War and Game

P-39Q-25-BE Unit: 11th GvIAP, VVS of Black Sea Serial: 19 (21953) Pilot - capt.D.V.Zuzin (15 victories). Odessa, April-May 1944

Air Power History, Fall, 2006 by Viktor P. Kulikov

During World War II, the United States provided more Bell P-39 Aircobras to the Soviet Union through Lend-Lease, than any other aircraft. The P-39 became the most popular foreign plane imported because of the remarkable success enjoyed by Soviet airmen, notably by Aleksandr I. Pokryshkin and pilots of his division, who flew and fought on the eastern front.

The first P-39s to arrive in the Soviet Union, were the export variants, which the Americans began to turn out for England in August 1941. These were the Aircobra Is, fitted with 20-mm guns. Even as they tried to master the new American fighter, the Royal Air Force uncovered many defects and tried hard to improve them, but after a brief period of modifications, the RAF handed over eleven of its P-39s to the Soviets, shipping the planes via convoys to the USSR through northern ports.

In mid-January 1942, two Aircobras were delivered to the 22d Reserve Aviation regiment ZAP (Zapasnoi Aviatsionnyi Polk/). Subsequently, the 22d became the training center, where the fighter regiments were retraining for foreign the foreign planes. Soviet pilots and engineers were struck by the plane's unconventional configuration, including the engine placement in the center of the fuselage, the three-wheel undercarriage with a nose-wheel, and a mobile type instead of a shift canopy. The Soviets took extraordinary measures to master the plane. The Scientific-Test Institute of Air Forces (Nauchno-Ispytatel'nyi Institut Voenno-Vozdushnylh Sil/(NII VVS) sent a group of experts, headed by an engineer (I. G. Rabkin) and a test pilot (V. E. Golofastov). While English engineers and technicians, attached to the 22d ZAP, helped their Soviet allies as best they could, the severe Soviet weather made the airplanes' outdoor assembly--directly on a flying field--trying, to say the least.

When the first Aircobra was assembled, Golofastov began taxiing tests and only after practicing for some time in that manner, did he lift off into the air. Having gained some experience, Golofastov began to train the instructor-pilots of the 22d ZAR. Major Akulenko was the first instructor pilot to take off in the P-39.

In April and May 1942, after Soviet airmen ran official tests of the Aircobra, they concluded that the American fighter was the equal of Soviet and German planes of its class. Soviet experts regarded highly the P-39's maneuvrability, takeoff and landing characteristics, powerful weapons, and good equipment. Moreover, the plane was equipped with a heated cabin--no Soviet fighter enjoyed such luxury. The NII VVS test reports predicted that the Aircobra would prevail in air combat against all types of German planes and was also ideal for close air support. Simultaneously with the official tests, military pilots from the aviation regiments began to prepare for their training flights on the Aircobra. Based in Ivanov City, the 22d ZAP became the training center for the fighting regiments. Major S. I. Mironov's 153d IAP was the first to arrive. Next, the 185th IAP, from the Leningrad front arrived for refresher training. However, the 19th Guard IAP from the Karelian front--whose members independently learned to fly the Cobra--were the first to fly the plane in combat.

On May 15th, pilots of the 1st squadron under Captain Kutakhov (later Marshal of Aviation) became the first to qualify on the Cobra. The training, including personnel and regimental staffers, was completed without incident. That day Soviet Cobras from Shongui airfield encountered German fighters, but neither side sustained any losses. On the next day in a dogfight with eight Messerschmitt Bf 109s, Senior Lieutenant I. D. Gaidenko's plane was damaged, forced to land, and the pilot seriously wounded. It was the first Aircobra lost on the Soviet-German front.

Later on, pilots of the 19th Guard IAP flew cover over Kirovskaya railway and Tulomskaya hydro-electric power station from Murmashi airfield, helped the ground troops of the Karelian front. The 20th Guard IAP, in the same division, received Aircobra fighters. Soviet pilots patrolled front-lines at Murmansk. For example, on June 15, six Aircobras from the 19th Guard IAP under the command of Captain I. V. Bochkov west to Murmansk intercepted six bombers and 16 fighters of the Luftwaffe. In the air fight, Soviet pilots shot down nine enemy planes.

At the end of June, the 153d IAP arrived at the Voronezhskyi front in support of the 3d Shock Aviation Group. Since June 30 the regiment participated in battle operations on Aircobras. From Voronezh and Lipetsk airfields the regiment fought to the end of September. During the four months, pilots of the regiment flew 1,070 combat sorties, shot down 64 enemy planes (including 45 fighters), and lost 8 planes. The Commander of the 153d IAP Colonel Mironov attributed his unit's successes first of all to the skill of his pilots and second to the Aircobra's superior characteristics. In October, the 153d regiment was reinforced with new Aircobras and was transfered to the Northwest front. After more outstanding operations on November 22, the regiment was upgraded to the rank of Gvardeiskyi (Guard) and renamed the 28th Guard IAP.

In October, the 2d Guard SAP (Smeshannyi Aviatsionnyi Polk/Mixed Aviation Regiment) of the North Fleet naval aviation, received their first ten Aircobra I fighters. This unit's mission was to to defend the port of Murmansk. On April 14 1943, while repulsing a German air raid on Murmansk, the 2d Guard numbering ten Aircobra and six Hurricane fighters engaged an enemy force of 14 German fighters. In the ensuing battle, five German and one Soviet fighter were shot down.

The mass appearance of Aircobra fighters on the East front took place already in 1943. By that time the deliveries of the new P-39 were carried out, from the north through Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, from the south through Iran, and from the east through Alaska. Aircobra fighters were distributed to the new aviation units, out of which the whole divisions and corps were formed.

Beginning in November 1942, the United States began to deliver the P-39D model. The D, built for American forces, was transported to the Soviet Union via Iran. The D model differed from the Aircobra I mainly with respect to modified equipment. The series D-2 had also an auxiliary fuel tank under the fuselage, the V-1710-63 engine, capable of generating up to 1,325 h.p. on afterburner, also carried a 37-mm cannon.

Beginning in 1943, the P-39 series K, M, N, and Q were shipped to the USSR along the Alaska-Siberia (ALSIB) route. According to the Soviet data, the U.S. sent 2,593 P-39s through the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk The greatest number of planes were the P-39N, featuring the V-1710-85 engine and the P-39Q with more powerful armaments--37 mm cannon and six 12.7 mm machineguns.

