they joined forces. Fauconberg's attack on London was the only town siege of the wars. The city authorities resisted, knowing that Edward was approaching.

In 1469, Warwick and Edward's brother Clarence harnessed popular discontent to gain control themselves. Warwick met up with an army of his Yorkshire tenants to isolate Edward from London and intercept the earls of Pembroke and Devon who were leading men to Edward at Nottingham. Pembroke's Welsh men-at-arms were defeated near Banbury (battle of Edgecote, 26 July) where he fought unsupported by Devon's West Country archers, possibly due to a quarrel. However, Warwick could not command obedience; in September he released Edward, who apparently forgave him. In early 1470, Warwick tried again. A Lincolnshire rising was intended to join Warwick at Leicester on 12 March, to trap Edward between them and a Yorkshire army. However, Edward was alert. The Lincolnshire rebels tried to ambush Edward near Stamford, before he could unite his forces at Grantham, to save their leader's father from execution. Warned by his spies and scouts, Edward routed them at 'Lose-cote field'. By 18 March, his army growing every day, Edward had put his army across Warwick's way into Yorkshire. But then Warwick's vanguard feinted towards Rotherham and, as Edward advanced to fight, he escaped across the Pennines. Edward could not follow at once, owing to the lack of provisions in the thinly populated uplands and the need to pacify Yorkshire. Warwick and Clarence escaped to France where king Louis XI, in order to gain English support against Burgundy, reconciled the arch-enemies Margaret and Warwick and funded an invasion. Although Edward easily dealt with a rising of Warwick's retainers in Yorkshire (August 1470), in early September a storm scattered Anglo-Burgundian ships in the Channel, allowing Warwick to land. When Warwick's brother Montagu defected, Edward barely escaped to Burgundy, and Henry VI was restored to the throne.

In March 1471, Edward sailed for England with almost 2,000 troops, including 300 hand-gunners provided by the duke of Burgundy. An Italian diplomat reported that 'men think he will leave his skin there'. In the following weeks, Edward took calculated risks to defeat Warwick and Margaret (who was still in France) separately, while they failed to concentrate their forces. Since Edward landed in Yorkshire where he had few supporters, he claimed only his family lands. The dominant local landowner, Northumberland, let him pass, while Montagu at Pontefract failed to intercept his small force. A bold advance on Newark dispersed some 4,000 Lancastrians, and then Lord Hastings led in the first significant support of 3,000 well-equipped men. At the end of March, Warwick sensibly withdrew into the walled town of Coventry, refusing battle. Although Clarence, with 4,000 men, defected to Edward (3 April), greater reinforcements joined Warwick. Edward broke the deadlock by seizing London (11 April). Warwick had to follow, and Edward advanced with less than 10,000 to confront his larger army at Barnet. In the dark, Edward pushed his men forward for a dawn attack to neutralize Warwick's artillery. Owing to this, the armies were not aligned, so when Edward attacked after four o'clock on Easter Sunday (14 April), his outflanked left fled, pursued by Warwick's right. But in the dense mist, the rest of his army fought on, oblivious. His right enveloped Warwick's left, but the battle was decided in the centre. After three hours of intense combat, in which Edward fought prominently, Warwick's army broke. Casualties were heavy: more than 1,000 dead were reported, among them Warwick and Montagu. The same evening, Margaret landed in the south-west.

Rather than strike before Edward replaced his losses, the Lancastrians decided to join their supporters in the northwest and Wales, which required them to cross the Severn. To deceive Edward they made feints towards London. Edward remained in the Thames valley, keeping both routes covered, then advanced 30 miles (48km) on 29 April to guard the Severn at Gloucester. The Lancastrians successfully lured Edward south by appearing to offer battle, while their army refreshed itself at Bristol before a forced march overnight to Gloucester. Fortunately for Edward, the constable refused them entry, condemning them to march to the next crossing at Tewkesbury. Having covered 50 miles (80km) in 36 hours, the Lancastrians were too exhausted to cross that afternoon. Consequently, Edward's army was able to catch them, covering more than 30 miles (48km) on 3 May on the open downland, to camp 3 miles (5km) away. Although the Lancastrian strategy had failed, they held a strong site on a low ridge for the now unavoidable battle. Goaded by Yorkist artillery and archery, Somerset led the Lancastrian right down to attack Edward's centre, using the close terrain to approach unseen. However, his division was squeezed between the Yorkist centre and left, then routed by a surprise attack by 200 men-at-arms Edward had concealed in a wood. The Yorkists then defeated the Lancastrian centre and left separately. The Lancastrians in the north collapsed following Tewkesbury, but in Kent, Thomas Fauconberg (a cousin of Warwick) threatened London with a considerable force. News of Edward's victory emboldened the city authorities to resist, a course of action unusual in the Wars of the Roses. Guns were mounted on the river wall and the gates were protected with bulwarks and guns. Fauconberg's assaults on London Bridge and the city gates (1 2 and 14 May) were beaten off. His ships' guns mounted on the south bank of the Thames were overwhelmed by London's artillery. The approach of Edward's advance guard hastened the dispersal of Fauconberg's men.

In December 1460, the Lancastrians mustered a new army, and killed Richard of York at Wakefield. This began a prolonged mid-winter campaign, involving most of the English nobility. Margaret brushed Warwick aside at St Albans, but failed to occupy London, allowing Edward of York to be declared king. He pursued the Lancastrians to Yorkshire, where two days of heavy fighting culminated in his victory. Although he was dilatory in snuffing out the last Lancastrians in Northumberland' they were not a serious threat.

The most intense fighting of the Wars of the Roses took place between 1460-61. While Margaret waited at Coventry for York to invade from Dublin, she failed to send adequate forces to defeat the Yorkists at Calais. Some 2,000 Yorkists seized a bridgehead at Sandwich (June 1460), and by promising good government attracted men in Kent, and cash and transport in London. Warwick advanced in two columns (4 and 5 July) until the Lancastrian position was known. Rain and negotiations slowed the advance. Although many contingents were still on the road, the Lancastrians were confident in their fortified camp near Northampton. But when the Yorkists attacked on 10 July, 'the ordnance of the king's guns availed not, for that day was so great rain that the guns...were quenched and might not be shot' (Anonymous London chronicler). The Kentish foot played a notable role in the assault. In barely half an hour, the Lancastrian army was in flight, betrayed by Lord Grey who let Warwick in. The casualties, around 300 in number, were mainly Lancastrian, and King Henry was captured.

York was no longer content to rule through Henry VI, but by claiming the throne himself (October 1460) he rallied support for Margaret and her son Edward. Margaret's army mustered at Hull (December), advancing to Pontefract . Rather than allow winter to discourage the Lancastrians, York and Salisbury marched north (9-21 December) to rescue their partisans in the north and to forestall defections. At York's castle of Sandal (Wakefield), they were dangerously isolated, and were surprised and defeated outside their defences in an obscure fight (30 December). York and Salisbury headed the list of the dead. Margaret's army then advanced menacingly southwards. Warwick's decision to fight close to London was wise, but at St Albans he first moved his army out of its fortified camp, then failed to locate the Lancastrian army. Somerset skilfully approached from the north-west to attack the Yorkist rear (17 February 1461) with his most reliable troops, the lords' retinues. In both armies food was scarce and the levies unreliable. The Yorkist vanguard put up a fight, but Warwick failed to rally the main body, and his Burgundian gunners could not get their cumbersome weapons into action. The Yorkists escaped into the dusk, abandoning Henry. Margaret then made a crucial error. Her withdrawal to Dunstable to await supplies from London allowed York's son Edward, victorious over the Welsh Lancastrians at Mortimer's Cross (2-3 February 1461), to reach the city, where he was proclaimed king as a last resort to justify continued rebellion. Margaret fell back in order to raise fresh troops in the north. Edward's vanguard followed on 9 March, the main division two days later, joined by contingents en route.

The armies raised for the March 146i campaign were the largest of the Wars of the Roses - possibly over 20,000 on each side, many of whom had been under arms since before Christmas. On 28 March, Yorkist patrols found the bridge over the river Aire destroyed and defended so, as the Yorkist bishop George Neville wrote 'our men could only cross by a narrow way which they themselves made and over which they forced a way at sword point, many men being slain on both sides'. Lancastrian failure to reinforce their vanguard, while Edward fed in his whole army, led to them losing a strategic obstacle. The Yorkists camped in snow and bitter cold, and next morning found the Lancastrians drawn up 6 miles (10km) away near Towton, anxious to settle the matter. A strong wind favoured the Yorkist archers, but the Lancastrian cavalry routed Edward's cavalry and pursued them. The battle was decided in their absence by the melee between the dismounted men-at-arms. The Lancastrian army, composed of many different retinues, may have lacked cohesion, and it broke after a long struggle. Many were killed as they fled, especially at Tadcastet, where the bridge had been broken to impede the Yorkists. Towton has the reputation as one of Britain's bloodiest battles, but even figures reported at the time of from 9,000 to 28,000 dead, would seem to be exaggerations. It effectively gave Edward control of England, but Henry VI escaped and Lancastrians maintained a foothold in Northumberland. Edward's inability to find reliable constables for border fortresses allowed the Lancastrian cause to revive, until his diplomacy ended Franco-Scottish support for Margaret. Then, in 1464, Warwick's brother, Lord Montagu, defeated the Lancastrians in two skirmishes. The royal siege guns, sent by sea from London, were needed only at Bamburgh. The execution of captured Lancastrian leaders, and the capture of Henry VI in 1465, extinguished support for the Lancastrian cause in England. Their last stronghold, Harlech, fell in 1468.

