War and Game

Born in Barzdorf, Silesia, on 10 October 1895, Richthofen was a cousin of the famous World War 1 ace Baron Manfred von Richthofen and in 1918 served in the squadron that had been named after his legendary relative. After Germany's defeat in World War 1 he studied engineering and then joined the much diminished Reichswehr, where he participated in several flying competitions. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled to Italy as a member of the German General Staff. Returning to Germany he was attached to the Technical Division of the air ministry but in 1936 was appointed chief-of-staff of the Condor Legion for service in Spain. After serving in this capacity under Hugo Sperrle and Helmuth Volkmann, Richthofen took command of the Condor Legion in November 1938. During his time in Spain he shown excellent diplomatic skills in dealing with the Nationalist command and was also largely responsible for developing air tactics that would become standard within the Luftwaffe during World War 2, particularly in the field of ground-attack techniques. He returned home in May 1939 and served with Stuka units during the invasion of Poland in September and the Blitzkrieg against France and the Low Countries in May 1940. During July he was given command of Fliegerkorps VIII, a specialist unit of Stukas and reconnaissance aircraft that suffered severe losses during the Battle of Britain. In 1941 he gained the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and was made General der Flieger. During this period he served on the Eastern Front and was made a Generalfeldmarschall in February 1943. As head of Luftflotte IV he was privy to the preparations for the Kursk offensive but did not take part in the attack as he transferred to Italy to take command of Luftflotte II shortly before the battle opened. Von Richthofen died on 12 July 1945, after being diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumour.

When assessing German involvement in Spain two questions are paramount: to what extent did it ensure Franco's ultimate victory and what impact did it have on the weapons and tactics that the Wehrmacht deployed during World War 2? In the first days of the civil war, from August to November 1936, when the Condor Legion proper was organised, the commitment was seen as short-term and limited in scale. Yet the score or so of Luftwaffe transports sent to Spain enabled Franco's Army of Africa to reach the Spanish mainland. Its arrival did not guarantee a Nationalist victory but probably ensured that the rebellion would survive the initial chaos that surrounded it. Subsequently, the German commitment grew massively in response to the foreign aid dispatched to the Republic the Condor Legion was sent as were smaller numbers of army and naval personnel and vast quantities of supplies to fuel the Nationalist war effort. German ground, sea and air forces undertook combat missions but the value of the training they gave to the Nationalists, although less glamorous, was probably of equal if not greater value. Equally noteworthy was the contribution of the German officers who joined Franco's staff. After the failure to take Madrid in late 1936 and early 1937 they convinced him to nibble away successively at Republican territory-a strategy that prolonged the war but probably made victory more likely-and also played significant roles in the direction of the battles that followed the stalemate around the capital.

German military personnel undoubtedly played a major part in developing the skills of Franco's forces. The Condor Legion established various schools where Nationalists were taught anti-aircraft, aircraft maintenance, signals and flying techniques. In all, some 500 Spanish aircrew received flight instruction, while a further 60 or so were trained in Germany. On the ground, Gruppe Imker contained probably no more than 600 Germans but a network of bases was established across Spain to train Nationalist recruits in various military skills. These included officer schools, non-commissioned officer facilities and an infantry training school. Of equal importance were facilities where other German instructors taught artillery, mortar, and chemical warfare and signal techniques. Armour and anti-tank training was also undertaken near Madrid and Toledo, where recruits were taught on both German and captured Soviet tanks. Reports suggest that some 56,000 Nationalists soldiers were schooled by the various German detachments, thereby providing Franco with a large corps of well-trained and technically proficient soldiers. The North Sea Group, although the smallest of Germany's detachments, trained Nationalists in the use of torpedo-boats, communications and seamanship but the naval campaign during the civil war was of comparatively minor importance.

The Condor Legion played a major part spearheading many Nationalist victories. Its chief responsibilities were to gain air superiority, interdict the flow of supplies to the front, and support ground offensives-all roles that were successfully accomplished in Spain. By operating in these ways in Spain, the Legion undoubtedly gave the Nationalists air superiority over many battlefields from 1937 and eventually over all Spain. Its fighter pilots scored a little more than 300 confirmed kills, a not insignificant contribution to the battle for air superiority but one actually dwarfed by the Italians, who claimed 903, and one nearly matched by the Nationalists, who recorded 294 aerial victories.

The Legion's Kl88 bombers dropped some 21,000 tons of ordnance and the German pilots claimed to have sunk 60 vessels of all types. It is also clear that German instructors from Imker and Drohne were sent to the front and engaged in combat but the paucity of adequate armour on both sides meant that tanks never had more than localised significance in combat. Although used against Republican aircraft with success, being credited with 61 enemy aircraft shot down, the heavy 8.8 cm Flak batteries also performed well in support of Nationalist ground attacks and in the anti-tank role.

Spain confirmed Germany's faith in the evolving concept of Blitzkrieg that was based on the close co-operation between ground and air units but also effectively subordinated the latter to the needs of the former. Tactically, the Luftwaffe drew several lessons from the civil war that for good or bad influenced its performance during World War 2. Werner Molders developed the highly effective Rotte and Schwarm, loose two and four-aircraft formations of fighters that allowed them to fly at faster speeds and gave greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in combat. Germany's medium bombers proved inaccurate when attacking pinpoint targets, but this failure was seemingly offset by the success of the ground-attack and dive-bombing tactics developed by Wolfram von Richthofen. Losses of ground-attack aircraft and bombers were comparatively low because the Condor Legion had effectively gained the air superiority that allowed these types to operate at will over mostly short ranges with often little or no fighter escort. Luftwaffe strategists recognised to some degree that these circumstances might not apply in the future and partly addressed the potential problems by developing faster, more heavily armed bombers, boosting the firepower of the Bf 109 by adding a cannon, developing a long-range fighter, the Messerschmitt Bf 110, and giving generally greater emphasis to fighter production. Yet, as the Battle of Britain showed, the Luftwaffe's experiences in Spain did not prepare it to meet and defeat independently at long range an enemy equipped with modern fighters.

Spain was also something of a proving ground for Germany's untried tanks and evolving armoured tactics. Although the number of tanks in action was comparatively small and they saw limited service, several conclusions were reached that aided the development of Blitzkrieg. Akey moment came in early January 1937 when a Nationalist assault on Madrid led by German tanks was easily repulsed by Republican anti-tank guns.