Aircobras appeared on all of the Soviet fronts from the North to South. By July 1943, there were seven times as many Aircobras in action on the Soviet front than there had been November 1942. The 258th SAD/mixed aviation division (renamed in August the 1st Guard Aviation Division) was equipped with P-39 and P-40 fighters and continued to fight on the Karelian front. In the Leningrad region, P-39Q were sent to the 102d and 103d Guard IAPs of PVO (Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona/ anti-aircraft defence). On the North-West front three regiments of the 5th Guard Aviation Division, under Colonel G. A. Ivanov, flew on Aircobras, and so did all of the regiments of the 1st Guard Aviation Division of Colonel V. V. Sukhoryabov on the Central front. Many P-39 were concentrated on the south sector of the Soviet front. The planes arrived here directly from Iran.

The 25th and the 11th ZAPs (reserve aviation regiments) were busy with pilot retraining. The 298th IAP, which received the P-39D and P-39K models, joined in air combat on Kuban from the middle of March 1943. By August its pilots had shot down 167 enemy planes, while losing 30 Aircobras. In recognition for its service, the regiment was upgraded in rank and renamed the 104th Guard IAP.

The 16th, 100th and 104th Guard IAPs belonged to the 216 IAD (later the 9th Guard IAD). The 16th Guard IAP (commanded by A. I. Pokryshkin) after retraining received new P-39D, K and L models from Teheran. In April 1943, the unit arrived in Krasnodar and almost at once joined heavy air fighting on Kuban. They fought through the end of the war later flying the P-39N and P-39Q, and at war's end was in Prague. Among the pilots of the 16th Guard were: three-time Hero of the Soviet Union Polkovnik Aleksandr Ivanovich Pokryshkin, with 59 victories; two pilots double Heroes of the Soviet Union: Major Grigorii A. Rechkalov, 56 victories, and Captain Aleksandr F. Klubov, 31 victories; and more than 15 other Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The third regiment of the same famous division was the 45th IAP (later the 100th Guard IAP) under the command of Polkovnik Ibragim Dzusov, who flew Aircobra and Kittyhawk fighters since February 1943. The 100th included such aces as brothers Boris and Dmitrii Glinka, 31 and 50 victories, respectively; Ivan Babak (33 victories) also flew in that regiment.

The number of Aircobras in the naval aviation also increased. By December 1943, the 2d Guard IAP and the 255th IAP of the North Fleet had about 30 P-39s. On the Black Sea Fleet, the 11th IAP received Aircobras in March 1943. The fighters protected Gelendzhik, where part of the Black Sea Fleet was stationed. Later they supported the ground forces along the front line, escorted bombers and torpedo-boats, and took off on "free hunts" (targets of opportunity) over the enemy territory. During the second half of 1943, the 11th IAP carried out 75 air combats, shot down 92 German planes (60 fighters and 32 bombers and reconnaissance), while losing 10 of their P-39. By the end of 1943 the 43d IAP of the Black Sea Fleet also had received some P-39s. The pilots of that regiment supported the advancing units of the Soviet Army and covered Pe-2 and A-20 Boston bombers in air raids on Constanza, Rumania. In November 1944, when battle action on the Black Sea had finished, there were 129 Aircobra fighters of different modifications in the naval aviation arsenal. The North Fleet used the Aircobra fighters as multipurpose planes. They took off to cover the ships and coastal objects, to support bombers and attack planes, and to attack enemy airfields.

Beginning in 1944, the inventory of Aircobras in the PVO system increased sharply. In late 1943, the PVO numbered only 65 Aircobras, while at the beginning of 1945, there were 597 P-39s. In 1944 the 57th, the 66th and the 101st Guard IAPs participated in covering American air bases in the Ukraine. American B-17 Flying Fortress bombers used Poltava and Mirgorod airfields during their shuttle bombing raids between Italy, England, and the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that the regiments located closer to front, were armed with Aircoras, while the rear echelons flew the Hurricane and Kittyhawk fighters. By the end of the war there were 8 regiments in the PVO system, armed with P-39s. In total they shot down 95 enemy planes.

While considered a marginal plane in the U.S. and England, the Aircobra was highly esteemed by the Soviet pilots. A. I. Pokryshkin called it a perfect, modern, and high-speed fighter. V. D. Lavrinenkov noted that Aircobras were the modern battle machine, made at the level of the best fighters of the war; E. Ya. Savitskii underlined that it conceded something to the Yak-l, but on the whole the P-39 was excellent. According to the official report of the 153d IAP, Luftwaffe pilots considered Aircobra fighters the most dangerous opponents and engaged them in battle only when they had advantages in numerical superiority, in height, and suddenness. Air combat conditions on the Soviet-German front generally saw air combat take place at an altitude of from 4,000-5,000 meters, where most air battles were fought. At these heights the Aircobra had the best flying properties in comparison with German and Soviet fighters of that time. In flight range, the Aircobra equalled Soviet fighters and with drop fuel tanks surpassed them.

Soviet pilots were unanimous in their high regard for the Aircobra's powerful armament. Even the Aircobra I, equipped only with one 20-mm cannon and 6 machine guns (including two of large-caliber) surpassed many Soviet fighters. The late modifications, for example P-39Q with 37 mm cannon and 4 Browning machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber, had the so-called shattering weapon. The Aircobra, on which Soviet ace Pokryshkin flew, had a control knob with combined firing buttons for cannon and machine guns. In the USSR, the armaments of the P-39Q modification were considered excessive and two underwing machine guns were often removed. The 37-mm cannon, as a rule, could destroy an enemy plane on one hit. That gun was used to hit armored cars, steam locomotives, river and sea vessels. From the second half of 1943 on, the P-39 was used less as a fighter and more often as an attack plane for raids on land and sea targets. During February 1944, the pilots of the 9th Guard IAP destroyed 13 planes, 110 motor vehicles, 100 horses, 5 steam locomotives and a lot of enemy infantry. From January 1 till May 10 1943, the 216th shot down 187 planes from the air and destroyed 200 on the ground. Soviet pilots were especially successful when flying Aircobra fighters during "free hunt" on railroads. The P-39's powerful gun pierced locomotive boilers with armour-piercing protectiles. In one combat sortie in September 1943, 12 pilots from the 19th Guard IAD destroyed 13 steam locomotives.

Other weapons for the attack plane variant of the Aircobra included bombs, usually demolition and incendiary bombs in the 100-250 kg range. Bombing was performed from horizontal flight, flat dive (under 45 degrees) and on the sea, at low altitude.