In these early campaigns, the issue was control of Henry VI. In 1452, York failed owing to his political isolation. In 1455, he was joined by the Nevilles, but victory at St Albans could not guarantee control of Henry VI for long. The stakes were raised in 1459 when Queen Margaret determined to remove York. His army refused to fight the king in person, but the Yorkist leaders escaped. They invaded from Calais and captured Henry at the battle of Northampton. Subsequently, York claimed the throne himself.




In February 1452, Richard of York first tried to remove Henry VI's favourite, Somerset, by force. The Lancastrian army at Northampton cut off York at Ludlow from his partisans in eastern England. When London and Kent failed to support him, he 'marvellously fortified his ground with pits, pavises, and guns' (Benet's Chronicle) - a tactic from the French war - south of the Thames near Dartford. When the king's army arrived, neither side was eager to fight and after negotiations York disbanded his forces. In 1455 , York tried again, backed by two powerful lords, Salisbury and his son Warwick. Avoiding the mistakes of 1452, they swooped on the royal army at St Albans (22 May 1455) before it was assembled. Lancastrian forces held the narrow streets of the unwalled town for an hour, but fled leaving around fifty dead when Warwick's men broke through some back gardens into the market place. The Yorkist lords killed their rivals, the duke of Somerset, Percy the earl of Northumberland, and Lord Clifford, but could not control Henry VI for long. The slide into war was led by the dominant figure at court, Henry's wife Margaret. The armies mustered in September 1459. Salisbury won a stiff skirmish at Blore Heath (23 September), but only poor co-ordination of the royal forces let him join York at Ludlow. The Yorkists boldly advanced to Worcester to avoid entrapment west of the Severn, but then fell back before the Lancastrians, until near Ludlow at Ludford Bridge they made 'a great deep ditch and fortified it with guns, carts, and stakes' (Gregory's Chronicle). The same night, the Yorkist leaders fled, dishonourably but sensibly: their army was demoralized; its elite troops from the Calais garrison were about to defect; and the presence of Henry VI with many lords in the Lancastrian army made many on the Yorkist side unwilling to fight.

The Romans landed in Africa, seized the coastal city of Aspis, and ravaged the neighboring area. Regulus advanced into the Carthaginian hinterland (apparently he intended to cut Carthage off from its allies and revenues and force it to come to terms). When he was confronted by a much larger Carthaginian army, well supplied with cavalry and elephants, he feigned retreat, lured the Carthaginian army after him into rugged terrain (where their cavalry could not operate), and smashed them. Regulus then went into winter quarters at Tunis, from which he ravaged Carthaginian territory and persuaded Carthage's Numidian allies (or subjects) to join him in ravaging Carthaginian territory. Regulus had every reason to be confident. The Romans outside Africa had won all but two (minor) engagements against the Carthaginians, he himself had defeated them in Africa, and he expected to defeat them again in the spring. Consequently, when he offered them terms, he named terms so harsh that he seemed to be goading them to further resistance rather than trying to settle the war.

During the winter, therefore, the Carthaginians sought, and found, help in a mercenary general, Xanthippus of Sparta; Xanthippus retrained and reorganized their army to fight the legion, and in the spring he met Regulus in battle. Xanthippus used 100 elephants to break the Roman formation and trample the soldiers while his cavalry encircled the Roman army and forced Regulus to surrender. The Carthaginian army killed or captured all but 2,000 Romans.

The defeat was severe but need not have been decisive; the Romans still held Aspis and their fleet of 350 ships defeated a Carthaginian fleet off Aspis and captured, or destroyed, over a hundred ships, but chance, and the Roman unfamiliarity with the sea, wrecked their plans. As their fleet was returning to Rome by way of the Messana strait, an enormous storm struck, hurled almost 300 of their ships on the rocks, strewed wreckage for fifty miles, and drowned the crews, perhaps as many as 100,000 freeborn Italians, a large number of whom were Roman citizens.

The Romans raised taxes and in three months built and manned 200 new quinqueremes, but in the next ten years the Romans suffered one disaster after another. In 253 they lost another 150 ships in a storm off Africa, and they abandoned the campaign there. In 249 the consul Claudius ignored bad weather and the consequent ill omen that the sacred chickens wouldn't eat ("let them drink, then," he said, and had them thrown overboard), and he lost 100 ships and 20,000 men in an attack on the Carthaginian fleet at Drepana.

Nonetheless, Roman tenacity, leadership, and their enormous resources drove the Carthaginian forces in Sicily to the westernmost reaches of the island where the Romans overcame storms, poor judgement, counterattacks, hunger, and the loss of naval support to cling to the siege of the great Carthaginian stronghold in the west, Lilybaeum. The Romans had suffered huge losses of men (the census of 247 B.C. shows a drop of 50,000 citizens) and materiel—a total of 1,500 warships and transports—and their treasury was depleted. The Carthaginians had suffered even more. They had lost their revenues from Africa and from their trading empire, they were about out of money to hire mercenaries (rumor had it that they had murdered Xanthippus because they could not afford to pay him), and they could no longer afford to man their fleet.

The Carthaginians sent a commission to Rome to discuss peace terms and a prisoner exchange. When the Romans rejected both, the Carthaginians attempted to put pressure on the Romans in Sicily. In 247 they send a new commander, Hamilcar Barca, to command the forces in Sicily. He was convinced that he could use his limited resources to force the Romans to agree to terms. Hamilcar Barca was a brilliant tactician, and the Romans did feel the pressure, but they responded with new determination. The Senate voted to lend money as individuals to the state to build a new fleet of 200 modern warships.

In 242 the consul Lutatius Catulus sailed the fleet to Drepana, there to confront the Carthaginians, but the Carthaginians did not have the money to pay their crews except in an emergency, and the Carthaginian fleet lay unmanned at home. They needed most of 242 to find the crews, and in March of 241 the fleet sailed—manned by raw crews—with the intention of picking up Hamilcar and his men to use as marines, but Catulus intercepted them at the Aegates Islands. The Romans sank fifty ships and captured seventy. The Roman victory totally isolated the Carthaginians in Sicily, and the Carthaginians were compelled to accept Roman terms—to evacuate Sicily, to return all prisoners, to pay an indemnity of 2,200 talents over ten years, and to make an immediate payment of 1,100 talents; each side was to hold its possessions without interference from the other.

The First Punic War was over.

As their reputation grew, so did requests for their aid. An Italic people calling themselves the Mamertines ("devoted to Mamers," their god of war) had seized the Sicilian town of Messana, appealed to the Carthaginians to help them against the tyrant of Syracuse, Hiero (who wanted to expel them), and then had second thoughts about the garrison the Carthaginians imposed on them. They sought help from the Roman Senate, but the Senate referred the question to the Roman people: Carthage did not threaten Rome's control of Italy, and it had the greatest monetary resources of any city-state in the Mediterranean—an annual tribute of 12,000 talents. The Roman people voted to accept the alliance.

The consul of 264 B.C., Appius Claudius (nicknamed "the Log"), mobilized his forces and dispatched an advance party, which fought its way into the harbor of Messana. The Mamertines ordered the Carthaginians to leave, the Carthaginian commander complied (he had no orders to fight the Romans), and he returned home, there to have his decision repudiated with a death sentence. A Carthaginian army under the command of Hanno was sent to cooperate with Hiero's Syracusan army and put Messana under siege.

The First Punic War (264-241) had begun.

The Romans had a clear and simple strategy—gain a foothold in Sicily, expand their control (and limit Carthaginian control) throughout the island, and then invade Africa and knock Carthage out of the war. Up to a point all went exactly as they planned. Appius Claudius ferried his army across the straits of Messana at night, forced Hiero to retire to Syracuse, drove Hanno from the field, and thus, in two quick operations, accomplished Rome's primary objective—to preserve its new ally, Messana, and to acquire a base of operations.