Many foreign observers argued that tanks were far too easily destroyed by anti-tank guns and could only operate successfully in the infantry support role as a type of mobile artillery rather than as the spearhead of an offensive. Von Thoma and others drew different conclusions from the Madrid battle. They argued that the tanks had fought in much smaller numbers than appropriate for a leading role and that motorised infantry and anti-tank guns able to keep up with the armour and close air support to neutralise the enemy artillery were vital.

Finally, the PzKpfw I tanks, never seen as more than an interim design for training Germany's own armoured corps, were clearly too thinly armoured, under-gunned and under-powered to survive on the battlefield. Consequently, added emphasis was given to newer designs that overcame these weaknesses, although few were available for the Blitzkriegs of 1939 and 1940.

Published by H-German@h-net.msu.edu (January, 2009)

Björn K. U. Weiler. _Henry III of England and the Staufen Empire, 1216-1272_. Woodbridge and Rochester: Boydell Press, 2006. xi + 247 pp.

$80.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-86193-280-1.

Reviewed for H-German by Shami Ghosh, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto

Medieval Diplomacy: A Family Affair

Henry III of England had a long but rather stressful reign: succeeding to the throne in 1216 as an infant, he (or more accurately his regents) was faced with subduing civil war, recovering the lands on the continent lost by his father, keeping the barons under control, and avoiding excommunication.

From Björn K.U. Weiler's illuminating (if extremely dense and often rather dry) narrative, it is clear that one of the principal means Henry used to deal with the problems that beset him was the cultivation of links with kings and aristocrats on the continent, as well as the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II. This book provides an important narrative of the political history of England, France, and Germany in the thirteenth century, but perhaps an even more significant aspect of this study--especially for historians of Germany--is that it removes England from its insular fastness and places English politics firmly within a broader political context. In addition, Weiler also offers many insights on the nature of medieval foreign relations and the means by which they were conducted.

Weiler begins by pointing out that "foreign relations" or "diplomacy," if not further defined, are terms that are likely to be misunderstood when applied to this period. No medieval estate was even roughly comparable to the modern diplomatic corps; in addition, medieval "countries" were far more intimately connected with the person of the ruler than today's nation-states, and thus the relations between them hinged on personal ties between rulers. Furthermore, ecclesiastical and secular magnates in England, France, and the empire enjoyed a considerable degree of independence, and these aristocrats could, and often did, function not just as intermediaries who forged links between their overlords, but as independent parties who pursued foreign relations in their own right and made personal connections to their own advantage. Such ties were the norm, and medieval monarchs in this period commonly arranged marriages with the kin of other leading families all over Europe for themselves, their siblings, and their offspring. These marriages were, first and foremost, political and diplomatic arrangements, made to secure support both against what would hopefully become mutual external enemies, as well as internal rebels. The other factor of primary importance in medieval diplomacy was the mediation of the pope: lacking in military might, the pope could nevertheless influence the actions of rulers with the threat of excommunication and the concomitant danger of the king's loss of influence over the ecclesiastical magnates in his own kingdom as well as a potential loss of face and power among his lay aristocracy. How Henry III, the Hohenstaufen emperor Frederick II, and the Capetian Louis IX managed the delicate interplay between the personal, religious, and political is the subject of Weiler's book.

The narrative is arranged in three chronological sections: the first covers the period from Henry's accession to the marriage of his sister to Frederick II (1216-35); the second section takes us up to Frederick's death in 1250; and the last part analyzes how, with the decline of the Hohenstaufen, Henry attempted to place his own dynasty at the center of European politics by promoting his brother's installation as emperor in the last twenty years of his reign.

Henry's primary goal, at least in the early years, was to regain the Angevin territories lost to the king of France by his father John. He did not, however, possess adequate military might to begin a war outright; instead, he sought to obtain support from French aristocrats, the pope, and the leading nobility of Germany, in order that Louis of France might be pressured into allowing Henry overlordship over the lands he claimed. Weiler points out that in the relations with the empire, it was not just the emperor who was of importance; the position of the emperor depended to a large extent on the support he enjoyed from his--often quite independent--magnates, many of whom (most notably the archbishops of Cologne and the dukes of Brunswick and Brabant) were in frequent contact with the English court. For many years, Henry's approaches to the empire came to naught because the magnates were not in a position to pressure Louis enough to be of much use, and Frederick was more interested in shoring up his own position--threatened by antagonism from the Holy See--than in getting involved in other people's squabbles. Although it seemed that this balance of power might change when Frederick sought the hand of Isabella, Henry's sister, Weiler suggests that this marriage, arranged largely through the mediation of the pope, was an effort on the latter's part to bring about peace between the Plantagenets and the Capetians, since the Hohenstaufen would now be closely linked to both. For Frederick, the alliance would have been advantageous primarily because of the possibility of English financial and military support for his crusade, and also because he would now have a potential future ally should further conflict with the papacy erupt. As Weiler points out, being a successful crusader was crucial to Frederick's policies, not only because of his own claims to lordship over the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, but also because it was one way of ensuring support from a papal curia that was otherwise often hostile on account of the emperor's increased exercise of authority in Italy. To have a major European monarch's support for both crusade and as mediator with the curia would therefore certainly have appeared advantageous to Frederick.

As it turned out, neither party really gained much. Beyond the promised dowry, Henry did not have much in the way of money or men to offer, since his barons were restive and none too keen on embarking on or sponsoring foreign ventures of dubious advantage to them. Moreover, Frederick was too interested in maintaining good relations with the Capetians to want to be involved in helping Henry regain Anjou, Normandy, and Poitou. While Frederick had to balance carefully the pope, Louis of France, and Henry III (as well as making sure he kept his German barons in line), Henry had to maintain good relations with his brother-in-law without offending the pope, who soon enough excommunicated Frederick (again). He attempted to achieve this goal not only by allowing the pope to collect dues in England for his anti-imperial campaign, but also simultaneously intervening with the pope for peace with the emperor, and not allowing his own knights to fight in any wars against Frederick.

