War and Game

WALTER S. DUNN, JR.

The Red Army was the only army that could defeat the Wehrmacht in World War II by conventional means. To defeat a foe as skillful as the Germans required advanced weapons in sufficient quantity and an army of at least 5 million men in Europe willing to take enormous losses. The British and the Americans could never have accepted such heavy casualties to defeat the Germans. Public opinion in both countries would have balked at a war dragging on for years with millions of casualties. The Russians suffered heavy casualties, nearly 6.9 million killed and died of wounds and sickness; and 4.6 million missing, of whom only 2,775,000 returned after the war. It took a concerted effort by the British and the Americans to overcome about 100 German divisions from 1943 to 1945. If the other 200-plus divisions had come from the Eastern Front, the Allies would have been in dire straits. The question remains whether the atomic bomb would have been used in Europe.

On the other hand, the Red Army was able to cope with the full power of Germany and its satellites. In the summer of 1943 practically the entire German Army was on the Eastern Front. The occupation force in France had only one combat-worthy division and the few divisions in Sicily had only recently organized. With this knowledge Stalin saw that he would be the victor and his main concern turned to the postwar world. Even though Allied assistance would have reduced Russian casualties, he had little concern. In April 1945 the Red Army could have waited on the Oder and let the Americans take Berlin, saving the Russians 250,000 killed and wounded. Instead, Stalin insisted on a race to be first between the First White Russian Front and the First Ukrainian Front, needlessly increasing casualties.

The three keys to Soviet victory in World War II were the strength of its organization, the availability of weapons and supplies, and the powerful presence of supporting combat units. This study details the first key—the units and how, when, and why they were formed. The cohesion of units from rifle group to army group enabled poorly educated and unsophisticated Russian peasants and workers, often much older and less physically fit than their counterparts in other armies, to defeat the German Army. The symbols of the unit's significance in the Red Army abound: the swearing-in ceremony in the presence of the regimental flag, the awarding of honorific names to regiments and divisions commemorating the taking of a city, and the passing of unit traditions to new formations after the original unit disappeared. The honorific titles remained with a division even though it changed its number and function. The other keys—supply and supporting arms—are mentioned in developing the central theme but require separate studies. The purpose of this work is to relate how the Red Army was organized and functioned in World War II. As a result of the study, it will become apparent that by early 1943 the Red Army was able to defeat the German Army without military action by the West. Russian strategy from then on was dictated by politics and by the position of the Soviet Union in the postwar world.

A Soviet military writer has outlined the factors that determined a nation's ability to win a war:1

1. The economic base

2. Technological competence

3. Military doctrine and tradition

4. Geographic environment

5. Ability and experience of personnel

6. The comparative power of the enemy

An advantageous position in a majority of these areas was necessary for victory. The Soviet government addressed all of these factors in the 1930s and early 1940s, and by early 1943 had achieved an advantage in all areas.

A strong economic base was created by the five-year plans that developed heavy industry and adopted mass-production techniques. In June 1941 Germany, with the addition of the economic power of its occupied countries, was far stronger than the Soviet Union. The loss of western Russia in 1941 further depleted the Soviet economic base. However, by Draconian measures and concentrated effort, Russian military production surpassed German production by early 1943.

Industrial technological competence, the second factor, was acquired from technical assistance contracts with the Americans in the 1930s. Military technology was gained through cooperative activity with the German Army in the 1920s at air bases and tank training grounds in the Soviet Union. Battlefield competence was strengthened by experience in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War. At Kursk in July 1943 the Russians seized the initiative and held it until the end of the war.

Tradition came from a blend of the czarist army and the revolutionary armies of the new government. During the war more and more of the prerevolutionary traditions were reintroduced to the Red Army. Doctrine was developed during the 1930s and in the first two years of the war. Soviet military leaders learned from the concepts being developed in the West and from actual experience fighting the Japanese and the Finns.

The fourth factor, geographic environment, was fixed, but Soviet strategy and tactics were developed to make the fullest use of the environmental advantages and to compensate for the disadvantages. The ability and experience of the personnel, the fifth factor, was improved through the reformation of the Red Army in the 1930s, though it did not reach the point of equality with the Germans until 1943.

With regard to the last factor, comparative power, the Russians began an armaments race with the Germans in the early 1930s. After eight years of investing in heavy industry, Russia switched to manufacturing weapons in 1937. The Germans had a significant head start and retained their superiority in quality and quantity in 1941. The Russians overcame their deficit by early 1943. In early 1943 five of the six factors turned in favor of the Soviet Union, leading to eventual victory. The sixth, geography, had always been favorable to the Russians, but full advantage was taken of the climate and the terrain in offensive operations in the last two years.