In 263 B.C. two new consuls convinced Hiero to sign a fifteen-year treaty: the Romans recognized him as "king" of Syracuse, and Hiero paid the Romans an indemnity of 100 talents. At first the Romans were able to win support in Sicily by spreading the Ptolemaic story that they were the descendants of the Trojans—they granted freedom and autonomy to two Sicilian cities that asserted a connection with Aeneas—but soon they committed an act that repulsed Sicily.

The Carthaginians had retired to their base at Agrigentum, and the Romans wasted no time in putting them under siege; they built a double wall around the city, to blockade it and to protect themselves from a Carthaginian relief force of 50,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, which soon besieged the Romans besieging Agrigentum. The siege of Agrigentum demonstrated Roman tenacity and confirmed Hiero's loyalty: the Romans ran out of food but did not lift the siege; Hiero broke through the Carthaginian lines to resupply the Romans; a massive Carthaginian assault on the Roman siege works was beaten off with heavy losses, and the Carthaginian garrison inside the city decided to use the cover of the assault to abandon Agrigentum. The Roman commanders occupied Agrigentum and then shocked Sicilian Greeks by giving the city to their troops to sack and by selling the entire population into slavery.

Although the Romans had been successful so far, they now realized that the war would require them to subjugate the whole of Sicily and to neutralize the Carthaginian outposts in Sardinia and Corsica.
Consequently the Roman Senate authorized the construction of a fleet of 20 triremes and 100 quinqueremes (a captured Carthaginian ship was the prototype), and they drafted 30,000 oarsmen to "sit and sweat" at rowing machines on land—the trick to rowing with banks of oars is to train the quinquereme's five-man tier to pull together. The Carthaginians' long experience at sea seemed to give them the upper hand, but a simple invention, the "raven," a boarding plank with a spike at one end and a hinge at the other, changed the nature of war at sea. The consul, Duillius, in command of this new Roman fleet, found the Carthaginians near Mylae. Duillius had thirty ships fewer than the Carthaginians, and he was the first Roman ever to fight a sea battle. The ravens, however, worked perfectly. They locked Roman ships to Carthaginian, and Roman soldiers crossed the planks and slaughtered the Carthaginian crews. Duillius eliminated fifty Carthaginian ships. (The Romans were never to lose a sea battle to the Carthaginians.)

By the end of 257 the Romans had confined the Carthaginians to the western third of Sicily, they had neutralized the Carthaginian forces in Sardinia and Corsica, and they were ready to invade Africa. They organized a fleet of 300 ships with crews of 300 oarsmen and 120 marines each (a total of about 100,000 men) and two legions of about 15,000 men. The invasion force of 256 B.C. was commanded by Marcus Atilius Regulus. Regulus had to fight for his passage against a Carthaginian fleet lying off Cape Ecnomus. The Roman "ravens" worked again, and the Romans captured fifty Carthaginian ships and sank thirty.

The Greeks of south Italy and the Adriatic now looked to Rome as their protector rather than to the Spartan colony of Tarentum. The Tarentines believed that Rome had usurped the position that was rightfully theirs and, in 281, they attacked a small Roman fleet en route to the Adriatic to suppress piracy. Roman ambassadors sent to Tarentum to demand redress arrived during a festival when the Tarentines were drunk. A large crowd gathered and mocked the Romans. One drunk flung his own feces at the Roman ambassador. The Roman ambassador departed but left in the air the ominous remark, "You will wash my garment clean with your blood."

When the Tarentines sobered up, they realized that they had made a bad mistake, but they then made a worse one. They appealed to Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, to protect them. Pyrrhus knew little of the Romans, but he was an experienced general who was confident in his own abilities and in his phalanx, cavalry, and elephants. He came west not to champion the Tarentines, but to fulfill an old ambition, to unite the Greeks of Italy and Sicily in a league with himself as hegemon (as Philip and Alexander had been hegemons of the Hellenic League). Pyrrhus had been told 300,000 Italic natives stood ready to serve him. To prevent this fiction from becoming reality, the Romans garrisoned south Italy and sent a consular army to winter in Samnium.

In the beginning of the campaigning season of 280 B.C. the Roman consul forced an engagement on Pyrrhus at Heraclea. On the eve of the battle Pyrrhus observed the Romans pitching camp. When he saw the fortified camp they built, he exclaimed, "These are not barbarians." In the morning he stationed his elephants on his flanks to frighten off the Roman cavalry and used his phalanx to break the legions. The Romans lost 7,000 men; Pyrrhus lost 4,000. The master tactician, upon being congratulated for his victory, said, "Yes, one more like it and we are done." Pyrrhus marched on Rome, but he found few allies, and forty miles from Rome he turned back. He offered the Romans what he thought were generous terms: the Romans would guarantee Greek autonomy, and they would withdraw from the territory of the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. The Senate rejected the terms.

In the spring of 279 a double consular army met Pyrrhus at Asculum near the Aufidus River. The battlefield was rugged and unsuited to a phalanx, but Pyrrhus had created a flexible phalanx by putting maniples of Samnites and Lucanians between units of his phalanx. The two armies fought all day without a decision, but early the next morning the king seized favorable ground and broke the legions. The Romans retreated to their camp and defended it successfully. One consul and 6,000 Romans had been killed. Pyrrhus lost 3,500 men and was himself wounded. He had won a battle, but his next step was not clear.

At this point he was invited by Sicilian envoys to come put Sicily in order. Sicily was in turmoil because of the death of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles —Pyrrhus was the son-in-law of Agathocles—and because the Carthaginians had launched an invasion. Pyrrhus offered the Romans a truce with but one demand—that the Romans recognize the territorial integrity of Tarentum. The Senate might have agreed, had a Carthaginian admiral (with his whole fleet of 120 ships) not appeared and offered to subsidize the war against Pyrrhus, to use his fleet to blockade Pyrrhus in Tarentum, and to transport Roman troops to Sicily, if they wished, to carry on the war against Pyrrhus there. The Romans accepted the Carthaginian treaty, and the two consuls with their armies advanced on Tarentum. Pyrrhus sailed for Sicily and left the Romans with a free hand to regain control of southern Italy.

After some initial successes in Sicily Pyrrhus's schemes collapsed, and in the spring of 275 he gave up and returned to Tarentum with a much-reduced force. The two Roman consuls were operating separately against Pyrrhus's former allies—none of them would help him now—and Pyrrhus tried to defeat one consul before the other could come to his aid. At Beneventum he fought his third grim battle against the Romans; the day ended without victory for either side, but that night the other consul reached the battlefield, and Pyrrhus withdrew. Pyrrhus left a garrison in Tarentum and returned to Epirus with but a third of the forces he had brought to Italy. The Romans won this war without ever having defeated Pyrrhus in battle.

The Roman victory brought them to the attention of the eastern courts. The court poet of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, identified the Romans with the Trojans who escaped from the sack of Troy under the leadership of Aeneas, and Ptolemy made a pact of friendship with them. The victory also gave the Romans a free hand in south Italy. They subjugated the native peoples, confiscated territory, and settled colonies to further divide these people from each other and from themselves. In 272—Pyrrhus was killed in a skirmish in Argos: an old woman threw a roof tile which stunned him, and a Gallic mercenary cut off his head—the Romans laid siege to Tarentum. The consul in command made a private deal with the Epirote garrison by which they handed over the citadel to him and were allowed to leave unharmed. The Romans treated the city with decency, accepted it as a naval ally, and permanently garrisoned the citadel with a legion, both to watch Tarentum and to protect southern Italy. The Romans were now masters of the greatest resource of military citizen manpower in the western world: a quarter of a million citizen-soldiers.

Pausanias ’ misadventures and Spartan reluctance to become involved in overseas military operations handed to the Athenians leadership of the Greeks in the fight against the Persians. Spartan leadership, seen by many Greeks as corrupt and arrogant, gave way to the Athenians, who, on account of their democracy, may have been perceived as more open and friendly. Shortly after Pausanias ’ recall home, the Athenians took the initiative and established a new military alliance, the Delian League, to continue the war against the Persians (478/7). Established on Delos, Apollo ’ s sacred island, the Athenians organized the Greeks for what some imagined would be a permanent war. Rich and populous communities, especially those on the prosperous islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, provided ships and crews in the military expeditions that the Athenians led and became more powerful themselves. Communities too small or disinclined to serve in person were assessed financial contributions. The Persian War veteran and hero Aristides established these initially, his nickname ‘ the Just ’ persuading the Greeks that their monies would be handled judiciously.  Later known as phoros , or tribute, these monies were paid into a war treasury kept at Delos and were administered by a board of Athenian officials called the hellenotamiai , or ‘ treasurers of the Greeks ’ .  The first assessment totaled some 460 talents, a vast sum. The Athenians regulated the tribute and kept lists (which were published) of the assessments and how these changed in the years that followed.  So armed and funded, the Athenians acquired incredible military power enabling them to lead expeditions throughout the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean world.