Like the first two parts of book, the third, covering the period after Frederick's death, is also colored by a narrative of apparent initial success followed by a long-term failure. When it became apparent to Henry that the Capetians would not easily give up the lands he claimed, and that he could not muster the military might he would need to wrest them away (and he knew full well that a large-scale war between two prominent Christian monarchs would bring down anathema from Rome on both), he began to look elsewhere for means of enhancing Plantagenet prestige. His first venture in this direction was to try and place Sicily under the rule of his son, something in which he was briefly successful; however, opposition from the barons because of the increasing military and financial costs of ruling Sicily, the difficulty of sending troops there without French support, competition with a variety of other European magnates over the Sicilian crown, and wavering papal confidence in the Plantagenets all contributed to the ultimate failure of this enterprise. Henry's next effort was to have his brother elected Roman emperor, but just as the alliance with Frederick did not bring about Henry's restored control over the French territories he claimed, the placement of his brother on the Roman throne did not fulfill its promise of a Plantagenet _imperium_. Richard was hampered by his English concerns, and he was to be the only Plantagenet Holy Roman Emperor. Weiler notes a shift in emphasis in Henry's politics from a focus on regaining the lost French lands to more genuinely foreign affairs, from Plantagenet rule of Sicily and the empire to his planned crusade.

Although the story he tells is a complex one, and his narrative is dense, Weiler nevertheless presents this rather old-fashioned political history (in a time when subaltern social history appears to be more the norm, and stories of kings and emperors the exception) with enthusiasm and skill. He clearly has a command of a wide range of primary sources, including those from Germany; my only niggling criticism is that I would have liked for the sources to be allowed to speak, occasionally at least, in their own words (though this is admittedly rare in most works of this nature). Specialists will doubtless find much to debate in Weiler's rehabilitation of Henry as a competent king whose policies were very much in keeping with what was normal for monarchs of his time. While his portrayal of Henry as a ruler with definite and not necessarily irrational policies is more than plausible, it does seem that at times Weiler makes too much of his case. For example, the Sicilian affair was only made possible by means of very extensive payments to the papacy, which exceeded Henry's annual revenue by a great deal, and although medieval economic policies should certainly not be judged by modern standards, surely this measure goes beyond what is reasonable. Nevertheless, Weiler's argument is generally well reasoned, and even if scholars differ in their ultimate judgment on Henry's rule, much will be learned from this study by specialists and non-specialists alike.

Apart from the insights he offers on medieval diplomacy in general, and Henry and the empire in particular, he is to be commended not only for restoring England (however reluctant England might be to yield to this restoration) to the realm of European history--which is where it certainly belongs, at least during the medieval period--but also for bringing to an English-speaking audience the results of a vast corpus of German-language scholarship, which the author has clearly mastered. This book is, by its very nature, not just about England and its relations with the empire; it also provides much that will be new--at least for audiences not very familiar with German scholarship--on the political history of the reign of Frederick II. He is one of a younger generation of scholars writing in English, but focusing on or including German history and scholarship in the compass of their work, which is greatly to be welcomed. (Warren Brown, Eric Goldberg, Hans Hummer, and Matthew Innes are other prominent examples, though for an earlier period.) For too long, the history of German-speaking Europe before the Reformation, and modern German scholarship on the Middle Ages, have receded from the horizon of English-speaking academia, whether for reasons of recent history and politics, or simply out of a lack of linguistic skills. Weiler is a more than worthy representative of what is (I hope) a new trend in English-language scholarship on pre-modern Europe.

This Panther hull and turret are emplaced in Berlin.

According to Tom Jentz's book, *Germany's Panther Tank*, no less than 60 Panthers were shipped to the Leningrad front in November 1943 to serve as immobile pillboxes. Thirty apiece were given to the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions, and of these, ten per division were to be utilized as a reaction force, and they were left mobile; the rest were dug in. I/Pz. Rgt. 29 provided 60 volunteers to help man the runners; the extra crew members for the runners, and the crews for the pillboxes, were to be provided by the Luftwaffe personnel. On December 26th, III. SS-Panzer Korps ordered that the mobile tanks be concentrated into one ad hoc unit, leaving the dug-in vehicles where they were.

City of Baghdad 1530s

Map of the Safavid state. The area of Mesopotamia, permanently lost to the Ottomans in 1639 is shaded.

The case of Baghdad is well-suited to serve as an example of the methods used by the Ottomans for besieging major fortified places, since it twice successfully resisted attack: first a seven-month siege in 1625–6, then a short offensive in October and November 1630, before finally yielding in 1638 to a full-scale Ottoman attack lasting 39 days. Because of the massiveness of its fortifications, Baghdad drew the attention of a wide variety of contemporary observers. The most detailed description of the condition of the walls of Baghdad at the time of the Ottoman siege in 1638 is given by Ziyaeddin Ibrahim Nuri, who was himself present in the Ottoman army as he composed his history of the campaign. Nuri counted 114 towers (kule) along the walls, stretching on three sides from the North Gate (Imam -i Azam) near the Tigris, along the east wall, around to the South Gate (Karanlik Kapu) on the Tigris. An additional 97 towers along the west wall parallel to the Tigris brought the total to 211 towers. In the space between each pair of towers, 52 crenels (beden) were inserted. The entire circumference of the walls was paced off and determined to be 27,309 paces. Thus, assuming a distance between each tower of roughly 130 paces, a crenel was to be found at each interval of two and a half paces throughout the walls’ extent. Since each of the over 10,000 embrasures was ideally to be defended by five men, two musketeers, one bowman, and two assistants, the defence of the city walls alone required a small army. The height of the wall was 50 cubits (25 metres) and its width ranged from 32 feet at the base of the moat 41 to 10 to 15 cubits (7 metres) along the top between the turrets. Because Baghdad’s walls were constructed of shock-absorbent brick rather than brittle stone, and reinforced throughout much of their length by earthen ramparts, they were able to withstand a heavy bombardment without suffering very great damage.

The approaches to the walls were guarded by extensive outworks, including three parallel ditches. The first ditch was a pike’s length deep and broad, while the second ditch in the green between the walls and the outer ditch was half the width of the first. The main moat surrounding the city walls on three sides was at least three to four pikes’ length in breadth, but its depth varied, so that in some places it was half filled with water and in others hardly ankledeep. The main moat was at its widest and deepest along the east wall facing the White Gate (Ak Kapu). Following Hafiz Ahmed’s siege in 1626 concentrated along the southern wall in the vicinity of the Gate of Shadows (Karanlik Kapu), and Hüsrev Pasha’s siege in 1630 concentrated along the northern walls in the vicinity of the gate of Imam-i Azam, the Safavid garrison commander Bektash Khan carried out extensive repairs on these sections of the Walls. Ramparts were built behind the main wall of the fortress all along the north and south faces, and an additional ditch was dug and filled with water as a fallback in case the first defences were breached. After these improvements the east wall, surrounded by its extensive outer moat, was the only remaining part of the city’s defences protected by a single barrier wall.

