War and Game

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was fought during October 23–26, 1944, in response to the attempt of Japanese naval forces to disrupt and destroy U.S. landings on the Philippine island of Leyte. The Battle of Leyte Gulf developed into the largest naval battle of any war and was also distinguished by the first kamikaze attacks.
Learning where the American landings on Leyte were to take place, Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander in charge of the Japanese Combined Fleet, launched Operation Sho-Go (Victory), by which he intended to draw the Third U.S. Fleet (under Admiral William “Bull” Halsey) into battle north of Leyte Gulf so that the Japanese naval forces could catch the landing forces as well as the smaller Seventh U.S. Fleet (under Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid), which was covering the landing, in a massive double envelopment, or pincers. Whereas in previous battles, U.S. Navy commanders had enjoyed the advantage of Ultra decrypts, which gave them extensive knowledge of Japanese radio communications, the Japanese changed codes before Leyte Gulf and maintained a high degree of radio silence. Toyoda’s trap very nearly succeeded.

Toyoda assigned Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, commander in charge of the Mobile Force, tactical command of Operation Sho-Go. Ozawa divided his ships, including the two largest battleships ever built, Yamato and Masashi, five conventional battleships, and 16 cruisers, into two striking forces, under Vice Admirals Kurita Takeo and Kiyohicle Shima. Ozawa himself led a decoy fleet, including four aircraft carriers, to lure Halsey to the north while Kurita and Shima closed the pincers. A portion of Shima’s force, in company with a number of Kurita’s ships (under Vice Admiral Shejo Nishimura), were detailed to sail into the Leyte Gulf via Surigao Strait, while Kurita approached the gulf by way of the San Bernardino Strait. The rest of Shima’s force escorted Japanese troop reinforcements to Leyte Island.

On October 24, Task Force 38, under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, launched air strikes against Kurita as his ships crossed the Sibuyan Sea, sinking one battleship, damaging others, and prompting Kurita to reverse course for a time. Kurita’s excess of caution put him behind schedule, but Halsey overestimated the damage that had been done to him and discounted Kurita as a threat. This played into the Sho-Go plan. With Kurita apparently out of the way, Halsey pursued Ozawa’s decoy fleet.

The trap was set, but U.S. PT boats (followed by destroyers, then battleships and cruisers) attacked Nishimura as he entered Surigao Strait on the night of October 24. Nishimura was killed and all ships but a single destroyer of his force were sunk. Shima, who had been following Nishimura, withdrew without joining the fight. Thus one arm of the Japanese pincer was destroyed. Nevertheless, the other arm, Kurita’s force, was still intact; Kurita sailed into the gulf via the San Bernardino Strait on the morning of October 25. A U.S. escort carrier group under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague sighted the force off Samar Island. Both the American and the Japanese commanders were taken by surprise, but Kurita assumed that Sprague’s ships were part of a much larger force and therefore ordered his ships to attack independently rather than risk committing his entire force. Had he used all that was available to him, he could easily have destroyed Sprague’s outnumbered, outgunned escort carriers. As it turned out, however, in independent action Sprague’s aircraft sunk two Japanese cruisers, and torpedo fire from a U.S. destroyer damaged a third cruiser. Sprague lost two of his escort carriers, one of them to a kamikaze attack. Two of his destroyers and a destroyer escort were also sunk, while a number of other ships sustained serious damage. It was perhaps the most desperate naval engagement of the Pacific war, but Kurita, presumably short on fuel—and doubtless still fearing the presence of a larger force—suddenly broke off the engagement and withdrew.

In the meantime, Admiral Kinkaid had radioed Halsey, who was in fighting pursuit of Ozawa, for aid. Halsey responded by sending one of Mitscher’s task groups south to engage Kurita. Yet he apparently did not fully realize the desperate nature of the situation in Leyte Gulf and therefore retained some ships under Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee to continue the fight against Ozawa (who had already lost four carriers to Mitscher), rather than send them south to cut off Kurita’s escape. Only after Lee was within range of what remained of Ozawa did Halsey, at last waking to the full danger to the Leyte landings and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, order Lee to break off and steam south as well. A smaller force continued to pursue Ozawa, and two more ships were sunk, but Ozawa nevertheless managed to escape complete annihilation. As for Lee, the delay imposed by Halsey meant that he arrived in the gulf too late to intercept Kurita.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a great American victory, albeit flawed by Halsey’s misjudgment. The Japanese lost three battleships, four aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, and nine destroyers as well as many aircraft. Most important, the Japanese failed to disrupt the Leyte landings, thereby virtually ensuring that the Americans would retake the Philippines.

Further reading: Cutler, Thomas J. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001; Willmott, H. P. The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.