Just as the Spartans faced the challenges posed by a successful wartime leader, so too did the Athenians. In the first years after the Persian defeat, Themistocles, the architect of victory at Salamis, dominated the city and engineered its recovery. He foiled a Spartan attempt to dissuade the Athenians from rebuilding their city walls, which would have left the city vulnerable to future attack. But the fickleness of the Athenian democracy, the jealousies a successful figure like Themistocles faced from enemies eager to see him fall, led to his political eclipse. In about 474/3 the Athenians ostracized him and the vote may have been rigged.  In 1937 a hoard of ostraca, or voting tokens, was found in an old well on the acropolis of Athens. Of some 191 pieces, all but one bore his name. Upon study only fourteen different hands could be read, evidence that a group of his enemies had surely gathered, written out the ostraca and then handed them out on voting day.  There is no way of knowing if these ostraca date from 474/3 or not, but they clearly indicate that Themistocles had enemies and that they were organized. Bound by the law, Themistocles left Athens and for a time resided in nearby Euboea. But then he too was caught up in the Pausanias scandal and fled to Asia where the new Great King, Artaxerxes I, son of his late rival Xerxes, gave him shelter. His former enemies welcomed him warmly and years later Themistocles died an honored exile.

Themistocles, however, had his defenders in Athens and not long after his ostracism, one of them, the Marathon veteran and playwright Aeschylus, reminded the Athenians of Themistocles ’ service to the state. His drama Persians , staged in 472/1, not only commemorated the victory over the enemy, but indirectly praised the now dishonored Themistocles. Interesting too is the identity of the choregos , the individual responsible for providing the chorus with costumes and training. Pericles, son of Xanthippus and a wartime ally of Themistocles and scion of Athens ’ grandest family, made his public debut as Aeschylus ’ benefactor, subtly showing too where his political sympathies lay.

By 467/6, some members of the Delian League began tiring of wartime life as the Persian threat receded: there seemed little reason for a military alliance, forged in the euphoria of victory, to continue. Such was the case with Naxos, an island state, which now withdrew from the alliance. The Athenians, however, did not see things this way. When making their agreement, members of the new league had ceremoniously dumped into the sea lumps of iron and pledged that until the iron floated, they would remain loyal to their oaths of membership. The Athenians saw the Naxians as oath - breakers and so responded with great force. Attacked and subdued by veteran Athenian forces, the Naxians were compelled to dismantle their city - wall and pay penalties as they were forced back into the League. The allies, quickly becoming subjects now, could see that Athens would not negotiate or arbitrate any differences: there was little choice for them other than acquiescence to Athens ’ greater power.

Naxos, however, was not the only state unhappy with the growing arrogance of power displayed by the Athenians. In 465 another island state, Thasos, broke its association with the League, as the Athenians encroached on its mainland holdings – rich in gold and silver. For some three years the Athenians assailed the island, finally subduing it and forcing it back into the League. Like Naxos, Thasos suffered severe punishment. But there were other casualties as well. Enemies of Cimon, who had commanded the Athenian forces in the campaign, prosecuted but failed to convict him of corruption.  Less fortunate were the Athenian settlers later introduced as colonists into the disputed region. Occupying a township known as Ennea Hodoi, the ‘ Nine Ways ’ , the colonists were attacked by the local Thracian population and virtually annihilated, frustrating Athenian hopes of expansion (Thuc. 4.102.2).

Sometime around 466 the Athenian - led campaign against the Persian menace finally struck a decisive blow. At the Eurymedon River in Asia Minor, the Athenians and their allies led by Cimon destroyed a combined Persian fleet and army, thereby ending any chance of the Persians returning to Aegean waters. Cimon may have reached a settlement with the Persians, but by 460 he was in exile, ostracized, after an abortive expedition to Sparta. The Athenians now began flexing their military muscle throughout the eastern Mediterranean world. An expeditionary force to Cyprus was diverted to Egypt to support the rebellion of the Libyan prince Inarus. Fighting here lasted through several campaigning seasons and the Athenians invested a great deal of money and resources. In the end the Persians scored a major success, diverting the waters of the Nile and marooning the Athenian ships, then destroying them (c. 454).

As these dramatic events unfolded, the Athenian political scene heralded a new arrival – Pericles. Known by name and reputation, his political sympathies were revealed c. 462/1 when he supported the efforts of the reformer Ephialtes to strip the old aristocratic council, the Areopagus, of its authoritative judicial powers.  In attacking the Areopagus Council, Ephialtes transferred its power and prestige to other and more popular bodies, the assembly, law courts, and Council of 500. Responses to the reforms were impassioned and cost Ephialtes his life, though the details are far from clear (Plut. Per . 10.7 - 8). These events, however, found their way into the popular imagination through the dramatic medium of Attic drama. In 458 Aeschylus staged the only surviving trilogy in Greek tragedy, the Oresteia . In its final play, Eumenides , Aeschylus warns of the dangers of civil war and how this worst of political evils must be avoided.

Did Aeschylus make a political statement, and if so who heard his message? While the political nature of the dramatic venue can be overstated, so much so that the rich matrix of intellectual and spiritual ideas and beliefs is overshadowed, it remains that the theater experience was a diverse one with real and contemporary issues sometimes at play.  Here the Athenians heard the views and opinions of their best minds, who asked them to think about the world around them and to act as informed citizens. It must also be seen that those who heard these words were almost certainly the minority. The Theater of Dionysus, where Aeschylus ’ Oresteia was performed, as later the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, was apparently not large and may have accommodated no more than the local theater in Thorikos. 19 In many ways, then, the theater experience was an elite experience. It did voice political concerns about the community and its political figures, but those who heard it represented a relatively small portion of the population.

In the turmoil of Ephialtes ’ reforms and death, and fighting raging in many corners, the Athenians, apparently with Pericles ’ backing, recalled Cimon from exile (c. 452?). A new Persian fleet threatened Greek communities and Athenian influence in the eastern Mediterranean, and Cimon led an expeditionary force to Cyprus but died not long after arriving (c. 451/0). His death, preceded by the setback in Egypt, led to a settlement between Greeks and Persians. Brokered by Callias, Cimon ’ s brother - in - law, these decade - old enemies signed the so - called Peace of Callias probably in summer 450/449. Three decades of hostilities with the Persians now ended.

As Athens acquired great power so too did it acquire great wealth. Possibly in 454 and because of the failure of the Egyptian expedition, the treasury of the Delian League was moved to Athens. Within a short time, c. 449, the Athenians were rebuilding their city, something they had deliberately delayed since the end of the Persian Wars. In the ‘ Oath of Plataea ’ the Greeks had agreed not to rebuild their ruined sanctuaries and now with peace came a great building boom in Athens.

In the decade that followed, the Athenians would have seen their city transfigured from a war - ruined wreck to an architectural showcase reflecting the power of imperial Athens. Pericles, dubbed ‘ Olympian ’ by his critics (Plut. Per . 8.4), took a keen interest in the designing of buildings and shaping of sculpture, and perhaps sat on a commission that supervised the whole program.  His ‘ Olympian ’ size ego no doubt prompted many artistic suggestions too. But it appears that his friend, the great sculptor Phidias, acted as the overall director of the rebuilding of the acropolis. Already he had crafted the great statue of Athena Promachos that greeted visitors to the acropolis (c. late 450s). Later he designed the gold and ivory cult statue of Athena Parthenos herself that would be placed in her rebuilt temple, the Parthenon, designed by Callicrates and Ictinus (built 447 – 432).  Later Phidias got into trouble. Charged with embezzling funds, and despite help from Pericles, he fled into exile (Plut. Per . 31.1 - 5).

Elsewhere Mnesicles built a new gateway to the acropolis, the Propylaea, while below it stood the Odeon, a circular music hall that took its inspiration from the pavilion of the Persian king seized at Plataea some thirty years before. Similar rebuilding took place at the sacred precinct at Eleusis where the important Mysteries of Demeter and Persephone were celebrated.

Not all saw these expenditures as just, since much of the money funding this program came from the allied contributions, now deposited in Athens. Pericles ’ influence over the city came to be seen by other Athenians as a threat. Chief among these critics was Thucydides, the son of Melesias, a relative of Cimon, who now mounted a challenge to Pericles ’ leadership. Perhaps for the fi rst time, organized ‘ party ’ politics were practiced in the assembly. Thucydides grouped his followers together so that they could present a single voice, literally, in assembly debate. Both men were talented speakers and effective politicians, and their rivalry attracted even the attention of Archidamus, the Spartan king. Once asking Thucydides who the better wrestler was, Thucydides replied that ‘ whenever I throw him at wrestling, he beats me by arguing that he was never down, and he can even make the spectators believe it ’ ! (Plut. Per . 8).