In overcoming Baghdad’s imposing defences, the Ottoman army was assisted by a large force of trench diggers (beldar) and a specially trained corps of army engineers called lagimci, that is, miners and sappers. When the army arrived at its destination, its first task was to establish itself in trenches around the city’s defences. With a few exceptions all the infantry troops were assigned to the trenches, while the cavalry were posted behind the trenches to guard against attack. Since many of the 24,000 beldar recruited at the rate of one per twenty households from Anatolia, and the 7,000–8,000 lagimci ordered to report for duty by Murad were assigned to other duties, it was a relatively small group of experienced engineers who joined the troops in the trenches. A register made of those actually present in the trenches during the 1638 campaign shows that, since 680 beldar had been diverted to duties as oxen drivers (sürücü), 91 as construction workers repairing fortresses, and another 1,000 assigned to the shipyards at Birecik, only 1,500 men were counted present in the trenches. The process of sapping or creating a zigzag trench (siçan yolu) to the edge of the moat was slow. The average sap proceeded at a rate of no more than fifty yards a day. The reason for the slowness was that, although the first trenches were dug at a distance of one mile from the outer moat, because of twistings and turnings they were five miles long by the time they reached the outer moat, and they had to be wide enough to accommodate the gun carriages to bring the siege guns into close range of the city’s walls. In order to protect the front edge of these trenches from enemy fire, as well as to adjust the elevation of the besiegers’ gun batteries, extensive use was made of gabions woven out of twigs and boughs (chit). Because Baghdad’s sparse vegetation fell short of providing the necessary materials, care had been taken to collect sufficient quantities of boughs and twigs during a lay-over day near Kerkuk on the march to Baghdad. A passage translated from Nuri’s account of the siege describes how these gabions were put to use during the siege.

When it came to be the time for transferring the cannon to the entrenched positions, boughs of twigs were distributed to the troops and twenty sticks were given out for every thousand men of the provincial cavalry for fashioning into gabions. Once completed, the gabions were placed in front of the cannons and filled with earth. They stood up like towers and by distributing the gabions equally on all sides, a fence-like structure was created, the gaps of which were filled by the cannon. In order that each cannon might be fitted into its proper place along the gabion fence, it had to be adjusted according to the elevation of the castle walls at that part of the trench. If the walls were low, the cannon could remain at the same level, but if they were high, the elevation of the barrel could be altered by stacking one or two more layers of gabions on top of each other.

In the case of Baghdad the walls started from low foundations and rose to a great height, the rise often accentuated by the enemy’s own excavations of earth which they piled up on the far side of the moat. As a result, it became necessary to elevate the cannon throughout the length of the gabion fence. We thereupon dug out ramparts of earth at the edge of the moat, taking care to leave aside the earth which had been thrown there by the enemy so that when the base of the walls was exposed to view, by adding five to six layers of gabions, the elevation of the cannons was raised to the required level. Afterwards the gabions were covered over with earth and made level and, when a cover of boards had been laid on top, the timariots were ordered to lend a hand in hauling the cannons into place with hawsers. It was remembered that at the time of the late Hüsrev Pasha’s siege in 1630 seven layers of gabions had been placed on top of one another to prepare the gun nests. In short, once the gabions had been constructed, set in place and covered with earth, the cannon were hauled up to the front line for final positioning.

While the army was thus occupied the enemy began to excavate earth from the foundations of the walls starting first at the “Flat Tower” on the north wall near the Imam-i Azam Gate and continuing along the whole extent of the walls all the way to the “Persian Tower” on the south wall. When the experts were consulted about the reason for their digging of this inner trench at the base of the walls they agreed that the enemy’s motive was to prevent the laying of mines from our side of the moat. Indeed later on when we reached the moat and attempted to lay our mines they were able, by using this inner trench, to frustrate all our attempts to lay mines through the holes they had opened facing us from behind the walls. However, for the present, we continued our progress with the trenches, moving forward pace by pace each day until we reached within thirty-seven paces of the front edge of the moat. (Translation of an excerpt from Nuri’s description of the Ottoman siege of Baghdad in 1638)

Once the painstaking preparatory work described by Nuri in the foregoing passage had been completed, the cannon could begin to train their fire against the city from the first line of trenches. But it was not until the besiegers had overcome the obstacle of the outer moat and the guns could be moved forward to a range dominating both the walls and the enemy movement behind the walls within the city that any real advantage was to be gained from artillery fire. Once the attackers had taken complete control of the moat and could construct high ramparts on top of which their gun emplacements could be erected, the defenders could no longer maintain much hope of holding out. Because its preservation was so critical to the defenders, it was only after a hard fight that the control of the moat was relinquished. The defenders could resort to a number of countermeasures to retard the forward progress of the besiegers’ trenches. While the besiegers poured earth into the moat from above, seeking to close it off and erect their ramparts above it for their guns, the defenders excavated pockets from beneath the walls and by means of long-handled shovels removed the earth as soon as it was thrown into the moat. The 1630 siege of Baghdad by Hüsrev Pasha, despite thorough Ottoman preparations including 2,000 camel loads each consisting of two ten-foot bales of cotton to be used in filling in the moat, had been frustrated by similar defensive countermeasures. In 1630, the Safavid defenders built a trap in an area which they had undermined and later covered with grass. This trap collapsed under the weight of the advancing Ottoman attackers and the siege had to be abandoned. From such examples it can be seen how essential it was for the attackers to seize control of the whole extent of the moat before any thought of a final assault on the walls could be considered.

The fight over earth in the moat, like the establishment of the first line of trenches, involved little direct contact between the two contesting armies. In the next phase, high earthen ramparts (tabiya) were constructed level with the city walls on the far side of the moat. The cannon were hauled up to the top of these ramparts from where they dominated the so-called “covered way” between the edge of the moat and the walls. To protect the gunners on top of the ramparts, calatrop shields resembling the bristly hairs on the back of a wild boar (doñuz dami) were erected. A miniature from the early seventeenth century shows clearly the form which the gun emplacements took (see p. 120).