P-39s were used also for battlefront reconnaissance. The plane was equipped with a vertical aerial camera AFA-I. Such-reconnaissance missions were carried out by the 118th ORAP (Otdelnyi-Razvedyvatel'nyi Aviatsionnyi Polk, separate reconnaissance aviation regiment), in the 67th and 98th Guard IAPs.

At low and medium altitude, the Aircobra had insufficient speed and maneuverability. But the plane's major defect concerned the engine, which was positioned in the Aircobra's center of gravity. Whenever the pilot fired the gun and the shells were expended, it affected the plane's alignment sharply, often causing the fighter to go into a spin. The spin produced a considerable load and vibration on the controls and any delay in recovering from a spin could be fatal.

The spin produced numerous failures and crashes in combat units. During two months in 1944, spins caused two accidents and four failures in the 1st Guard IAD. No one was immune, even skilled pilots found it difficult to recover from a spin. The NII VVS had three accidents: on February 2, 1943, K. A. Gruzdev was lost in an Aircobra; on January 3, 1944, K. A. Avtonomov (flying a P-39N) went down; and on April 27, 1944, K. I. Ovchinnikov crashed (in a P-39Q-10). The situation deteriorated to the point that in the Fall of 1943 Bell Aircraft dispatched a special team to Moscow.

Another problem encountered on the Aircobra was the difficulty in exiting the plane once it entered a spin. Pilots jumped out of the left door, which in an emergency was thrown off, but often struck the P-39's tail, again with fatal results. Two Heroes of the Soviet Union--N. M. Iskrin in May 1943, and B. B. Glinka in July 1944--crashed in this way. Sometimes, even if the pilot was lucky and managed to get out of the spin, he could encounter a new danger. The heavy overloads deformed the P-39's tail unit and tail, jamming the plane's elevator and rudder.

The Soviets acted to contain the problems by implementing an extensive safety program. Flight tests demonstrated specific pilot actions that caused spins. The NII VVS held meetings and practices where skilled pilots demonstrated safe methods of piloting the American fighter. An educational film was made about the problem and distributed for screening at combat units. These efforts helped reduce the accident rate at the front, although it was impossible to eliminate losses completely.

Also, the chief engineer of the Soviet Air Forces ordered several modifications made and imposed restrictions. For example, aerobatic flying without ammunition was categorically forbidden. Engineers replaced the armored oil tank to improve the fighter's forward the alignment and reinforced the tail. As a result of the modernization--which affected 326 planes--the P-39 successfully passed the NII VVS tests.

Another problem concerned the P-39's Allison V-1710 engine. The engine's expected operational life of 250 hours fell short under battle conditions, where it lasted only between 60 and 70 percent of the flying hours predicted. The degraded performance was attributed to excessive afterburning that overheated the engine oil and fused and jammed bearings. Connecting rods came off and pushed the engine out of action. The use of poor quality oil and gasoline also reduced the engine life. Because of shortage of the American spare engines at least 100 P-39s were refitted with the Soviet M105P engine.

In the winter, oil lines and cooling systems were heated. With the beginning of cold weather, the planes' lubricants were partially replaced with more cold-resistant Soviet products. The rupture of fuel system pipes caused fires in the air. Thus, while ferrying not far from Gudermes, the Hero of the Soviet Union N. E. Lavitskii was lost. In that connection American duraluminum pipes were replaced with specially processed copper from Soviet stocks.

The North and Baltic Fleet tried to outfit the P-39 on a ski undercarriage. However, that innovation did not gain much acceptance and Aircobras continued to fly on wheels the year round.

To speed up training, the Soviets built a two-seat trainer, with the second cabin ahead of the main. That plane resembled the American P-39. Pilots complained that the front cabin was close and uncomfortable. The propeller rotated 40 cm before the pilot's eyes and, in case of emergency, a pilot would inevitably get under the rotating propeller.

In 1944, Bell Aircraft stopped production of the P-39. The last five P-39Q passed along the Siberian ALSIB air route early in 1945. The totals produced vary according to different sources. The U.S. delivered to the USSR between 4,719 and 4,746 Aircobra fighters of all models. England re-exported 212 to the USSR, but of those only 158 P-39 arrived at Soviet northern ports. On the whole, in accord with Soviet sources, the USSR accepted 4,952 Aircobras. The following models of Aircobras were sent from the USA: 108 P-39D, 40 P-39K, 137 P-39L, 157 P-39M, 1113 P-39N, 3291 P-39Q.

Many regiments and divisions of the Soviet Air Forces flew Aircobras until the end of the war. Soviet pilot G. G. Golubev flying combat in Czechoslovakia early in May 1945, shot down one of the last enemy aircraft (a Dornier Do 217) in the European theater of operations. By war's end, Soviet Air Forces and aviation of PVO (anti-aircraft defence) had an inventory of 3,078 Aircobra fighters, including 700 planes in the PVO system. At the same time, Soviet naval aviation had 691 Aircobras. Aircobras appeared in the Pacific Ocean Fleet in July 1945, when the Soviet Union was preparing for war against Japan. The 27th IAP from the North Fleet and the 43d IAP from the Black Sea Fleet were transfered on the Far East. Both regiments had approximately 100 Aircobras.

According to the Soviet data, by the end of the war the P-39's combat record was: one Aircobra loss per 122 combat sorties and 4 enemy planes destroyed. Many pilots were credited with destroying 20 enemy planes. Major Grigorii Andreevich Rechkalov, an Aircobra pilot of the 16th Guard IAP, shot down 50 German planes and is designated a "champion."

Aircobras remained in the Soviet aviation arsenal until 1950 and could be found in flying schools until about 1955. On the whole, the Aircobra was a good, reliable combat plane that left a significant mark in the memory of Soviet pilots.

Bell P-63 Kingcobra

The P-63 Kingcobra was a further development of the Aircobra. It had the same general arrangement as its predecessor. The Bell Aircraft designers somewhat increased its dimensions, and changed the tail unit and wing. Out of 3,303 Kingcobra fighters constructed from 1943 to 1945, 2,400 went to the Soviet Union.

In December 1943, the Bell company sent detailed information about the new fighter to Moscow. In February 1944, representatives of NII VVS, engineer-pilots A. G. Kochetkov and F. P. Suprun, were sent to the U.S. to carry out all-round tests of the plane before its mass delivery to the Soviet Union.