Two major elements led to Russian victory: production and manpower. The strength of the Soviet economy, created in large measure by American technical assistance in the 1930s, enabled the Russians to outproduce the Germans. An efficient military organization placed the fruits of production in the right place at the right time. The production methods were learned from the Americans, but the organization of manpower was homegrown.

Little has been written of the war on the Eastern Front by Western authors because of a lack of access to the Soviet archives. There is little doubt that the war was lost for Germany on the Eastern Front. By the end of 1943 the Germans had little hope for a victory, even though the Allied invasion was six months away. How could a backward country, the Soviet Union, defeat Germany, one of the greatest industrial powers of the world, having probably the finest trained and equipped army of World War II? The most popular opinion in the West has been that masses of Russian soldiers attacked the German defenses until the Germans were overcome. The Soviets, on the other hand, emphasize the superiority of the socialist system and the heroism of the individual inspired by Communist fervor.

The popular Western image of the Red Army during World War II was a huge army of illiterate, ill-trained, ill-clad, poorly equipped, subhuman soldiers who fought because they feared the NKVD machine guns at the rear. Victory for the Red Army as viewed by the West came only by trading ten Russian lives for one German life. This image continues in popular Western literature.

The Soviet image of the Red Army is almost as distorted. In communist publications, the Red Army was composed of super-patriotic, idealistic young men who had to be restrained from forfeiting their lives by needless acts of personal bravery. According to the Soviets, the real problem was not urging the troops to sacrifice their lives but restraining them from doing so needlessly. The task of the officers was to instruct them to be better soldiers and to give their lives for a reason. The Soviet position was that the soldiers were imbued with patriotic fervor based on faith in the socialist system and the Communist Party.

Closer to the truth was that the Soviet Union outproduced the Germans and, willing to take losses, overwhelmed them. Was it possible for a country with less than half the steel-making capacity of Germany and its satellites to win the battle of production? Lend-lease was part of the answer, as it provided Russia with trucks, locomotives, rails, and other goods that would have absorbed much of Soviet production capacity.

The question still remains: How could a country that was not able to provide rifles for its army in World War I outproduce most of Europe only 25 years later? In the intervening period Russia had been devastated by many crises: defeat in World War I, foreign occupation from 1917 until 1919, a civil war that lasted until 1921, and a Communist regime that eliminated the professional class, including army officers, engineers, government officials, transportation specialists, and almost every other person with the skills necessary to make an economy work smoothly—not once, but twice, after the Revolution and in the purges of the late 1930s. The Soviet Union was in chaos by the late 1920s with millions dying of starvation and industry at a standstill.

During the 1920s, the Communist leadership swallowed its pride and invited foreign concessions, encouraging companies to come into Russia and operate coal mines, gold mines, factories, the telegraph system, and other businesses. Although this system spurred economic activity, the basic concept of giving foreign capitalists the right of exploitation was not acceptable, plus profits flowed out of the Soviet Union. Cancellation of the concessions began in the late 1920s, and by the early 1930s most of the concessions were gone.

Replacing the concessions were technical assistance contracts. Coincidental with the first five-year plan, designed to modernize the Soviet economy, the Russians began signing technical assistance agreements with Western companies, primarily American, some German, and a few British, French, Swiss, and others. The agreements generally called for the company to design, build, and equip a plant and train Russians in its operation. These plants were then copied by the Russians with limited foreign help. Under these agreements the entire auto, tractor, and steel industries were expanded and modernized. Other industries also benefited from foreign expertise. By 1936, although most of the technical assistance contracts had expired and the foreigners had left, the Soviets continued to import machinery for their factories.

Foreign assistance enabled the Soviet Union to advance technologically over a half-century in the course of about eight years. Copying Western technology catapulted Russian manufacturing acumen into the twentieth century by eliminating the need for research and development and standardizing almost everything from blast furnaces to lathes. Multiple-unit construction reduced manufacturing time and cost. By the late 1930s the Soviet Union had the latest designs and the largest factories, primarily copied from the best in the United States. After the foreigners left, young Soviet engineers with little experience operated existing plants and produced copies, not only of machines but of entire plants. These factories, although plagued by inefficient operation in the late 1930s, formed the basis for the Soviet war industry in World War II, making the tanks and other weapons that defeated the Germans.

In addition to production, the other factor was manpower, which was not an exclusive Soviet advantage. There were 80 million Germans versus 200 million Soviet citizens. However, the Germans had the manpower of allied European nations and the population of the occupied zone of Russia. Russia lost over 60 million people in the first six months of the war, equalizing the ratio of manpower, 140 million Russians versus 80 million Germans plus 60 million Russians, many of whom cooperated in the German war effort. Although Russia's allies made a substantial contribution to defeating the Germans with the air war and lend-lease supplies, until June 1944 the Allies did not tie up considerable numbers of German troops. Germany's allies—Finland, Roumania, Hungary, and Italy—made major contributions to the armies on the Eastern Front.