The prickly calatrop shields protecting the forward positions on a level with the castle walls are visible in the upper part of the composition, while two pairs of siege guns are shown in the background protruding from openings in a fence-like structure constructed of upright gabions (chit) filled with earth to give them stability. The forward gun emplacements were manned on a revolving duty basis by companies of 20–30 Janissaries, who from their high vantage point could survey enemy activity within the walls, and protect the artillerymen who continued the business of bombarding the walls undisturbed. Furthermore, the control of the moat area by the attackers meant that the miners could go about their work protected by the calatrop shield erected above them. It was because of incomplete control over the full length of the moat during the 1630 campaign that the miners’ efforts produced a breach of only 40–50 cubits.68 In the 1638 campaign, on the other hand, the miners were successful in opening a breach 858 cubits (zira) in length.69 By installing a handrail (tarabizan) 70 on either edge of the flattened top of the ramparts, the combat troops had direct access to the walls. Under the shelter of the Janissary gun outposts, they could now attach their ladders and scale the walls with ease.

Once the attackers had established themselves at the wall, the outcome of the siege was a foregone conclusion. In the hand-to-hand fighting which followed heroic deeds might delay or accelerate the capture of the fortress, but could rarely change the course of events. The investment of Baghdad in 1638 followed the general rule for sieges that the two most critical phases were the preparation of siege works and the capture of the moat. The moving of earth (by both defenders and attackers) was without doubt the chief occupation of the greatest number of men for the longest period of time in most sieges. Far more man-hours were spent in getting ready for the final assault than in direct contact or combat of any description. An indication of the division of labour present in most sieges is given if we examine the standard equipment listed in arsenal inventories of the period. In an eighteenth-century inventory of the mid-Danubian fortress of Ada Kale sapping tools, including 6,531 shovels, occupied more shelf space than any other category of military equipment. An inventory of the Diyarbekir arsenal for 1636 gives similar prominence to digging tools, and includes 3,600 shovels and picks as well as a supply of 1,900 spare, wooden, shovel handles. Supplies sent to mobile units were of a similar order. We know, for example, that a quantity of 4,000 iron shovel blades and 4,000 pick-heads were issued from central stores as part of the equipment set aside for an army setting out for the eastern front in the 1630s.

Advanced weaponry, whether for use in major conflicts or in the context of small skirmishes, played a mostly non-critical role in determining the outcome of battle. A hint about the undiminished importance of “conventional” weapons such as arrows and sabres during the concluding phase of siege when hand-to-hand fighting broke out is provided in a passage from Silahdar’s account of the investment of Çehrin in 1678. According to Silahdar, in the final phases of battle the handguns, issued as a matter of course to the Janissaries, had a rather restricted application. It seems they were used more to provide safe cover for the troops as they rushed forward from their trenches to scale the walls than as offensive weapons in their own right. A final volley fired in unison was more often than not used merely as the preliminary to a clash of swords, hatchets and halberds or the launching of spears which typified the fighting in close quarters. Under conditions of close combat, the resumption, still more the sustaining, of musket fire was too risky, since each halt for the reloading of their weapons placed the advancing soldiers in a fatally vulnerable position. Its supposed status as an “outmoded” weapon did not alter the fact that, for purposes of the final mêlée which inevitably ensued as part of the closing (and therefore determining) phase of battle, the sabre proved the more useful (and therefore lethal) tool of the trade.

The musket, as the more advanced and technically superior, but in the seventeenth century by no means yet perfected, weapon, in fact offered little tactical advantage and its temperamental performance made it not just useless, but a positive liability in situations where rapid reaction and decisive action were required. In close quarters, missing the target on the first shot, or even failing to inflict sufficiently serious wounds, could have fatal results for the musketeer unless he had his more “primitive” fallback weapons (daggers, swords, etc.) ready to hand. The continuing reliance on relatively “primitive” or non-technical solutions to combat challenges in seventeenth-century warfare is still more apparent, when we shift our attention from the consideration of prolonged sieges and military force concentrated against heavily-fortified places defended by large garrisons to a consideration of the conditions that prevailed and the pattern of engagement that typified military action directed against lesser forces stationed in fortifications of the more modestly constructed type.

LINK

Strategy & Tactics magazine (the January/February 1970 issue..now that’s old!). I have not seen anything that would dispute what it says in the last 30 years. I think it fairly summarizes the problems the divisions had.

"Not all the Luftwaffe's infantry did as well as the parachute forces. While the Stalingrad campaign raged in late 1942, manpower shortages became increasingly apparent. Hitler decided to take excess Luftwaffe administrative personnel to the army. Goring pleaded to retain control and promised to mobilize 200,000 men, a sum far larger than originally expected, Hitler agreed.
Excess construction troops, parachute transport units, ground crews, flak and some foreign volunteers were formed into an infantry branch with 22 combat divisions. The personnel met high physical standards and similar improvisations had worked in the past. The Luftwaffe had often been forced to field combat units (usually battalions) for the protection of its Russian airfields, particularly in the winter of 1941-42.

But as it turned out, the training and replacement systems within the air force proved grossly inadequate in creating infantry combat units. The care of weapons, equipment and horses remained below standard. The leaders, particularly at the company level, often lacked any sort of combat experience. The competent technical, signal and artillery units weren't simply enough to provide a base for an infantry division. Although the units proved useful for occupation and security duties, they collapsed in combat, often just a few days of intensive fighting.

The project depleted army resources. Initially the divisions consumed enough equipment to build the equivalent of five panzer divisions. After wards the army had to transfer considerable numbers of small unit leaders and instructors so that the units could partly fulfil their mission. The army retained full control only after a unit was nearly destroyed, whereupon local army formations inherited the remnants. Much of the disbanded personnel, along with several air force penal battalions, eventually became replacement troops for the parachute divisions.

Thus most of the disbanded personnel did become replacements as had originally been planned. But the detour through Luftwaffe control proved costly. By 1945 only four of the original twenty divisions remained."

I would say from what is said above and everything I have read about them in the last couple of decades that the Luftwaffe Field Divisions turned out to be a monumental waste of time. The personnel should have gone straight to the army for formation and training.