In the end Pericles prevailed. He counterattacked forcefully, arguing that the allies did not contribute men or material to the defense of Greece from renewed Persian attack. Additionally, Athenians from all walks of life were profiting not only from military service but from the many jobs and work springing up from the vast program of public works. The wealth and power that Athens accrued also empowered the democracy, as payments were handed out for jury service as well as attendance at public festivals, making possible the participation of many more citizens in the political process. Against the growing prosperity of Athens, Thucydides could not compete. Pericles secured his ostracism (c. 443/3) and though he later returned, his political influence seems spent.

Thucydides ’ departure may not have bothered many Athenians who could look around their city and see everywhere the fruits of their labors and their sacrifices made good. Complacent and satisfied, however, the Athenians were not and those like Pericles knew that such hard won gains could be lost just as quickly.

The appearance of the Spartan hoplite during the Persian wars was homogeneous, all hoplites had red cloaks, bronze armor (kodonosximos), Hoplon shield, and closed Corinthian helmet. Individual differences appear in the symbols on the shield the shape of the lofiostatis, and decorating paintings on their clothes.

As Athens grew powerful and wealthy – and just a little cocky – the Spartans watched from their safe haven deep in the Eurotas river valley of the Peloponnesus. Content to remain at home since the Pausanias affair, the Spartans were more concerned with the ever menacing presence of the helots. Critical to this control was their dominance over their neighbors, most of whom were members of the military alliance that Sparta led, the Peloponnesian League.

But in c. 464 disaster struck: an earthquake of tremendous force left virtually every house and building in Sparta destroyed. Striking in daylight, loss of life was severe, including a school full of boys of elite status. Only a few of these survived, having run after a rabbit that appeared moments before the earthquake struck, killing most still inside. Years later remains of the school, now the tomb of those killed, the Seismatias , remained a visible reminder of the tragedy (Plut. Cim . 16.5).

The Messenian helots, ever dangerous, quickly seized the moment and rose in rebellion, pressing the Spartans hard. Establishing a formidable position on Mt. Ithome, the Messenians repelled successive Spartan attacks. In one of these Arimnestus, Mardonius ’ killer at Plataea, died with three hundred others in the battle of Stenyclerus, having taken on the Messenians unaided (Hdt. 9.64.2). So severe was the situation that the Spartans appealed to the Athenians for aid. A lone Spartan envoy appeared before the Athenians, a simple and silent suppliant. Moved by this appeal, Cimon led a thousand Athenian volunteers to rescue the Spartans. Soon after arriving, however, the Spartans worried about their would - be saviors. Perhaps afraid that the democratic Athenians might switch sides and help the Messenians, the Spartans told the Athenians that their help was no longer required.

This Spartan volte - face ruined Cimon ’ s stature in Athens and explains the circumstances of his ostracism (c. 461) engineered by his opponents. When fighting with the Spartans flared up and that with the Persians soured in Egypt and the east, Pericles and others called him home, soon sending him off to Cyprus where he died campaigning. But before his death he managed to bring about a five - year peace between Athens and Sparta (c. 452/1). This was only a temporary cessation in the hostilities. Relations between the two states would harden considerably in the following years.

But the Spartans still needed help against the Messenians and called in assistance from other communities, perhaps thought more trustworthy than the Athenians. The struggle with the helots, especially those of Messenia continued for years.  Those Messenians holding out in their mountain stronghold on Ithome (as late as 456?) finally agreed to terms with the Spartans, only too happy to grant their safe exit. The Messenians found protection with Athenians who were just as happy to settle these battle - hardened veterans at Naupactus, a port in Ozolian Locris, which guarded the northern approaches to the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc. 1.103.1 - 3).

After the Persian Wars, Athens and Sparta had taken divergent paths. Sparta remained an old - fashioned tribal community whose goal focused on preserving the status quo – maintaining control over the Peloponnesians to ensure control over the helots. Athens, however, was becoming increasingly a ‘ modern ’ state where, as Pericles emphasizes in Thucydides, democracy had reshaped its citizens into lovers of the polis.  Democratic institutions established at the end of the sixth century continued to be expanded and refined throughout the fifth – magistrates with defined tenures of office ce, a functioning assembly that wielded real authority, law courts and juries that expressed the will of the people.  To maintain this development – and the wealth of empire that came with it – Athens had to stay the course, to exercise power and authority wherever possible.

But this Athenian reality may be expanded. Political scientist John Mearsheimer has argued that democratic states are as driven by power politics as their authoritarian counterparts and practice similar policies of aggression. Such analysis fi ts democratic Athens in the middle years of the fi fth century. In stark contrast to slow and ‘ conservative ’ Sparta, as the Corinthians emphasized in an illuminating comparison (Thuc. 1.70), Athens constantly looked for opportunity wherever it could be found. The tensions between these two states were not only between a ‘ land ’ power and a ‘ sea ’ power, but between two communities that for more than two generations had been heading in opposite directions.

Ch'i Chi-kuang was a Chinese general whose reforms of the Ming army's training and deployment on the northwest frontier gave the Chinese a new offensive capability on the open steppes, allowing them in the next two centuries to conquer the nomad peoples of the eastern half of Asia and thus create the imperial China we know today.

The secret of Ch'i's success was twofold. On the one hand, he took Sun Tzu's remarks about drill, more drill, and still more drill at face value, as Chinese military men had ceased to do after the fourth century B.C., when cavalry archers made close-order infantry formations excessively vulnerable in the open field. Ch'i overcame that difficulty with a simple technical innovation: when enemy attack threatened, he formed protective lagers out of light and heavy carts that carried baggage and supplies. Unit drill correspondingly expanded to include carefully worked out patterns of deployment, whereby marching men could shift from column to lager and back again at a moment's notice. Wagon lagers protected the infantry's flanks and rear from nomad cavalrymen's arrows; and by leaving portals in the wall of wagons, Chinese cavalry and infantry forces could sally forth whenever a favorable opportunity offered for going over to the offensive. Such tactics allowed well-trained troops to march across the grasslands secure from devastating surprise. This in turn allowed Chinese armies to break up state structures on the steppes by destroying nomad headquarters, harassing the herds, and depriving men and animals of safe and sure refuge.

In effect, being able to move at will across the grasslands meant that Chinese numbers could now be brought to bear against the nomads' superior mobility as never before. The age-old standoff between steppe horsemen and Chinese settlers was thereby permanently upset. Mounted herdsmen could no longer effectively resist Chinese military power, even though it was not until 1757 that the last autonomous nomad confederacy was destroyed, when Kalmuks, fleeing from their Chinese enemy, had to seek Russian protection.

In 1568, Ch'i experimented with his new style of field operations by organizing what can best be called a "cart division." As eventually standardized, such divisions comprised 126 heavy carts, 216 light carts, 3,000 cavalry, and 11,000 infantry; and thanks to the carts’ carrying capacity, his foot soldiers had access both to halberds for close-in defense and to crossbows for the attack. This pattern of troop organization soon proved its practical value, combining mobility with security in the open field. By 1574, when Ch'i was promoted to the topmost rank of the Chinese army and took up his new post at Peking, he had sixteen cart divisions with a nominal strength of 224,000 men under his command. His divisions routinely practiced maneuvers on a scale surpassing anything European armies attempted before the nineteenth century. And at the individual and small-unit level, everyday training involved endless drill in use of weapons and deployment, from march to lager and back again, so that in principle and to a large degree also in practice, each man knew his assigned task and station in every foreseeable tactical circumstance.

Ch'i's achievements were appreciated by the court, as a citation issued by the Ministry of War on the occasion of his promotion to supreme command aptly demonstrates: "In a hundred battles," it says, "Ch'i has shown a brave heart. He has completely mastered the victory calculations of Sun Tzu. He understands the established rules of the ancients, and he understands their implementation."  He followed his successes on the northwest frontier by organizing comparably mobile forces to oppose Japanese pirates who had been raiding the coasts of China, meeting with considerable success on that front, too, before his retirement in 1582.

Indeed, Ch'i's combination of old and new fitted Chinese needs so well that it became normative thereafter. His fame and influence were much magnified by the fact that he explained in detail what needed to be done by writing two books, entitled A New Treatise on Disciplined Service (1560) and A Practical Account of Troop Training (1571). They were frequently republished thereafter, most recently in 1939, because Chiang Kai-shek wanted his troops to have the benefit of Ch'i's instruction. Ch'i's books were also translated into Korean in 1787 and into Japanese in 1798.