The manpower equation was balanced by Germany's extremely wasteful and inefficient management of both industrial and human resources. Whereas the Russians extracted the last drop from their potential, the Germans only talked of total war until late in 1943. From the very beginning Russia demanded incredible sacrifices from its people. Fourteen-year-old boys, women, and invalids were employed in factories working ten-hour shifts six or seven days a week to replace men in the army. Every possible ounce of human and industrial capacity was devoted to winning the war, stripping the civilian economy of all but the barest essentials. In contrast until the very end the Germans still had the highest ratio of personal maids of any country in World War II. German women were not employed in industry to any appreciable extent and factories worked only one shift. Some teenagers served part time in antiaircraft units, but the high schools remained open. On the other hand, the Germans continued to manufacture luxuries such as furniture and other civilian goods and obtained more nonessential products from the occupied countries.

Even in the captive nations, life was probably more palatable than it was for a Russian transferred to one of the new industrial centers in the Ural Mountains. The Red Army seldom had more than 6.5 million troops directly involved on the Eastern Front. The total in the armed forces was usually about 10 million. The German and satellite armies facing the Russians varied from period to period, but seldom were below 3 million and sometimes exceeded that number. The Russians did enjoy a two-to-one margin overall and a higher margin in select areas. The cost of winning a war against an opponent as powerful and skillful as Germany was high. Ten million Russian soldiers died, compared to about 3 million Germans and their allies killed on the Eastern Front. Russian losses of three-to-one were the price of attacking a highly proficient defender.2

When the regular divisions were destroyed by the Germans in 1941, thousands of young Communists were dispatched from the cities to instill patriotic fervor and to gain time through heroic action, sometimes fighting to the last man.3 On the other hand, many Russian soldiers, hating the Stalinist regime, surrendered readily, believing that the Germans were liberators.4 The Soviet soldier did not have an unquenchable patriotic love for the Communist Party and the socialist system. The fact that the Germans were able to recruit hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens to serve as service troops in the rifle divisions, as well as to fight the partisans, to work as laborers in Germany, and even to serve as soldiers in Ost Battalions in France, indicated that there was disaffection with the Soviet system, especially in the Baltic States, the Caucasus, and the Ukraine.

The Red Army men fought as most soldiers, not with outstanding brilliance but with persistent determination. The Soviet soldier fought in all likelihood because of national pride and hatred of the Germans.5 Knowledge that the Germans treated prisoners inhumanely became widely known after the first few months of the war.6 In the early months of the war the Germans had captured millions of prisoners with ease. After the record of brutality and atrocities became known, the prisoner bag dropped appreciably. The brutal policies of the Germans revealed in towns recaptured in the winter of 1941-42 also instilled a desire for revenge in the troops.

Production and manpower were brought into play by the Red Army. In the early months of the war the Red Army leadership was inexperienced and the men untrained. By 1943 combat experience had changed the Red Army into a professionally led, capable, trained army. By the end of the war it was equipped with the most cost-effective weapons used by any army during World War II. To believe otherwise is to be faced with an anomaly. How could subhuman masses defeat what was undoubtedly the best tactically trained army of the war, the German Army?

To make use of the production and manpower, the Russians had to improve their military skills beginning in the 1930s. First a doctrine for the overall strategy on the conduct of war had to be devised. Considerable debate followed on tactics resulting from experience in Spain, the Mongolian border, and Finland. Then weapons had to be designed to implement the tactics, and units organized to utilize the weapons. Finally, and equally crucial, a system was planned to provide manpower and produce the weapons, munitions, and other supplies to create units and to replace losses.

The keys to victory were the organization, support, and supply of the Red Army. All three had to be accomplished in the most cost-effective manner. Although the industrial base of the Soviet Union was but a fraction of the potential industrial base of the combined industrial nations of Europe under Hitler's sway, what made the difference was the Russian ability to reduce every weapon and organization to the minimum standard to accomplish the mission. The Soviet government had learned the value of utter simplicity through necessity during the period following the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War. The need to restore the devastation and the enormous effort to reconstitute the country under the two five-year plans taught the lessons of maximum return for investment; the resources used to accomplish an objective had to be reduced to the bare minimum.

Russian weapons were simple, not because the soldiers were too stupid to operate complex weapons but because anything that could not offer advantages to compensate for the cost was eliminated. An example of minimum quality to accomplish the task was the T34 tank that was extremely uncomfortable for the crew. The men in the turret perched on seats suspended from the turret side because there was no floor. The base of the tank was filled with shells covered with mats. After firing the first few rounds, the loader jumped from his seat and scrambled around on the bottom of the tank while the turret revolved above him. However, the gun and the armor were excellent and the tank was considered the best one used during World War II.