As the Air Force infantry regiments were classed as Jaeger, or Rifle, units the private soldiers carried the rank of 'Rifleman'. This soldier, carrying an anti-vehicle device made by taping the heads of a cluster of stick grenades around one complete grenade, is armed with the usual K.98 rifle and Mauser bayonet. He wears the issue steel helmet with a foliage framework of canvas straps hooked to it, and the Luftwaffe greatcoat; the shoulder-straps of this are piped in Jaeger green. His leather belt and shoulder braces are black, and the D-rings on the backs of his shoulders are used to attach a grey-blue canvas carrying frame (here, perforce, almost invisible) for the reduced equipment of his 'assault pack'. The mess-tins are strapped across the top, and below them the rolled shelter-quarter in camouflage material. On the belt are his grey-blue canvas bread bag, for rations and small personal effects, a water canteen, and his gas-mask canister. The leather carrying case for the entrenching spade, and the bayonet scabbard, are slung beneath this. Invisible here, but attached to the carrying frame under the rolled camouflage quarter, would be a cloth bag of tent-pegs.

COMMANDERS:
Oberst Walter Heydemeier ........................ 21/7/42 - 10/42
Oberst Herbert Ewert ................................. 10/42 - 4/43
Oberleutnant Helmut Funck ....................... 4/43 - 5/43
Oberst Lothar von Corvin-Wiersbitzki ........ 15/7/43 - 11/43
Oberst Waldemar Kluge ............................ 11/43 - 7/44
Oberst Fritz Fullriede ................................ 7/44 - 8/44
Oberleutnant Robert Schulz ..................... 8/44 - 9/44
Oberst Waldemar Kluge ........................... 9/44 - 10/44
Oberst Karl-Eric Bertram .......................... 10/44 - 26.3/45
Major Kurt Mörgel .................................... 3/45 - 5/45
Major von Gemmingen ............................ 5/45 - 5/45

The origins of the Fallschirmpanzer Korps Herman Göring and also that of the Fallschirmjäger can be traced right back to the beginning of the NSDAP's rise to power.

The minister of the interior at that time was none other than the W.W.I fighter ace Herman Göring who ordered the creation of a police force who's task it would be to put down any resistance to the Nazi regime swiftly and thoroughly. The task of raising this police force fell to Polizeimajor Wecke who on the 25rd February 1933 reported the establishment of his 414 strong Polizeiabteilung a.b.V.

They were based at at the barracks of the former Prussian koniglin-Elizabeth-Garde-Grenadier-Regiment Nr.3 in Charlottenburg. The unit’s first objective took place on March 2 1933 when Göring and his new police unit attacked a Communist base in Berlin. It was the first of many raids across Berlin where Communist party activists were known to frequent and during these raids Marxist and Communist ringleaders were rounded up and imprisoned.

On July 17th the organization was re-named Landespolizeigruppe Wecke z.b.V. and later in December it re-named Landespolizeigruppe "General Göring". In April 1935 it was again renamed, this time "The Regiment General Göring" and an order from Göring in September that same year stated that the regiment was to be absorbed into the Luftwaffe and the volunteers would form the cadre for the new German Fallschirmtruppe. In January 1936, the I. Jäger-Battalion/RGG under Major Bruno Bräuer and 15. Pionier Kompanie/RGG were transferred to Doberitz for parachute training with the rest of the regiment sent to Altengrabrow for reorganization with Major Walther von Axthelm resuming command of the regiment in August.

During this time the moral and camaraderie within the General Göring was very high. As with the Waffen SS the selection criteria was very strict and only volunteers were accepted. These volunteers had to be between the ages of 18 and 25, of a minimum height of 1.68 metres, be eligible and fit for military service (no spectacle wearers were accepted), be of Aryan ancestry, have a clean police record with no previous convictions, be unmarried and loyal to the National Socialist cause. These strict guidelines were adhered to until 1942 when slight adjustments were made. The need for the recruits to be German citizens was relaxed and the minimum age was dropped to 17 years old. With the shortage of manpower as the war progressed, many of these new guidelines were not adhered to and numerous replacements drafted in from other Luftwaffe units did not meet these criteria.

Those lucky enough to be accepted into the General Göring Regiment in those early years received many distinct advantages to that of their army and to a certain extent their Waffen SS counterparts. There were several different branches and speciality trades available to them such as grenadier, signaler, engineer etc. Also the barracks they were stationed at in Berlin-Reinickendorf was considered the best barracks in Europe (even better than that of the Waffen SS Officer Training School at Bad Tölz which was considered one of the most modern at the time). It was situated near the Kiefernwald near Berlin and was built under the watchful eye of Göring himself. Up until recently it was occupied by the French and was re-named "Quartier Napoleon".

In 1938 the IV Falschirmschutzen-Batalion and the 15 Fallschirmschutzen Pionier Kompanie were separated from Regiment General Göring and formed into Fallschirmjäger Regiment 1 and this unit can be seen as the originator for the cadre for the Fallschirmschule at Stendahl.

The Regiment Herman Göring participated in all the pre-war occupation offensives in Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia but played only a small part in the Polish Campaign where most of the Regiment was kept back in Germany as Flak defence and bodyguard for Herman Göring.

In March 1942 after fighting in all the subsequent campaigns it was ordered by Göring that the regiment be expanded to brigade strength and in March 1942 and was re-named "Brigade Herman Göring". The regiment was pulled out of the line for re-organization and an ersatz battalion was trained up in Utrecht in Holland. The control of men and supplies to the Brigade was down to the Special Administrative Staff (SonderStaff) and was based in Berlin along with the Wach Battalion. The bulk of the rest of the brigade was based in France.

On 15th October further expansion was undertaken and the brigade was enlarged to divisional status and was officially designated Division "Herman Göring". To fill the required numbers 5000 volunteers and the complete Fallschirmjäger Regiment 5 were absorbed into the new division but this reorganization was far from complete when the Allies advanced in to Tunisia in 1943. A Panzer Division was to be formed from the existing units with the recommendations that the army supply equipment, experienced Officers, NCOs, and Panzerwaffe instructors and commanders. These recommendations brought the addition of 1,500 men per month and saw the transfer of inexperienced Luftwaffe personnel to the army panzer divisions for "on the job training" and experienced panzer officers and NCOs were transferred the HG Division. All tanks and other equipment (apart from Flak guns were supplied by the army). The training battalion based in Utrecht was expanded to regimental size and also received in its "Gesenden-Kompanie wounded personnel who released from hospital but were not yet ready for combat duty.

With the relentless Allied advance on Tunisia the division was ordered to move to Italy and the units who's training was not yet complete were to finish there training in Italy where further equipment was also issued to them. The bulk of the division was based at Santa Maria near Naples with the remainder (Gruppe Neuaufstellungen) being garrisoned near Bordeaux in the south of France where they received a further influx of volunteers from southern France.

