Napoléon’s Grande Armée
The never-ending Napoleonic wars had an impact on many French homes. Military service was mandatory for all able-bodied Frenchmen between the ages of 20 to 25, but rich people could be exempted by paying for a replacement. A reasonable estimate of the number of Frenchmen conscripted between 1800 and 1814 would be about two million out of a population of 28 million. Judged by the standards of 20th-century wars, this was not an excessive proportion. In theory soldiers were eligible for discharge after five years, but after 1804, most discharges were only for serious medical reasons. The veterans were responsible for training new recruits, thereby combining experience and young talent. Promotion was always based on personal merit and valor in combat. Over time, needs changed these basic rules.
The weight of the Napoleonic wars was also a burden on allied and dependent European countries, which were required to supply military contingents. At times Napoléon’s army included soldiers from Italy, Denmark, Poland, Belgium and the Netherlands. In 1804, Switzerland provided 16,000 soldiers. The states of the German Confederation were heavily drawn on for contributions. In 1805 Bavaria provided 30,000 men, Cleve-Berg 5,000 in 1806, Westphalia 25,000 in 1807, Saxony 20,000 in 1812. The Grand Elector of Württemberg, having been a loyal ally of France during the war of 1805, was rewarded by the title of king, but the new realm was obliged to supply a contingent of 12,000 soldiers in 1806. Other smaller states, like Waldeck, Anhalt, Hessen- Darmstadt, Mecklemburg, Lippe, Nassau, Baden and Prussia, had to provide contingents too. When Napoléon decided to invade Russia in 1812, his Grande Armée included soldiers of twenty different European nations. These foreign troops, raised from regular national draftees or volunteers, did not always remain loyal, though. Napoleonic armies also included some foreign mercenary units, notably Irish exiles, deserters and mercenaries (“Wild Geese”). In August 1803 an Irish battalion was formed, growing to regiment size in 1809; it was known as the “Third Foreign Regiment” in 1811, and was disbanded in 1815.
As supplies were frequently lacking, the Napoleonic soldier was often a villainous looter, a pitiless brigand forced to live off the countries he passed through, friend or foe. Yet a military career remained an enviable possibility and high-ranking officers, generals and marshals could build up huge fortunes. Eighteen marshals of France were created in 1804 as Grand Officers of the Empire, receiving army command but also large fiefs and revenues. Napoléon believed, a bit simple-mindedly, that devotion could be bought with money and honors. Besides the large emoluments that went with certain offices, there were also considerable fringe benefits. Marshal Berthier, for example, was the happy recipient of an annual sum of 1,300,000 francs. The Empire believed devoutly in the glories of military life and in romantic if hazardous feats of arms, so Napoléon exploited to the utmost his soldiers’ burning desire to distinguish themselves on the battlefield. He developed to a fine art the cult of personality, and most French soldiers of the ranks worshipped the Emperor. His familiar manner, simple uniform (grey frock, typical bicorne or uniform of a colonel of the guard), and demagogic bonhomie aroused great enthusiasm. Old hands, young ones, and grognards (grumblers) of the Imperial Guard had an almost fanatic reverence and admiration for the Petit Caporal (Little Corporal), as they affectionately nicknamed Napoléon. Many soldiers, rejoicing and basking in the reflected glory of the Emperor, never complained about their efforts and sacrifices, since fame, honors and booty were their rewards. New recruits and veterans, at least those who returned home safe and sound between campaigns, could show off their glittering medals and handsome uniforms. War was inconvenient but for some men it was also glamorous. The deep attachment that existed between Napoléon and his soldiers was not a gratuitous invention, nor a posthumous legend; it was a reality, which continued as long as his victories lasted and in many cases lived on after his fall, exile and death.
In the field of military organization Napoléon largely borrowed from previous theorists and the reforms of preceding French governments, and only developed much of what was already in place. He continued, for example, the Revolution’s policy of promotion based primarily on merit. Artillery was integrated into reserve batteries, the staff system became more fluid, and cavalry once again became an important formation in French military doctrine. Uniforms, although flamboyant and colorful for parade, were often ill-fitting, uncomfortable, inappropriate and inadequate for men in the field. Boots rarely lasted more than a few weeks. Weapons and technology remained largely static through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, but operational mobility underwent massive restructuring. Napoléon’s biggest influence was in the conduct of warfare on the move, and was regarded by the influential military theorist Carl von Clausewitz as a genius in the operational art of war. A new emphasis towards the destruction, not just outmaneuvering, of enemy armies emerged. Since armies could not live off the land indefinitely, Napoleon always sought a quick end to any conflict by a decisive pitched battle. Invasions of enemy territory occurred over broader fronts, which made wars costlier and more decisive—a phenomenon that came to be known as Napoleonic Warfare.
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