Having crashed one Kingcobra during the spin-tests, Kochetkov managed to convince the Americans of the necessity to modify the airframe. The shipment of P-63s was planned to begin in the first half of 1944. Early that summer American ferry-pilots delivered the first Kingcobras to Fairbanks and began to train Soviet pilots on them. In Alaska only the squadron commanders of the ferrying aviation division were trained. All other pilots would master the new plane directly in their regiments at the front. The P-63 ferrying went along the Siberian ALSIB air route. The first plane was handed over in June 1944. Beginning in September 1944, while still in the American aircraft factory, the P-63A began to be painted with the symbol of the Soviet Air Forces--red stars with white edging.

The new fighter did not arrive at the front immediately since there was no Soviet aviation shortage at that time. This permitted careful flight testing of the P-63. From the end of 1944 until March 1945, the planes of the series A-1, A-5, A-7 and A-10 were consecutively tested in NII VVS and LII NKAP (Letno Ispytael'nyi Institut Narodnogo Kommissariata Aviatsionnoi Promyshlennosti/ Flying-Test Institute of People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry). On the whole, the P-63 performed well. Among its positive attributes were: high speed, good maneuverability, powerful weapons, and safe controls.

The P-63A was at a speed disadvantage to the Messerschmitt Me 109G-4 (9 km/h at a height 5,000 meters) and in rate-of-climb (2 m/sec) at the same height. But in horizontal maneuver the American fighter outstripped both the Me 109G-4 and Focke-Wulf FW 190A-4.

Testing revealed other lacks compared with P-39s: the P-63's useful loading and fuel capacity were lower and its defensive armor was not as good. Also, wing covering deformation appeared on the A-1, A-5 and A-6 series aircraft. Consequently, Bell increased the thickness of the covering and strengthened the wings from the A-7 series on. The aerodynamic instability also emerged while pulling-out and during aerobatics. The latter problem was addressed on the P-63N with the installation of a more powerful engine, the V- 1710-117, and a ventral fin. Despite all of the designers' efforts, both the Kingcobra and Aircobra suffered from spins. When the cannon and fuselage machine guns ammunition were spent, the trim of the planes was disturbed, requiring immediate correction by triming the tabs. Otherwise, the P-63 went into a spin. Therefore, Soviet pilots flying the Kingcobra were forbidden to execute a sharp pull-out and input in vertical figures.

Beginning in the spring of 1945, the P-63 began to arrive at frontline PVO aviation units. The P-63 was best suited for search and interception missions. At altitudes above 7,500 meters, the Kingcobra overtook English Spitfire Mk. IX and Soviet Lavochkin La-7. It had good ceiling of 13,105 meters. The standard equipment of all P-63 was radio semi-compass MN-26Y, that essentially facilitated navigation at night and in clouds. Early in 1945 one P-63-A-10 arrived, equipped with radar. The radar was intended to prevent attacks from behind. By May 1, 1945 51 PVO regiments were equipped with P-63s.

The initial Kingcobras went to units that had been armed with Aircobras. The first to receive P-63s was the 28th IAP of PVO, based near Moscow. By August 1945, P-63s arrived at the 17th and the 821st IAPs, ten planes in each. In autumn several Kingcobras came to the 39th IAP. All these regiments entered PVO of the Moscow region.

The P-63 began to be delivered in to Soviet Air Forces in the summer of 1945. As preparations were made for the war with Japan, the new fighters were sent to aviation units of the 12th Air Army in the Far East. The 190th aviation division under the command of Major General Fokin was the first to receive P-63A. The division was transfered to Trans-Baikal in June 1945 and by August 2 finished retraining on the new American fighter. During air operations in Manchuria it flew from two airfields--"Ural" and "Leningrad"--located not far from Choibolsan in Mongolia.

The 245th IAD, which included the 940th and the 781st IAP regiments also flew P-63s. In July and August Kingcobras arrived at the 128th SAD (mixed aviation division), based on Kamchatka peninsula. At the beginning of air operations 97 P-63s arrived at the 9th and the 10th Air Armies.

During the brief military campaign against Japan, Kingcobras were used to provide air cover from air ground troops and ships, to attack and bomb, provide escort, and conduct reconnaissance. For example, on the second day of the offensive 40 II-4 bombers, escorted by 50 P-63s bombed the fortifications at Suchzhou. Pilots of the 190th and the 245th IADs working as attack planes and light bombers supported the advancing Soviet and Mongolian troops. They also covered transport planes, delivering fuel to the advanced tank and mechanized units. The P-63s carried two Soviet FAB-100 bombs externally. Underwing large-caliber machine guns were not usually mounted. The 888th and the 410th IAPs from the Kamchatka peninsula inflicted considerable damage to Japanese bases on the Kuril Islands, and then covered the landing of Soviet troops on them.

The Japanese aircraft did not offer serious resistance to the advancing Soviet armies, therefore it was impossible to assess the Kingcobra's performance in air fights. One unique air combat in a P-63 was flown by Junior Lieutenant I. F. Mirishnichenko of the 17th IAP. On August 17 he and V. F. Sirotin (a Hero of the Soviet Union) attacked two Japanese fighters, who were attacking transport planes coming in for a landing not far from the ship Vanemyao. One Japanese pilot was shot down, another managed to disappear on low-level flight among nearby hills. Miroshnichenko probably shot down the Japanese Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters.

Concurrently, the first P-63s arrived at the 7th IAD naval aviation unit of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. At the beginning of the war with Japan, the division had only 10 Kingcobras. Anether twenty arrived during the battle actions. However, they didn't participate in combat operations.

The lease of the American fighters to the Soviet mission in Alaska stopped immediately after Japan's capitulation. The last Kingcobra was delivered to Kamchatka peninsula on September 29, 1945. The Soviet Union managed to receive 2,400 P-63 of the total 2,450 ordered. After the war the most advanced lend-lease fighter occupied a firm position in Soviet aviation. Kingcobras were sent not only to aviation units in the USSR, but also to Soviet occupation armies in Germany (the 1st Guard IAD in Neuhausen), Austria, China (the 83d IAK in Port-Artur).

The exact number of P-63s in Soviet naval aviation is not known, but there were many of them. Kingcobras came in aviation regiments of the North and Black Sea Fleets, earlier armed with P-39 Aircobra. Pilots of the 314th and the 246th IAPs flew on these planes in the Baltic Fleet.