The Manchus, who established the Ching dynasty in 1644, changed Chinese military arrangements by planting garrisons of Manchu cavalrymen-so-called Banners-at strategic points in China proper; and, being less hostile to the Mongols than the Ming had been, they also enrolled Mongol cavalrymen in some of their Banners. By combining these traditional cavalry forces with Ch'i's style of combined arms, the Manchus were able to expand their power across China's traditional borders, occupying Tibet, pacifying Mongolia, and in 1755 destroying the last formidable steppe confederation, which had been organized by a people known as Jungars. The empire that we call China thus came into existence in the course of the eighteenth century.

By 1839-1841, when European troops first clashed with Chinese soldiers, the rigor of Ch'i's training was much reduced and internal unrest had already begun to threaten the dynasty. Moreover, by that time the effectiveness of European weapons had far outstripped anything the Chinese had at their disposal. As a result, even small European forces had no great difficulty in penetrating Chinese coastal defenses. Thereafter, westerners' disdain for Chinese military traditions prevented them from recognizing how Ch'i's archaizing reforms had succeeded in upsetting the millennial balance between nomad mobility and Chinese numbers that had kept the Chinese at a disadvantage ever since 350 B.C.

Disregard of China's military achievements was increased by the fact that Ch'i's reforms had entirely neglected the offensive capability of handguns. This made sense at the time, for the crossbows his infantry used were far cheaper and more effective against unarmored nomad cavalry than the clumsy handguns of the age. China had pioneered the development of gunpowder weapons, beginning about 1000, but found far less use for them than Europeans did. In particular, the Chinese had no reason to build cannon to knock down the walls they were trying to defend; and their crossbows were so much cheaper and quicker-firing than early handguns that they had no inducement to develop infantry gunpowder weapons either. They did develop medium caliber guns for protecting ships and harbors, but were left far behind by the reckless way that Europeans, from the fourteenth century onwards, began to invest in gunpowder weaponry of every size, from monstrous bombards to hand-held pistols.

This cost the Chinese dear after 1839, but ought not to detract from our appreciation of the success with which Ch'i Chi-kuang wedded archaizing reform with cost-effective technological innovation in the sixteenth century. His military reforms helped the Chinese, in tandem with the Russians, to extinguish the political-military power of the Eurasian steppe nomads forever; they made China what it is today, the world's only surviving imperial state. Few individuals in the entire history of the world can boast of such a conspicuous monument.

One aspect of the military revolution which is alleged to have begun at the end of the fifteenth century is that infantry became more important in the field. This nearly contemporary picture of the battle of Nancy (1477) shows the power of Swiss infantry armed with pykes and halbards. Infantry armed with similar weapons were important in warfare as early as the twelfth century.


Even when mounted knights ruled European battlefields, foot soldiers undoubtedly outnumbered them, since each knight needed servants and supporters to keep himself, his horse, and his weapons in working order. But infantrymen whose role was to support (and mop up after) a cavalry charge remained subordinate. Warfare in western Europe began to alter when drilled infantry, whether independent or in rivalry with mounted knights, regained importance. This started as early as the twelfth century, when Italian townsmen managed to defeat an imperial army of German knights that recklessly charged the close-arrayed burghers' pikes at Legnano in 1176. A bit more than a century later, Swiss infantry repelled the knights that their Hapsburg overlord sent to subdue them and soon established themselves as the most formidable pikemen of Europe. Oddly enough, in distant Japan pikemen also proved their usefulness against charging cavalry, beginning in the fourteenth century; while in the Middle East Ottoman foot soldiers, the famous janissaries, started winning victories for the sultans in the fifteenth century; and offensive deployment of infantry changed the Chinese way of war in the sixteenth. Except in Europe, pikemen succeeded in battle only in association with cavalry bowmen, who guarded the flanks, harassed the enemy with their missiles, and were ready to pursue the fleeing foe as soon as charging pikes broke up the opposing army. In Europe cavalry continued to prefer the lance; and light infantry equipped with crossbows (or in England with long bows) provided pikemen with long range missile support, while knightly cavalry defended flanks and rear.

Wherever massed pikemen began to take part in battle, we can assume that practice was needed to keep formation; marching in step was the obvious way to achieve that result.

The idea of a sixteenth-century 'military revolution' which transformed European warfare was formulated by Professor Michael Roberts in the mid-1950s. Historians have argued over the precise timespan of this revolution and some of its details, but the concept that such a revolution occurred has been widely accepted. By contrast, the preceding Middle Ages have been presented as an era when the practice of war was unprofessional and changed little. They have been characterized as 'the long interregnum between the disappearance of the disciplined armies of Rome and the appearance of state forces in the sixteenth century' (John Keegan, A History of Warfare). As this suggests, historians have seen the military revolution in the context of the growth of the modern state after a long period of stagnation following the collapse of the Roman Empire. However, while important changes did occur in war and military organization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is arguable that their extent and novelty have been exaggerated.

According to Professor Roberts, the century after 1560 witnessed critical changes: a tactical revolution, in which musketeers in linear formations replaced lance and pike, and massed firepower 'blew away' feudal cavalry and blocks of pikemen; a massive growth in the size of European armies; and the adoption of more complex strategies to bring those armies into action. All these increased the burden of war on society, requiring the development of 'modern' states to recruit, pay for, and supply the new armies. Professor Geoffrey Parker's influential revision of 1976 pushed the starting date of the transformation back to the late fifteenth century, as well as stressing the importance of siege warfare, which Roberts had underestimated. The French invasion of Italy in 1494-95, with a horse-drawn siege train which demonstrated the power of new siege artillery was, according to Parker, a 'new departure in warfare'. It necessitated the development of costly new defensive systems of low bastions built of rubble and brick (known as the 'trace Italienne'). Parker concluded, however, that he had 'failed to dent the basic thesis', and that a 'new use of firepower, leading to a new type of fortifications and an increase in army size' still deserve to be interpreted as a revolution.
Seventeenth-century historians have raised important doubts about the Roberts-Parker thesis. In tactical terms, the pike only became obsolete with the invention of the ring bayonet in about 1670.

Tiberius' siege of Andetrium, AD 9. When the future emperor Tiberius was sent to Dalmatia to put down an uprising, he trapped Bato, the ringleader, in the hilltop fortress. Tiberius ordered an uphill assault, while he watched from a platform. It was a common tactic for the besieged to roll heavy objects downhill. The place was finally captured when a detachment of Romans made a wide detour and surprised the defenders by appearing on their flank.

When Octavian adopted the designation imperator as part of his name, probably in 38 BC, he was making a claim to be the outstanding military leader in Rome. In his campaign against Sextus Pompey he needed the aura of authority and the prestige associated with victory which it imparted (Syme 1958). Once established in power, Augustus tied the army closely to his person, and it was his legacy that all emperors bore the attributes of a Roman general (by the 70s imperator was the usual designation of emperors). Since all campaigns were conducted under their auspices, the glory belonged to them, and acclamations as general were added to their titles, while other names and epithets expressed the humiliation of Rome’s enemies (e.g. Parthicus—‘Conqueror of the Parthians’), and aggressive military prowess (e.g. ‘extender of the empire’). In public images imperial military responsibilities played a significant role and the emperor was depicted wearing military dress on statues, reliefs, triumphal arches, and coins, often as a conquering hero or a dignified but firm military leader, most strikingly illustrated by the statue of Augustus from Prima Porta (see Zanker 1988:190–1). Moreover, every emperor was personally associated with his troops— as paymaster, comrade, benefactor—and sought to demonstrate that he was a worthy and courageous fellow-soldier, deserving of their complete loyalty. Not surprisingly therefore emperors increasingly assimilated to their role as military leaders and by the end of the first century AD were taking personal command of all major campaigns. They could, therefore, spend more time with their troops, but this made the conduct of administration more difficult since the whole apparatus of government had to follow them. In one sense the imperial role as commander-in-chief was in keeping with Roman ideology, which held military prowess in high esteem and associated military command with the leading men in the state; but emperors also saw their successful command of the army and their popularity with the soldiers as protection against revolt.

Velleius Paterculus (1st C.BC–1st C.AD), 2. 104
At the sight of him (Tiberius) there were tears of joy from the soldiers as they ran up to him and welcomed him with tremendous and unprecedented enthusiasm, eagerly taking him by the hand and unable to restrain themselves from blurting out: ‘Is it really you that we see, general? Have we got you back safely?’ ‘I served with you in Armenia, general’.‘ And I was in Raetia’. ‘I received military decorations from you in Vindelicia’. ‘And I in Pannonia’. ‘And I in Germany’. It is difficult to express this adequately in words and indeed it may seem incredible.