The 1st and 3rd Fallschirmjäger regiments were the first to see action in Tunisia attached to 10th Panzer Division with the I./Flak Regiment undertaking air defence duties in Naples in December 1942. At this time the Grenadier Regiment HG was also transferred to Italy. During the early part of 1943 the transfer of the division to Africa had begun with the majority of the division landed by March and all units of the HG division in Africa came under the title Kampfgruppe Schmidt. By 1st May the estimated strength of the division in Africa was 11,000 officers and men most of whom surrendered on 12th May to Allied forces.

With this severe setback the remnants of the division in France, Italy and Germany were ordered to speed up their organization as a panzer division which should have been completed in April 1943 but with the dispatch of so many important units to Italy and then Tunisia this was not possible. In the summer of 1943 troops from all over Germany were transferred to Naples in Italy (with the exception of the I and III Abteilung who were based in Holland and the IV Abteilung who were based in Velten near Berlin) where they were fully trained and equipped. These new recruits made up a large part of the Ersatz-u.Ausbildungs-Regiement HG (Replacement and Training Regiment). Those Members of the Herman Göring Panzer Division based in Italy were soon flown to Sicily along with the 15th Panzergrenadier Division to counteract the expected Allied landings there. The Allies in due course and after much stiff German Resistance took Sicily and advanced onto the Italian mainland.

The HG Division was pulled out of Italy in July and sent east to Poland where it engaged the advancing Soviet forces and gave an extremely good account of itself receiving compliments from Generaloberst Walther Model for their gallant defensive actions near Warsaw.

On 1st October 1944, the division was to be expanded further into a Panzer Korps with the addition of a new panzergrenadier division. The numbers required to form the new division came by adding a Fallschirmjägerregiment along with personnel from the Luftwaffe including two signal battalions and a medium sized army artillery battalion. During this time of expansion however the HG Division were constantly engaged in action in East Prussia and by November this expansion seemed a daunting prospect due to the number of casualties sustained and the small number of replacements received. To counter this problem a practice was adopted which was common to many elite units at this time-that of incorporating transferred Luftwaffe officers, NCO's, and infantry personnel with no combat experience who were given very brief basic training and sent to the front-line. By Early 1945 both divisions were combat ready. The makeup of the HG Pz Krps at this time was:

Corps commander Generalleutnant Schmalz
Generalkommando
Korpstruppen
Fallschirm-Panzerdivision 1 HG (Generalmajor von Necker-from Feb. '45 Oberst Lemke)
Fallschirm-Panzergrenadierdivision 2 HG (Oberst Walther)
Fallschirm-Panzer Ersatz-und Ausbildungsbrigade HG (Oberst Meyer)
Ausbildungsregiment HG
HeimatStaff HG Berlin
Sonderformation und -dienstellen

The Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 HG was transferred from East Prussia to Litsmannstadt where it was thrust into the fighting alongside another elite unit- the Großdeutschland Panzer Korps (minus it's panzer grenadier division which had remained in East Prussia) and the Panzer Division HG was assigned to Großdeutschland Panzerkorps was under direct leadership of General der Panzertruppe Jauer and in March near Konigsbruck near Saxony it achieved it's last victory of the war by annihilating the 1st Polish Division which at the time was under the command of the Soviets.

At the time of the German capitulation they were fighting north of Dresden and with the news of the surrender immediately set out westwards in the hope of reaching the American lines but were cut off by a Soviet armoured thrust from Berlin and only a few were able to reach the safety of the American lines. Those who were captured by the Soviets received lengthy sentences in prison with the last of them being released in 1956.

It has been suggested that the formation of this division (later Panzerkorps) was totally unnecessary-as was the formation of so many Luftwaffe Field Divisions and the personnel of these formations could have been better utilized elsewhere (Field Marshal Rommel was one such person who held this view). Certainly Göring saw these formations (along with the Fallschirmjäger) as his own private army (as did Himmler with the Waffen SS) and wanted anything connected with flying under his jurisdiction. Whether this was a good or bad decision is debatable but he did use his influence to obtain the best equipment for his divisions and the HG Pz Kps did prove themselves a most formidable fighting force during the defensive battles in Italy and on the Eastern front during the latter part of the war. Testimony to this is the high number of Knight's Crosses won by its troops.

ORDER OF BATTLE: Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 HG

Division Command (2 LMG's) with:
Military Band
Map Section
Provost Court
Escort Company for Special Use (Armoured)

PANZER REGIMENT "Herman Göring"
Staff, Armoured Signals Section (4 LMG's), Light Armoured Section (5 LMG's)
AA Section (Motorised) 3X20mm Cannon
I Section (Pzkpfw V "Panther)
II Section with:
Staffs & Staffs Company
Armoured Flame-thrower Section
4 Panzer Companies with 17 Pzkpfw IV (total of 22 tanks per company)
1 Panzer Workshop
III. Section with
Staff & Staffs Company (2 assault guns & 1 LMG)
2 Assault gun Companies
1 Heavy Anti-Tank Company ( 12 Anti-Tank Guns & 12 LMGs)

PANZERGRENADIER REGIMENT "Herman Göring" 1

Staff & Staffs Company (Armoured), Signals Section, Motorcycle Messenger Section, Medium Tank Company, Combat Engineer Section (31 LMGs, 6 Flame Throwers, 3 Medium Anti-Tank Guns)

I. Battalion (armoured) with staff, 3 Panzer Grenadier companies (armoured) (39 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 Heavy Mortars each), 1 Heavy Panzergrenadier company (armoured) with 1 Light Anti-Tank Company and 2 75mm Guns.