Soviet pilots liked the P-63 for its ease of operation, and spacious, heated cabin with a perfect view, good devices and a shooting sight. However, after 1948 the problem of engine wear appeared. It was forbidden to fly the planes at extreme speeds. This edict was enforced by locking the throtle limiter quadrant. Kingcobras remained in action right up to the introduction of jet fighters. Their replacement began in 1950. In the end they played the important role in training pilots on jet engineering fighters MiG-9, and then MiG-15. Like the P-63, the jet fighters had a similar undercarriage with a nose-wheel. All Soviet fighters had an undercarriage of the old circuit with tailwheel. Here and there the task was sometimes complicated. For example, the landing approach was mastered without releasing the landing flaps at speeds of 400-500 km/h, imitating the MiG-15. When P-63s were removed from the inventory of combat units, they still remained in flying schools, as transitional plane.

The two-seat trainer variants of P-63 were produced in the USSR. Their first variants were made by hand air workshops and repair bases. The standard project of alteration was offered by TsNEB VVS (Tsentral'naya Nauchno-Experimentalnaya Baza Voenno-Vozdushnykh Sil/ Central Scientific-Experimental Base of Air Forces). The second cabin was placed instead of weapon bay. One machine gun was preserved to perform exercises in aerial gunnery. One two-seat P-63, altered by the 321st repair base, since December 1948 till April 1949 passed tests in NII VVS. V. E. Golofastov flew on it. The changes in alignment improved anti-spin characteristics of the plane. Program of tests included also parachute jumps to prove the safety of leaving the faulty plane. The jumps were fulfiled by the well-known parachutist V. G. Romanyuk. After that began a mass alteration of fighters into an educational variant on repair bases of air armies and fleet began. At present only one plane has been preserved in Russia. This strange hybrid of a P-39 and P-63 assembled from fragments of several planes that crashed on the Siberian air route ALSIB, is displayed in the Air Forces museum in Monino.

Mil Mi-1 in Native Markings

Air Power History, Summer, 2004 by Thomas McGarry

Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings Vol. I & II. By R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, Eds. Chantilly Va., National Reconnaissance Office, 2003. Photographs. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Selected Readings. Vol. I., Pp. 654; Vol. II., Pp. 371 ISBN 0-9724322-0-5 (Available for purchase from U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. or National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield Va.)

These two thick volumes are essential to anyone writing about or studying the Cold War, military reconnaissance, aviation history, and the history and contributions of the USAF, U.S. Navy, and Royal Air Force. They are an immensely detailed, revealing, and authoritative accounting of the Anglo-American aerial effort to gather information about the Cold War Soviet Union and its military and technological resources and capabilities. Each chapter contains largely first-person accounts by aircrews and technicians involved in specific individual flights or larger projects. They are very readable and informative and, at times, chilling or even humorous. Most read like a good novel you don't want to end.

This work is really just the beginning of the story, as there is much more to be told and known. But this is a solid step in accurately telling a necessarily secretive and unknown history of British and American overflights (not peripheral reconnaissance flights) of "denied areas" (the Soviet Union, North Korea, Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China) from 1950 through 1956. The volumes reveal, clarify, and document an incredible amount of material including some previously appearing in various books and magazine and newspaper articles only as tantalizing footnotes or unsubstantiated reports. These include the RF-100A "Slick Chick" activities in Europe and the RF-86A "Ashtray" flights made from Okinawa and Korea during and after the Korean War. Also documented are the better known RB-45C flights made by Royal Air Force "Special Duty Flights" crews in American aircraft wearing RAF roundels and refueled by KB-29s.

If a reader wonders about the scope of these efforts, the list of aircraft types involved is just one clue: RB-45B/C, RB-47B/E/H, RAF Canberra, RB-57A/D, RF-86A/F, and RF-100A missions are highlighted. But the author also mentions flights of RF-80A, RF-84F, P2V-3W, RP-29, RB-50E, RB-17, A-26, RC-97, RC-118, RC-121, and RC-130 aircraft as well. Unfortunately, little is included about RB-36 activities. And the study's scope means that the work of RB-66, photo-recon F9F, FH, and PB4Y aircraft is not included. The work of RAF photo-recon Spitfires is just mentioned as is some material on mainland China overflights by Republic of China U-2, RB-57, and RF-84 aircraft. Another aspect of these overflights still remaining largely untold and under recognized is the critical role of the USAF KB-29, KB-50, and KC-97 tankers in the success of these missions. There seems to be so much history and so little time to document it.

While the skills, courage, resourcefulness, and professionalism of flight crews and support staffs are finally publicly recognized, the reputations of several important national figures are also appropriately enhanced:

This work dispels the image of President Eisenhower as a genial, somnambulant golf-playing president. The strategic and organizational vision and skills that made D-Day possible were applied to the problem of determining Soviet capabilities and intents in some of the earliest and most frigid days of the Cold War. "Ike" transformed national security for the Space Age. Among his significant decisions were authorization of U-2 development, approval of specific overflights, and funding of reconnaissance-satellite development. He also established a highly compartmentalized program regarding overflights and the processing, interpretation, and dissemination of the gathered information. Vol. II presents (intelligently and, thankfully, chronologically) a range of official documents related to overflights and the security arrangements surrounding their planning and conduct and use of the gathered information.

Some historians, authors, journalists and at least one movie producer have delighted in Strangelovean depictions of Gen. Curtis LeMay as a "loose cannon" waging his own "war" against the Russians. Material presented here dispels that mythical image. LeMay's adherence to the chain of command, both military and civilian, is documented as well as his defined role in these flights. His deep concern for the safety and welfare of his crews and his better known insistence on exceptionally high and strict standards of military behavior and technical aeronautical competence are also detailed. President Truman's role in authorizing the earliest overflights is also documented, a little recognized act of foresight and courage taken by an under-estimated and appreciated leader.

Also included are dozens of wonderful and insightful anecdotes and flying stories as we]l as several mind-teasing revelations. An example is in Lt. Col. Arthur Andraitis' article about overflight imagery interpretation in the 1950s. He was with the 497th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron in West Germany and compared human intelligence reports with satellite imagery to verify an agent's accuracy. A member of his crew couldn't identify the type of helicopter in U.S. Army markings appearing in a photo taken along the Rhine River in West Germany when most of the photos they studied were of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Andraitis looked at the photo and realized that he was seeing a Russian Mil Mi-1 light utility helicopter in American markings being flown up and down the Rhine around American military installations!