Velleius was a friend of the imperial family and his successful equestrian career culminated in the acquisition of senatorial rank and eventual election to a praetorship. His description here of the return of Tiberius to take command of the German legions in AD 4 is doubtless exaggerated, but nevertheless Tiberius had a reputation for looking after his men well and for sharing the rigours of military life, and the enthusiasm of the troops was probably genuine. Later, Tiberius tried to exploit his comradeship with the army by reminding the mutinous Pannonian legions that ‘he himself had an outstanding concern for the courageous legions in whose company he had endured numerous campaigns’ (Tacitus, Ann. 1. 25).

Dio, 68. 23
He (Trajan) always marched on foot with the body of the army, looked after the dispositions of the troops during the entire campaign, drawing them up first in one formation, then another, and forded on foot all the rivers that they did. Sometimes he even circulated false reports through the scouts so that the soldiers might simultaneously practise their manoeuvres and be fearlessly ready to face any eventuality. Dio is referring to the Parthian war. The ideal of Trajan’s personal leadership in the Dacian wars is graphically expressed in the sculptures on his commemorative column, where the emperor is to the forefront of many scenes.

Senators held the most important positions in the command of the Roman army. Although only one of the six military tribunes was of senatorial rank, each legion was commanded by a legatus legionis, a senator usually of praetorian status. In provinces where only one legion was stationed the commander of the legion was also provincial governor (with the exception of Africa where from the time of Gaius the command of the III Augusta was distinct from the civil administration of the province). Provinces containing several legions and auxiliary units were governed by a senator of consular rank who was supreme commander of all the troops therein. Usually these men had previously held at least one military tribuneship (normally in their early twenties) and legionary legateship (normally in their mid-thirties). Similarly if an army was assembled for a campaign, the senior commanders were senators of consular rank. Only Egypt, and after AD 198 the new province of Mesopotamia, were governed by equestrian prefects, although containing legionary troops.

In their choice of commander emperors were therefore limited by traditional Roman respect for age, experience, and social standing, and the upper class ideal that senators were naturally competent to serve the state in whatever capacity it demanded. There was no military academy in Rome and no systematic preparation of men for military command or for service say, as British or eastern specialists. Senators held a wide variety of posts, including many in civil administration, each one an individuality, and often with periods of inactivity. It is therefore debatable how many senators had significant experience of active service, or indeed how far this was a requirement for advancement. Then, the time spent by senators in command of an army was relatively short, since most held no more than two posts, up to six years in all. However, some senators did acquire long experience of military command, and over a limited period, most notably in the northern wars of Marcus Aurelius, a more concentrated effort was made to assemble and retain men of proven ability in senior commands.

Furthermore, an emperor could appoint talented equestrians to senatorial rank and then employ them in posts normally reserved for senators. But emperors were always mindful of their personal security and the need to exercise patronage, and probably preferred nonspecialist commanders. In this way no military hierarchy of professional generals could emerge who might plot, or attempt to undermine imperial control of military and foreign policy.

Tacitus (1st–2nd C.AD), Annals 1. 80
It was also Tiberius’ practice to prolong tenure of posts and to keep some men in the same army commands or governorships up to the day of their death. Various reasons for this have been recorded; some think that he found new responsibilities tedious and preferred to let one decision stand indefinitely, others think that he was jealous that too many people might enjoy the fruits of office; others believe that precisely because he had a cunning mind he found it difficult to make a decision; for he did not seek out the exceptionally talented, but he also hated the corrupt, since he feared that the meritorious would be a threat to him and that the bad would bring about public disgrace.

Here Tacitus characteristically summarizes the dilemma faced by all emperors in trusting and controlling talented men who might be ambitious and use their army command to raise revolt (cf. Dio, 52. 8). Moreover, the expectations of the upper classes also had to be satisfied, as Tacitus (Annals 4. 6) illustrates in his comments on Tiberius’ appointments in the early part of his reign – ‘birth, military excellence, distinction in civilian pursuits, everyone agreed that he chose the best people’.

AE 1956. 124=Pflaum, Carrières 181 bis, inscription, Diana Veteranorum (Zana), Numidia, 2nd C.AD
To Marcus Valerius Maximianus, son of Marcus Valerius Maximianus who was local censor and priest, priest of the colony of Poetovio, with the public horse, prefect of the first cohort of Thracians, tribune of the first cohort of Hamians, Roman citizens, placed in charge of the coastline of the peoples of Pontus Polemonianus, decorated in the Parthian war, chosen by Emperor Marcus Antoninus Augustus and sent on active service in the German expedition with the task of bringing food by boat down the river Danube to supply the armies in both provinces of Pannonia, placed in charge of the detachments of the praetorian fleets of Misenum and also of Ravenna and also of the British fleet, and also of the African and Moorish cavalry chosen for scouting duties in Pannonia, prefect of the first ala of Aravacans, while on active service in Germany praised in public by emperor Antoninus Augustus because he had killed with his own hand Valao, chief of the Naristi, and was granted his horse, decorations, and weapons; in the same ala he achieved the honour of his fourth military post, prefect of the ala of lance-bearers, decorated in the war against the Germans and Sarmatians, placed in charge with the honour of centenarian rank of the cavalry of the peoples of the Marcomanni, Naristi, and Quadi journeying to punish the insurrection in the east (i.e. the revolt of Avidius Cassius, AD 175), with an increased salary appointed to the procuratorship of Lower Moesia and at the same time placed in charge of detachments and sent by the Emperor to drive out a band of Brisean brigands on the borders of Macedonia and Thrace, procurator of Upper Moesia, procurator of the province of Dacia Porolissensis, chosen by our most revered emperors for admission to the senatorial order among men of praetorian rank, and soon after legate of Legion I Adiutrix, also legate of Legion II Adiutrix, placed in charge of the detachments in winter quarters at Laugaricio, also legate of Legion V Macedonica, also legate of Legion I Italica, also legate of Legion XIII Gemina, also legate of the Emperor with propraetorian power of [Legion III Augusta], decorated by the most noble Emperor Marcus Aurelius Commodus Augustus on the second German expedition; the most distinguished council of the people of Diana Veteranorum (set this up) with the money contributed.

Maximianus, from a wealthy family of Poetovio in Pannonia, had performed valiant service as an equestrian officer and had attracted imperial attention and support, indicated by his promotion to senatorial rank at praetorian level and his immediate advancement to a series of legionary commands. We know from another inscription that he later became consul (c. AD 186). Serious trouble had begun on the Danube in AD 168, and in AD 170/171 Greece and the approaches to Italy were invaded by tribes including the Marcomanni and Quadi. Marcus Aurelius was prepared to promote men of military ability from outside the senatorial order in the interests of the state, and Maximianus initially performed a crucial role by ensuring supplies to the armies in Pannonia.

“If my city becomes a ruin mound, then I will be a potsherd of it, but I will never submit to the lord of Uruk” (Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature “Enmerkar and En-sughir-ana,” lines 132–134). 

Some scholars trace violent conflict back to the dawn of humankind. Others argue that warfare arose well after the advent of farming, through competition for land and resources and the need to defend them. Some early farming settlements were fortified, notably Jericho around 7000 B.C.E.—but its walls and towers were not necessarily for defense. They may alternatively have protected people and livestock against wild animals, demarcated the settlement, and been designed to impress other communities by concretely demonstrating power and prosperity. The early walls of Mesopotamian towns and cities such as Uruk and Abu Salabikh may have served similar purposes; defense against floods is another possibility.

Unequivocal evidence of armed conflict comes in the late fourth millennium B.C.E., with artwork on seals depicting fights between men armed with spears and bows, and bound prisoners. During the earlier third millennium (ED period) cities, often housing the bulk of their state’s population, began erecting walls for defense as well as for territorial demarcation and prestige. Excavation has confirmed the slightly later literary descriptions of Uruk’s city walls: A circuit 9.5 kilometers long and 4–5 meters thick built of typical ED plano-convex bricks enclosed an area of 550 hectares. At least two city gates with rectangular towers have been traced, and the wall may have had as many as 900 semicircular towers. Similar towers have been found in the strong walls around Tell Agrab on the Diyala.

The epic tale of conflict between Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, and his one-time benefactor and overlord, Agga, king of Kish, climaxes when Agga’s forces besiege Uruk and Gilgamesh defeats and captures Agga, possibly after a pitched battle. Sieges in the ED period were often decided by force of arms in attacks and sallies rather than by attrition during long investments. However, attempts might be made to break into a fortified settlement using scaling ladders, and defenses began to be enhanced with a glacis.

The walls of captured cities were broken down, partly to humiliate their citizens. Booty and prisoners were taken, and much of the city might be sacked. Some of the spoils of war went by custom to the king and some to the god of the victorious city in his temple. Stone bowls found in the Ekur temple in Nippur bear inscriptions showing they were booty from Rimush’s Elamite wars. Such inscriptions were an important part of the offering, demonstrating to both the god and the people that the king had fulfilled the god’s intention in prosecuting war and benefitting his people. Inscriptions quickly grew in length and substance from their terse early-third-millennium beginnings, and by the first millennium, royal inscriptions gave a long and detailed, although often exaggerated and inaccurate, account of the campaign, serving both as justification to the god and propaganda to the people. The form, style, phraseology, and content of inscriptions were dictated by tradition.

