Grande Armée Training Camps
THE CAMP AT BOULOGNE played an important part in the maturation of the armies of the Revolutionary period into the Grande Armee of Napoleon. It was particularly important for the training of French soldiers in everything from the manual of arms to grand tactics. On the right, officers and noncommissioned officers supervise soldiers' drill.
'We camped at the port of Ambleteuse, where a fine camp was formed; General Oudinot was in command of us with 12,000 grenadiers) who formed part of the reserve force. And every day we drilled and drilled. We were brigaded for training in embarkation. - JEAN-ROCH COIGNET, GRENADIER OF THE GUARD ON THE CAMP AT BOULOGNE
The army also had the opportunity to train under peacetime conditions rather than attempting to master the complexities of the maneuvers described in the Réglement du 1er Août 1791 while on campaign. This was particularly true from the summer of 1803, when Napoleon activated L’Armee des Cotes de l’Océan in preparation for renewed hostilities with Britain. These troops, who would later form the basis of the Grande Armee in the great campaigns of 1805-1807, were encamped in six major concentrations along the Atlantic coast, around towns such as Boulogne, Brest and Utrecht. For nearly two years, the various camps, which later formed the different corps d’ armée of the Grande Armée, underwent a rigorous regimen of drill and observation. Each camp was commanded by one of Napoleon's senior officers, who was charged with training the men. During this period, units spent time drilling and learning the various portions of the Reglement du ler Août 1791, from the manual of arms to the manoeuvres of their battalions. To ensure that training was to a high standard, inspectors were sent out to review the troops as they went through their various tactical evolutions and to quiz non-commissioned and junior officers on their knowledge of the Reglement du ler Août 1791. In addition, there were regularly scheduled meetings at the regimental level, where the regulations and instructions of senior officers were discussed and studied. It was expected that the junior and noncommissioned officers would pass on this knowledge to their men during training exercises.
Weekly routines were instituted for each camp. At Boulogne, for example, two days per week were given over to the school of the battalion and target practice - an exercise that was unknown in armies of the period, with the exception of the British. Three days were spent at higher-level manoeuvres involving the various divisions of the corps, while Sunday was reserved for exercises by the corps as a whole. Twice per month, manoeuvres were conducted that involved what today would be called 'live fire exercises', using combat munitions against targets.
As well as the types of training to be expected for infantrymen, the soldiers at Boulogne and other camps were preparing for the invasion of England. As such, men were also expected to learn the rudiments of embarkation and boat-handling. Some troops were also instructed in manning the ships' guns. Napoleon was clearly serious that this army was destined for the invasion of England, and insisted that the men go to sea for manoeuvres in their vessels.
On one occasion, ignoring a warning from his admirals of an impending storm, he ordered 20 sloops out to sea. The result was the loss of many of the craft and 2000 soldiers and sailors.
Such constant drilling over a period of two years might have been dangerously monotonous. To keep up morale, Napoleon made efforts to visit the camps and also held large-scale reviews that were great military spectacles filled with pomp and ceremony. On one famous visit in August of 1804, some 1300 drummers beat the Aux Champs to assemble the entire army. After the army was in formation, Napoleon distributed the Legion d'Honneur to deserving officers and men, the first mass award of those awards. As he said, 'it is with baubles that men are led'.
The intensive training that the nascent Grande Armée received while stationed along the Atlantic coast paid huge dividends when the army was deployed to fight in central Europe in the latter part of 1805 and throughout 1807. One thing that most clearly differentiated the Grande Armée from its adversaries was its training. In particular, the manoeuvres and evolutions that had been carried out at both the tactical and grand tactical levels gave French troops a decided advantage in battlefield flexibility. One major benefit was that the French units were more capable of coordinating different formations within their command structure as the situations dictated.
During the campaigns of 1806-07, it was not uncommon for the battalions within a French brigade to operate in a variety of formations as dictated by battlefield conditions. For example, if a brigade of four regiments, with a total of eight battalions, was required to assault a defended position, it would not have been problematic for that brigade to deploy one or two of its battalions, and its voltiguers, as a skirmish screen for three or four battalions in assault columns. The remainder of the brigade could easily have been kept in reserve or even deployed in line to provide fire support or flank protection for the assault force. The key is that the brigade commander could assign tactical formations for each individual unit under his command without any concern for maintaining an artificial integrity of formation at the regimental or brigade level.
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