The editors have also included an excellent appendix of suggested readings from a vast range of sources. As a very minor aside, it is unfortunate that Lt. Col. John Farquhar's research on overflights and other reconnaissance missions is neither included nor generally available. The deputy head of military history at the Air Force Academy, Farquhar was among a distinguished group of authoritative experts who assisted in organizing and chairing the symposium's panels.

These two volumes are a significant addition to the body of knowledge not only about political, military, and aviation history and the technology of aerial reconnaissance, but also the larger paradigm of the still-to-be written history of the latter half of the 20th Century.

Thomas Wm. McGarry, Aviation News Service, Lake Oswego OR

Air Power History, Fall, 2000 by A. D. Harvey

During the First World War, air operations were on a much smaller scale on the Italian front than in France and Flanders. Italian fighter pilots claimed to have shot down fewer than one-tenth the number of enemy aircraft officially credited to German fighter pilots operating over the Western front. [1] Nevertheless, the air war over the Isonzo and the Adriatic had several features that suggest the desirability of revising standard accounts of the evolution of air warfare that are based on the experiences of the British Royal Flying Corps and the German Luftstreitkrafte farther north, particularly with regard to the use of bombing aircraft.

In 1911, the Italians had been the first nation to employ aircraft in warfare, during the course of their invasion of Libya-- then part of the Ottoman Empire. On November 1, 1911, Lt. Giulio Gavotti dropped four bombs, each weighing two kilograms, on Turkish positions at Ain Zara and Tagiura. [2] Subsequent bombing attacks were denounced by the Ottoman government as contravening the Geneva Convention. In 1913, the Italian army's aviation battalion was placed under the command of a staff officer named Giulio Douhet, who has some claim to have been the only senior officer of the First World War era to have any real vision concerning the application of air power. Douhet made sure that the Italian government placed an order for several examples of the giant trimotor bomber designed by aviation pioneer Giovanni Caproni.

When war broke out in August 1914, Italy, at that time joined in a defensive alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, remained neutral and Douhet began writing commentaries on the war for the Turin newspaper La Gazetta del Popolo. He read with interest press reports of the first bombing raids by single German aircraft, warning on December 12, 1914:

Against the enemy that moves on the surface it is sufficient for safety to be in the rear of the battle line; against the enemy that is master of space there is no safety except for moles. Everything which is to the rear of the army and which makes it live is threatened and exposed; supply convoys, trains, railway stations, magazines, workshops, arsenals, everything. [3]

Douhet and his colleagues seem to have been less interested in the first air-to-air combats. By the time Italy abandoned its prewar alliance and declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915, several German aircraft had already been shot down by British and French two-seaters, in which the observer was armed with a machinegun, and the French pilot Roland Garros had notable success in a single-seater Morane monoplane equipped with a machinegun fixed to fire through the arc of the propeller. [4] During the first six months of the Italo-Austrian conflict, however, both sides confined themselves mainly to using unarmed planes on reconnaissance missions, partly because the additional weight of a machinegun and ammunition was found to be disadvantageous when flying over mountainous terrain. However, the Austro-Hungarians communicated their resentment for their former ally by bombing Ancona and Venice with naval flying boats during the first days of the war. In addition on October 24, 1915, four Austro-Hungarian aircraft raided Venice. Though causing no loss of life or limb, the raiders destroyed an important fresco by the eighteenth-century artist Tiepolo in the church of Santa Maria degli Scalzi. [5] The Italians, for their part, began using their Caproni trimotors to bomb Austrian aerodromes, roads, and railways in August 1915, but quickly found that a three-engined aeroplane was at least three times likelier to be grounded by mechanical problems than a single-engined aeroplane. [6]

Meanwhile, the Germans had developed a single-seater fighter, the Fokker Eindecker, armed with a machinegun--later two machineguns--equipped with interrupter gear to enable the pilot to fire through the arc of his propeller without hitting it. (Garros had frequently hit his own propeller, but had it fitted with steel plates to deflect the bullets, which as it turned out was not an entirely practical idea.) Flying the Fokker Eindecker, Germany's first fighter aces, Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke, began to make their reputations on the Western Front during the second half of 1915, and a small number of these machines were passed on to the Austro-Hungarians. On February 18, 1916, ten Caproni trimotors with the commander of the aviation battalion, Lt. Col. Alfredo Barbieri, among the crew, set out from Aviano to bomb Ljubljana. Three of the planes turned back with engine failure; the others were intercepted by Austro-Hungarian Fokkers, one of them flown by Capt. Jindich Kostrba, afterwards creator of the Czech air force. In a series of attacks lasting fifteen minutes, Kostrba fired all 500 rounds of his ammunition at the Caproni carrying Barbieri. Barbieri was killed along with one of the pilots; the other pilot, intermittently blinded by blood flowing from a scalp wound, succeeded in bringing his aeroplane and his dead companions back to an Italian airfield. Kostrba had time to refuel and intercept the surviving Capronis on their way back from Ljubljana and helped shoot down one of them over Austrian territory. [7]

The Italians did not get their own back until April 1916, when Francesco Baracca, aboard a French-built Nieuport, shot down an Austro-Hungarian Aviatik that had just bombed a railway line. [8] This was the first successful interception by an Italian pilot. Thus, one sees that whereas in France and Flanders the first aircraft to be attacked and shot down by other aircraft had all been on reconnaissance or artillery spotting missions, on the Italian front the first interceptions by either side were of bombing planes. In fact, three of the first four aerial victories claimed by Francesco Baracca, subsequently Italy's leading fighter ace, were over bombers, whereas it is questionable whether Germany's Baron von Richthofen or France's Georges Guynemer or Britain's Albert Ball and James McCudden ever shot down a bomber at all. [9]

Although the Austro-Hungarians only had single-engined bombing aircraft, their air raids on Italian targets were often more spectacular in effect than the Italian attacks. On February 14, 1916, for example, ten aircraft--each armed with eighty kilograms of bombs--flew from a base near Trento to attack Milan. This was fifteen months before the first raid on a town in Britain by German heavier-than-air machines flying as a group, though of course the Germans had already attacked London with airships. Orientating themselves by means of Milan's "white shimmering" cathedral (as the Austro-Hungarian commander described it) two of the attacking aircraft unloaded their bombs in the general direction of a power station, killing twelve people and injuring seventy. The other eight aircraft apparently became lost and scattered their bombs between Monza and Bergamo. [10] On July 13, ten Austro-Hungarian aircraft dropped about 100 small bombs on Padua and managed to kill the army major commanding the city's air defenses. [11]