In conflicts between Sumerian city-states the victor usually respected the integrity of a defeated city’s temples: Outrage at Lugalzagesi’s failure to do so is forcefully expressed in the inscriptions of his enemy, Uru-inim-gina of Lagash. In contrast, attacks by outsiders—nomads of the Syrian Desert and Zagros Mountains, such as the Amorites and Guti, and foreign states, particularly Elam—were ruthless and spared nothing and no one.

Sumerian distress at the devastation wreaked by their attacks—the noble buildings destroyed or infested by the enemy, the fields laid waste, the people slain or taken into captivity— is poured out in a series of Lamentations describing the sack of great cities like Agade, Ur, and Nippur.

ED art vividly captures the citizen armies of the period. “The Standard of Ur“ and “The Stele of Vultures” (see p. 75) depict foot soldiers armed with spears or pole-mounted axes, their heads protected by leather or felt helmets. A force of heavy infantry carrying large rectangular shields marches in a solid and impenetrable phalanx bristling with couched spears, behind a king armed with a dagger. Maces and throwing sticks were also used as weapons at this time. The leaders ride in ponderous war-carts with four solid wheels, drawn by donkeys or mules. These were used mainly for transport to the battlefield and in pursuit of retreating enemy forces, and as a vantage point from which the leader could see and be seen, to direct his forces and impress friend and foe. The dead of the opposing army lie beneath the wheels of the carts or are heaped up in a communal burial mound, while the living are marched off into slavery, their hands tied behind them, or are held in a net by the god whose approval of the victors’ just cause had precipitated the conflict and ensured its successful outcome. Later wars by larger states enjoyed the support of the war goddess Ishtar (Inanna), Nergal (Erra), god of strife, and the storm god Adad (Ishkur). Defeat, and even more terribly, the loss of the king in battle, betokened the withdrawal of divine favor.

Troops also included archers and soldiers armed with slings and ovoid stones, probably mainly recruited among the hunters and fishermen of the south. An inscribed object from ED Mari shows a bowman shooting from behind a wicker screen held by a spearman: This combination of archer and shield-bearer continued down the ages in Mesopotamian armies. The later third- millennium development of the composite bow revolutionized warfare. Constructed as a sandwich of three contrasting materials, wood glued between a horn inner layer (to resist compression) and a sinew outer layer (for elasticity), it had a far greater penetration and range (around 175 meters) than the conventional bow. The composite bow benefitted both attackers and defenders, enabling a wider area to be covered from the walls and troops on the ground to shoot defenders with more success.

In the ED period armed conflict arose generally from competition between settled states for land and water or nomad raids. Expeditions abroad to obtain commodities not available locally might also need armed protection or aggressive “sales tactics”—hence, for example, the fortifications around the Urukperiod settlement at Habuba Kabira and the military threats uttered by Enmerkar of Uruk against the distant state of Aratta.

By about 2350 B.C.E., however, some states and their kings were also interested in territorial expansion, and the military unification of the south was eventually achieved by Sargon of Akkad. He probably employed the first standing army who made up some at least of the 5,400 men who “ate daily” in the king’s presence. The Ur III king Shulgi created a standing army in years twenty to twenty-three of his reign: Many of the soldiers were holders of state land in return for various state duties, particularly military service, a system referred to later as ilkum. The landholder was liable to serve but in practice (though not in principle) could pay someone to take his place.

Detail of a relief in Sennacherib’s palace in Nineveh, depicting the siege of the Judaean city of Lachish in the year 701 B.C.E. Rebellion against the Assyrian state was savagely punished. (Zev Radovan/Land of the Bible Picture Archive)

The Assyrians gained their revenge when Mitanni crumbled in the mid-fourteenth century. From then until 612 B.C.E., Assyria became the dominant force in northern Mesopotamia, owing largely to their army, a professional and effective force that was also in the forefront of technological progress. Successive strong kings pushed the frontiers of the state ever outward, although it often shrank again under weaker rulers. Within Assyria proper—mat asshur, “the Land of Ashur,” which stretched as far west as the Euphrates valley—the crown made grants of land to dependents in return for a proportion of their produce, corvée labor, and military service as irregulars, continuing the ancient ilkum system. Militarism underlay the whole state, most officials holding both civil and military posts and every man being obliged to serve in the army if required, and the king was also the commander in chief. The Assyrian state enjoyed a simpler structure than the Mitanni hierarchy, all landowners being responsible directly to the king, who, as in former times, was answerable to the gods, especially Ashur. Through time, power was transferred away from the traditional landowning elite; as the crown gained control of an increasing proportion of the land, it granted estates to bureaucrats and generals. The ancient bala system was employed to provision temples, and especially that of Ashur: Offerings were made in turn by regions throughout the empire.

In the conquered lands beyond, vassal kingdoms were ruled by governors (shaknu) drawn from local dynasties or prominent local families. They paid tribute (often enormous quantities) to their Assyrian overlords and acted in concert with them. Much of the wealth from provincial tribute was used to create and embellish new Assyrian capitals. Kalhu, built by Ashurnasirpal, was established with a population of 16,000. Its construction involved not only huge resources but also the labor of 7,000 people for three years. Later capitals, Dur Sharrukin and Nineveh, also tied up vast material and human resources. The royal court and central administration were also supported largely out of tribute.

In the ninth century the Assyrians began to establish military outposts in conquered territory, supported by local taxes. These became administrative centers, developing into regional capitals. It was not until the eighth century under Tiglath-Pileser III that the Assyrians actually began to take the administration of the greater empire into their own hands, dividing the conquered territories into provinces under Assyrian governors instead of local rulers. The changeover occurred gradually, vassal states passing into direct rule when they rebelled.

Military force backed bureaucratic authority, and Assyrian actions were seen as the will of Ashur. The highest officials were the majordomo (rab sha muhhi ekalli), who had direct access to the king, the vice-chancellor (ummanu), who acted as the king’s scribe, and two field marshalls (turtannu), who could deputize for the king on the battlefield. Other high-ranking courtiers, who also held senior military offices, included the cupbearer (rab shaqe), the steward (abarakku), and the palace herald (nagir ekalli).

High court officials held the governorships of provinces, and lesser provinces were ruled by less senior officials. A provincial governor maintained his own court and was backed by a standing army. The province was regarded as his private estate, and the office often passed from father to son: a temptation to extortion or the exercise of independent rule. Nevertheless, provincial governors were generally honest, loyal, and conscientious. Bureaucrats were frequently illiterate, but there were many scribes attached to the administration, who wielded considerable power. Important bureaucrats were often eunuchs, enjoying particular trust because they could not entertain dynastic ambitions. Although most officials were Assyrians, foreigners in principle could also become part of the bureaucracy.

Under Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian kings, the temple became an integrated part of the political structure. Endowed by the king with substantial lands confiscated from rebellious individuals, the temples were given a considerable measure of responsibility for their local community, temple officials acting as local judges and presiding over district assemblies. They collected tithes from the citizens of their districts and paid a proportion of these to the crown. They also had to provide labor and resources as the palace required, for example pasturing royal herds and provisioning royal officials. Temple accounts and activities were open to scrutiny by royal officials.

The Assyrians increased agricultural productivity, founding new settlements and estates in both the Assyrian heartland and the provinces, under Assyrian generals and senior bureaucrats, and using deportees as labor. Conquered peoples also made up an increasingly large proportion of the armed forces, a circumstance that by weakening loyalty to the regime contributed to its eventual downfall. Another factor was the imbalance between the center and the provinces: The latter were drained of manpower and resources to aggrandize the former, causing economic depression.

Among the Assyrian provinces, Babylonia was a special case. Assyria needed peace along its southern frontier, and periodic hostility had to be dealt with. For several long periods, Babylonia was under Assyrian control, but the respect felt by the Assyrians for the elder state meant that it was not treated as a conquered land and not administered as an ordinary province. Instead the two realms were united, and Babylonia came directly under royal control, although the actual administration could be delegated to a royal chief minister. When Babylonia attempted to throw off Assyrian rule, it was not subjected to the brutal treatment usually meted out to insubordinate regions. Sennacherib’s aberrant behavior in sacking Babylon was widely viewed as hubristic. He swiftly paid the price of his impiety, and his son Esarhaddon lost little time before attempting to restore the city. When Assyria fell in the reign of Esarhaddon’s grandson, Babylonia was swift to seize control of the whole empire.