Throughout the war the number of man-hours and material needed to produce a T34 steadily declined by simplifying the design. Few changes were made to improve the performance at the cost of production. In contrast, German weapons became increasingly complex. Six months passed from the time the Tiger was first used in battle until it was comparatively free of technical flaws. The Panther was still not free of problems at the Battle of Kursk, yet both tanks were marvels of technical innovation.

German commanders, with large service organizations, continually complained about the lack of engines and other spare parts to keep their tanks and motor vehicles running. Hitler was castigated for being more concerned about making large numbers of new tanks rather than maintaining the existing ones. The Russians concentrated on making simple, easy-to-maintain tanks with a limited service life, replacing worn or damaged ones with new. Crippled vehicles were stripped of usable parts and scrapped or sent to the rear to be remanufactured in repair plants. Service units were kept to a minimum. Rarely if ever did a prisoner mention the lack of spare parts as being a factor in the shortage of equipment available to the front.

Prisoners did comment on the marvelous engine in the British tanks, but the average life of a tank on the Eastern Front was only six months. What was the point of putting a beautiful engine designed to last for years in a tank that would be destroyed before the engine was broken in? English tanks were used for training where long engine life paid off in training drivers. The "root of the matter" was cost-effectiveness. In what manner could human and physical resources be used to the greatest advantage? The choice was either a single beautiful tank with excellent optics and comfortable crew facilities or four ugly giants. The Germans opted for the former and lost the production battle, one of the keys to victory.

Another key to Russian victory was organization. Again the objective was to obtain the most cost-effective method of employing men and weapons under the prevailing conditions. During the 1930s the Russian military organization was in a constant state of flux, reflecting the radical changes in strategic and tactical thinking. Changes were still under way in mid-1941 and contributed a great deal to the early Russian defeats. However, a steady stream of new organizations were developed, tried, and if faulty, discarded, but if successful, replicated endlessly. Organizations were drastically altered to reflect the increasing number of weapons and the means to employ them versus the limited manpower position. While the number of riflemen in the division steadily dropped arithmetically, the number of weapons multiplied geometrically. The Red Army of April 1945 was a far more powerful instrument than in June 1941. Keeping constantly in mind the matching developments in the German, British, and U.S. armies, one can see the emergence of a powerful machine devoted to the defeat of Hitler. In the end success was achieved by overpowering numbers of weapons, not men, but paid for by tragic losses of the latter. By the spring of 1943 the Red Army had halted the Manstein counteroffensive that had drained the Germans of their strategic reserve, the occupation army in France. The final defeat of Hitler was merely a matter of time.

How much time was more a political than a military decision. The Western Allies could have hastened the end but chose not to. Stalin was afforded additional time to position the Red Army in the heartland of Germany to prevent a second Cordon Sanitaire similar to that created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. When the war finally ended in May 1945, the Soviet Union was able to erect an iron curtain, holding captive millions of people of Eastern Europe for over 40 years.

Protracting the war favored the Soviet Union and worked to the disadvantage of Britain and the United States. Prolonging the war gave Hitler an additional year or more to pursue the Final Solution. Most of the Jews killed in the Holocaust died in the last two years of the war. How many could have been saved by ending the war earlier? Churchill and Roosevelt made many choices during the war. Most were not dictated by circumstances, as many would argue, but came from a careful weighing of resources and desirable outcomes. Gross underestimation of the power of the Soviet Union and the Red Army was a major flaw in the calculations of the Western leaders. Rather than being worn down by the Germans, the Red Army grew stronger in the final years. The heavy Russian civilian casualties came in the early years of the war; there were no Soviet civilian casualties after the Germans were driven out in 1944. The goals of the West would have been best served by ending the war promptly in 1943 or early 1944. One of the reasons it failed to do so was a misconception of the Red Army. This study seeks to correct that misconception.

NOTES

1. K. Malanin, "Razvitie Organizatsionnik Form Sukoputhik Voist v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine," VIZh, August 1967, p. 28; G. F. Krivosheev, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat: Poteri Vooruzennix sil SSSR v Voinax Boevix Deistviiax i Voennix Konfliktax (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelistvo, 1993), pp. 130-31.

2. James F. Dunnigan, ed., The Russian Front (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1978), p. 83.

3. Alexander Werth, Russia at War (New York: Discus Books, 1970), p. 176. At the end of June 1941 each provincial Party committee was ordered to provide from 500 to 5,000 Communists for service. A total of 95,000 party members were mobilized and 58,000 were sent to the army. In addition, the first Opolchenye workers battalions were formed in late June.

4. Ibid., p. 265.

5. Ibid., p. 198.

6. Ibid., pp. 212-13.