On August 9, 1916, seventeen Austro-Hungarian aircraft bombed Venice, killing seven civilians and sank a British submarine docked at the Arsenal--probably the first submarine ever to be sunk by bombing from the air. Seven weeks later Austro-Hungarian flying boats sank a French submarine, the Foucault, while it was actually under way at sea. This seems to have been the second submarine ever to have been sunk by bombing. [12]

On November 11, 1916, a single Austro-Hungarian bomb killed ninety-three civilians sheltering in a casemate in the old fortifications of Padua. It was the worst incident involving civilians taking shelter from an air raid during the entire course of the First World War, although there had been an even greater death toll the previous June when a French reprisal raid on Karlsruhe had destroyed a circus during a matinee, along with most of the children in the audience. [13]

Altogether, more than 400 Italian civilians were killed in Austro-Hungarian air raids on towns in northern Italy; another sixteen were killed by bombs dropped on Naples by a German long range Zeppelin operating from Yambol, Bulgaria, on the night of March 10, 1918. [14] These figures may be compared with the 1,414 civilians killed by German air raids on England, the 746 killed by British and French air raids on industrial centers in western Germany, and the 104 Belgian citizens who died as a result of the Royal Flying Corps and later the Royal Air Force's efforts to knock out the German U-boat pens at Bruges. [15]

The number of civilians killed by Italian air raids is not known. Giulio Douhet had been promoted away from the aviation battalion to become chief of staff of an infantry division in February 1915, but had not ceased to press his ideas regarding the use of aircraft as a strategic weapon. In a memo written a few months after Italy entered the war he argued:

Modern armies represent the armored shield behind which the nations at war work to prepare the means appropriate to feed the war: the powerful aeroplane is able to pass over such armor and strike at the nation itself in its centers of production and along the lines of supply running from the country to the army. [16]

He advocated that an entire air army of 500 Caproni trimotors be maintained at the front. Unfortunately Douhet's superiors were much less interested in his memoranda than in the fact that he was sending copies to politicians in Rome, and in October 1916 he was court-martialled and sentenced to one year's confinement in a military fortress. Whatever enthusiasm his successor, Alfredo Barbieri, may have felt for Douhet's ideas came to an abrupt end in combat over Aisovizza, when Jindrich Kostrba intercepted Barbieri's Caproni en route for Ljubljana and killed him. After that the Caproni was used mainly for shorter-range missions against road and railway targets immediately behind the front line, and against Austro-Hungarian naval bases on the Adriatic coast. Other important strategic targets that were theoretically within the Caproni's range, such as the railway and armaments factories at Zagreb and the steelworks at Graz, were left undisturbed. In fact, although the Caproni trimotor was built in larger numbers than the British Handley-Page 0/400 bomber or the German Gotha GIV and GV--in larger numbers indeed, than any other multi-engine type until the 1930s. By no means an entirely satisfactory combat plane, the Caproni was so slow and unwieldy that the AustroHungarian naval ace Godfrey Banfield took a leading part in shooting down at least five Capronis, while piloting flying boats of exactly the same unaerodynamic configuration as the Supermarmne Walrus flying boats used by the RAF for air-sea rescue during the World War 11.17 In the end, the longest-ranged bombing mission carried out by Italian aviators during the First World War, a return flight of nearly 320 miles across the Alps to bomb the railway station and shoot up the marshalling yard at Innsbruck on February 28, 1918, employed four single-engined Ansaldo SVA 5s. [18] The same type was also used for the ten-plane mission to drop propaganda leaflets on Vienna on August 9, 1918. The one record set by Capronis was for the largest single air raid, on the nig ht of August 2, 1917, when thirty-six trimotors attacked Pola (now Pula in Croatia); but this record lasted only until the following May, when forty-three German bombers, some of them four-engined Zeppelin-Staakens, struck at London. [19]

It is possible, however, that one of the more than 800 Caproni trimotors built inadvertently achieved a historic first that subsequent events could only make more noteworthy. In June 1918, a Hungarian pilot, Frigyes Hefty, having shot down a Caproni over Il Montello, scratched the words Caproni (auf Il Montello), and the date 17.vi 1918, on the windscreen of his Albatros DIII. Subsequent victories were marked in the same way. [20] Hefty seems to have been the first fighter pilot of any nationality to have marked his "score" on his aeroplane. This custom, though universal during the Second World War--even the Japanese adopted it--is not recorded before 1918.

Since completing his PhD at Cambridge, England, A. D. Harvey has taught at universities in Italy, France, and Germany. He is the author of Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945 (1992), A Must of Fire: Literature, Art and War (1998), and articles on air warfare in the Journal of Contemporary History and War in History.

NOTES

(1.) Italian airmen claimed 530 aerial victories compared to 7,425 claimed by the Germans, who admitted to the loss of 6,830 aircraft. Rosario Abate, Storia della Aeronautica Italiana (Milan, 1974), p. 115; Erich von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft (Leipzig, 1921), p. 174, notes 1 and 2.

(2.) Abate, Storia della Aeronautica Italiana, p. 84.

(3.) La Gazetta del Popolo, Dec. 12, 1914, reprinted in Giulio Douhet, Le Profizie di Cassandra: raccolta di scritti (Genoa, 1931), p. 244.

(4.) See L. A. Strange, Recollections of an Airman (London, 1933), pp. 74-78 and Jacques Mortane, Carre d'As (Paris, 1934), pp. 8-11 for British and French attacks on German aircraft in Oct. and Nov. 1914; Jacques Quellennec ed. Roland Garros, Memoires (Paris, 1966), 254 foll, for the development and use of a Morane carrying a machinegun firing through the arc of a propeller fitted with deflector plates.

(5.) Peter Schupita, Die k.u.k. Seeflieger: Chronik und Dokumentation der osterreichisch- ungarischen Marineluftwaffe 1911-1918 (Coblenz, 1983), pp. 169-70 for raids by Austro-Hungarian naval flying boats; Andrea Moschetti, I Danni ai Monumenti e alle opere d'arte delle venezie: nella guerra mondiale MCMXV-MCMX VIII (Venice, 1932), p. 47 for the Oct. 24, 1915 raid. A complete list of Austro-Hungarian raids on Venice is given in Giovanni Scarabello, Il Martirio di Venezie: durante la grande guerra e l'opera di difesa della marina Italiana, 2 vols., (Venice, 1933), pp. 1, 59.

(6.) Luigi Contini, L'Aviazione Italiana in Guerra (Milan, 1934), p. 48.

(7.) Ibid., p.58 and Martin O'Connor, Air Aces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1914-1918 (Mesa, 1986), p. 110.

(8.) Vincenzo Manca, L'idea meravigliosa di Francesco Baracca (Roma, 1989), pp. 172-77.

(9.) Detailed lists of the aircraft shot down by leading fighter aces are now available in a series of books published by Grub Street London during the 1990s: Christopher Shores, Norman Franks and Russell Guest, Above the Trenches; Norman Franks, Frank W. Bailey and Russell Guest, Above the Lines; Norman Franks, Russell Guest and Gregory Alegi, Above the War Fronts; and Norman Franks and Frank W. Bailey, Over the Front.

(10.) For a personal account of this raid see Eugen Steiner-Goltl Edler von Auring, "Osterreichischungarische Fliegen beim Angriff" in Georg Paul Neumann ed. In der Luft unbesiegt: Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg: erzdhlt von Luftkampfern (Munich, 1923), pp. 50-56; see also Corriere della Sera, Feb. 15, 1916, 1d; Times, Feb. 15, 1916, 8d and Feb. 23, 1916, 7d; and Riccardo Cavigioli, L'Aviazione Austro-Ungarica sulla fronte Italiana 1915-1918 (Milan, 1934), p. 74.

(11.) Guido Solito, Padova nella Guerra (1915-1918) (Padua, 1933), pp. 199-201.

(12.) Public Record Office, Kew, London AIR 1/2282/204/73/2 Harold C. Swan to J. H. Towsey Aug. 10, 1916; Schupita, k.u.k. Seeflieger, p. 192.

(13.) Solito, Padova, pp. 228-9 and fn. 1, cf. Heidelberger Tageblatt, Jun. 24, 1916, 1c. The victims of the Karlsruhe tragedy were buried in a group of individually marked graves that are still to be seen in the town's principal cemetery.

(14.) Corriere della Sera, Mar. 12, 1918, 1a, c.f Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship Division, 1912-1918, p. 295

(15.) Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 7 vols, (Oxford, 1922-1934) V 153, VI 152, Public Record Office AIR 1/678/21/13/2137

(16.) Giulio Douhet, Diario Critico di Guerra, 2 vols., (Turin, 1921), II, pp. 20-21.

(17.) Abate, Storia della Aeronautica Italiana, p. 107; Jean Marie Gustave Pedoya, La Commission de l'Armee pendant la grande guerre (Paris, 1921), p. 164n.; A. R. Kingsford, Night Raiders of the Air (London, [1930]), p. 129.

(18.) Contini, L'Aviazione Italiana, pp. 151-52.

(19.) Abate, Storia della Aeronautica Italiana, p. 106, cf. Raymond H. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918: The Birth of the Royal Air Force (London, 1966).

(20.) O'Connor, Air Aces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, p. 180 reproduces part of Hefty's wind-screen.

A MiG-3 of the 34IAP operating from Vnukovko in the defence of Moscow in the winter of 1941/2. The aircraft is adorned with that most potent of Soviet slogans, 'For the Father land!' The MiG-3 had been designed for a high-altitude role but combats on the Eastern Front took place below 6000 m (19,685 ft), where the German Bf 109 had a distinct performance advantage. Consequently attrition was high, although many who were to become aces made their first 'kills' in the MiG fighter.

Air Power History, Fall, 2008 by Daniel J. Simonsen

Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front. By Artem Drabkin. UK: Pen and Sword, 2007. Map. Photographs. Notes. Illustrations. Appendices. Glossary. Index. Pp xv, 158. $39.95. ISBN: 1-84415-563-7

Artem Drabkin does an excellent job of sharing the stories and experiences of a handful of Soviet fighter pilots (all with fewer than 15 individual kills--typical for the VVS) and one aircraft maintenance troop. He searched out and interviewed Soviet Air Force (VVS) veterans from the Great Patriotic War (World War II). This book is a compilation of six of these interviews and is divided into separate chapters for each interview. It is very apparent that Drabkin painstakingly recorded and transcribed the veterans' experiences, making sure to share their stories in their own words. By always relaying the interviews in an intact format, some points are, of necessity, repeated. However, this helps to press home certain underlying themes or shared experiences throughout the book.

The book contains candid, honest, unedited opinions and memories from the Soviet viewpoint. The interviewees discuss how unprepared the Soviet Air Force was for war. They all share their stories about how they became interested in flying and ended up as fighter pilots. Interestingly, several of the pilots mentioned they were attracted to the uniforms!

Each of the pilots gave his opinion of how Soviet fighters compared to German fighters, his favorite airplane, and the most dangerous German aircraft to try to shoot down. All of them disliked the British Hurricane. Most of them preferred flying a Soviet plane, such as the Yak-1, rather than fly a Lend-Lease aircraft like the P-39 or P-40. They all compared their aircraft honestly and often favorably to their German foes, making sure to point out how to fight with and against each aircraft. Interestingly, at one time or another, all the pilots were shot down. Several were shot down multiple times and to a man worked to get away from the substandard medical care available in the Soviet hospitals.

A theme that flows through the book is how alcohol, mainly vodka, was a constant in their day. Only one pilot said that he didn't drink before or after a sortie and commented that, for him, alcohol and flying didn't mix. A second theme is the greater Soviet mistrust of their own people. Each squadron had a SMERSh (death to spies, part of the NKVD) representative. "The rule was: if you disengaged without reason, SMERSh would investigate you immediately." Another pilot relates how he was shot down behind German lines. His face was severely burned, but after ton days he miraculously escaped and got back to Soviet lines. He was subsequently investigated as a traitor and released only because he was a prisoner for just ten days.

The book is filled with interesting stories of Soviet bureaucracy, air combat on the Eastern Front, and personalized insight into the Soviet war experience. The chapters are captivating and gripping, helping to make the book an easy and enjoyable read. Any reader not overly familiar with World War II aircraft should first read Appendix 2 (Soviet Aircraft) and look at the photos of the aircraft.

If you're looking for an in-depth, comprehensive analysis of the early days of the air war on the Eastern Front, this is not the book for you. However, if you want a personalized view from the seldom seen Soviet viewpoint, this book is an absolute must read.

Lt. Col. Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Commander AFROTC Detachment 305, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, Louisiana