II. Battalion (motorised) with Staff, 3 Panzergrenadier Companies (motorised) (18 LMG's, 4 HMG's, 2 Heavy Mortars, 13 Anti-Tank Rifles each), 1 Heavy Panzergrenadier Company (motorised), Combat Engineer Section (4 LMGs), Heavy Anti-Tank Company with 3 Anti-Tank and 3 LMGs, 2 Light-Infantry Howitzer Companies (2 Light Infantry Howitzers and 1 LMG), 1 Medium Mortar Platoon (6 Medium Mortars and 2 LMGs)
13. Infantry Howitzer Company (6 Heavy Infantry Howitzers and 7 LMG's)
14. Anti-Tank Company (13 Heavy Anti-Tank Guns with 13 LMGs)

PANZERGRENADIER REGIMENT "Herman Göring" 2

COMMANDERS:
Oberst Walter Koch 2/43 - 4/43
Major Gerhart Schirmer 22/4/43 - 4/43
Hauptmann Horst Zimmermann 4/43 - 5/43
Oberst Lothar von Corvin-Wiersbitzki 11/43 - 30/1/44
Oberst Hanns-Horst von Necker 3/44 - 24/9/44
Oberleutnant Robert Schulz 24/9/44 - 10/44
Major Hans Briegel 10/44 - 12/44
Major Brede 12/44 - 2/45
Major Hans Briegel 1945 - 1945

Staff & Staffs Company (motorised), Signals Section, Motorcycle Messenger Section (6 LMG's) Heavy Anti-Tank Company (motorised) with 3 Anti-Tank Guns and 3 LMGs
I. & II. Battalions (same as for Pz. Gren. Rgt. "HG" 1)
13. Infantry Howitzer Company (4 Heavy Infantry Howitzers & 6 LMGs)
14. Anti-Tank Company (as for Pz. Gren. Rgt. "HG" 1)

PANZER SIGNAL DETACHMENT "Herman Göring"

Staff (15 LMGs)
Heavy Weapons Company (6 75mm Guns)
Light Armoured Reconnaissance Company (18 Armoured Reccon Vehicles with 20mm guns and 24 LMGs)
Armoured Reconnaissance Company (equipped with "Lynx" light tanks, 18 20mm guns and 25 LMGs)
Heavy Armoured Reconnaissance Company (56 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 Medium Mortars, 3 75mm Guns)
Light Armoured Reconnaissance Company equipped with VW Kubelwagens, 18 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 Medium Mortars, 3 Anti-Tank Rifles)
Heavy Reconnaissance Company (armoured) (37 LMGs, 2HMGs, ! Light Anti-Tank gun, 3 HEavy Anti-Tank guns, 4 Light Infantry Howitzers, Heavy Gun Platoon (6 75mm guns, Heavy antitank platoon, 2 Light infantry Howitzer Platoons, Combat Engineer Platoon).

PANZER ARTILLERIE REGIMENT "Herman Göring"

COMMANDERS:
Oberst Hans Oehring 2/43 - 8/44
Oberleutnant Fritz-Werner Hoberg, 1944 - 1945

Staff and Staff Batterie (2 LMGs)
Armoured Observation Batterie (12 LMGs)
I. Section with:
Staff & Staff Batterie (2 LMGs)
3 Batteries of Light Field Howitzers (motorised) with 4 light field Howitzers and 3 Light AA Guns each
II & III Sections with:
Staff & Staff Batterie (2 LMGs)
1 Battery 10cm Guns (motorised) with 4 Guns and 3 LMGs
2 Batteries Heavy Field Howitzer (motorised) with 4 Heavy Field Howitzers and 3 LMGs.
IV. Section with:
Staff & Staff Batterie (2 LMGs)
2 Batteries Light Field Howitzer 18/2 with 6 Light Field Howitzers and 8 LMGs
1 Batterie Heavy Field Howitzer 18/1 with 6 Heavy Field Howitzers and 8 LMGs

FLAK REGIMENT "Herman Göring"

COMMANDERS:
Oberst Walther von Axthelm, 1/9/39 - 31/5/40
Oberst Paul Conrath, 1/6/40 - 21/7/42
Oberleutnant Werner Hullmann, 21/7/42 - 5/43
Oberst Friedrich Meyer 20/5/43 - 11/44

Staff (6 LMGs)
Signals Platoon
AA Data Computing Platoon
Sound Ranging Team
Metro Platoon
I. Section
Staff (1 LMG) and Signals Platoon (1 LMG)
3 Heavy Flak Batteries with 9 37mm Flak, 3 20mm Flakvierling, 2 LMGs each,
1 Light Flak Column

PANZERPIONERE BATALLION "Herman Göring"

COMMANDERS:
Hauptmann Paul Haeffner 12/42 - 1/44
Hauptmann Haug 2/44 - 3/44
Hauptmann Bittig 3/44 - 6/44
Oberleutnant Josef Wolf 6/44 - 7/44
Oberleutnant Heinrich Böttcher 4/8/44 - 9/44

Staff (7 LMGs) and Staff Company (14 LMGs)
2 Engineer Companies (motorized) 1st & 3rd Companies. (18 LMGs, 2 Medium Mortars, 6 Flame Throwers, each)
1 Engineer Company (armoured) 2nd Company (armoured) (43 LMgs, 2 Medium Mortars, 3 Anti-Tank Rocket Launchers, 6 Flame Throwers)
1 Heavy Bridging Column (3 LMGs)
1 Light Bridging Column (3 LMGs)

PANZER SIGNALS SECTION "Herman Göring"

Staff
1 Panzer Telephone Company
1 Panzer Radio Company
1 Light Signals Column

REPLACEMENT TRAINING BATTALION "Herman Göring" with the DIVISIONAL-BATTLE-SCHOOL
Staff
3 Replacement Companies (18 LMGs, 4 HMGs, 2 Medium Mortars)
1 Heavy Replacement Training Company (2 Combat Engineer Platoons with 4 LMGs, 1 Heavy Anti-Tank Platoon with 3 Heavy Anti-Tank Guns and 3 LMGs, 1 Heavy Mortar Platoon with 6 Mortars and 2 LMGs).

COMMANDER OF THE "Herman Göring" SUPPLY TROOPS
Staff (2 LMGs)
8 Motor Vehicle Workshops
1 Supply Company (motorised) (6 LMGs)

MOTOR POOL SECTION "Herman Göring"
Staff (2 LMGs)
3 Workshop Companies (motorised) (3 LMGs)
1 Ordinance Company (4 LMGs)
1 Replacement Transport (75 Vehicles & 2 LMGs)
1 AA Repair Platoon
1 AA Special Equipment Workshop Platoon
1 Equipment Platoon

ADMINSTRATION COMPANY "Herman Göring" (4 LMGs)

BAKERY COMPANY "Herman Göring" (4 LMGs)

BUTCHER COMPANY "Herman Göring" (4 LMGs)

MEDICAL SECTION "Herman Göring" (4 LMGs)
Staff
3 Medical Companies (motorised)( 4 LMGs)
3 Ambulance Platoons (2 LMGs each)
1 Decontamination Platoon (2 LMGs)

FELDGENDARMERIE UNIT (motorised) "Herman Göring" (3 LMGs)

FELDPOST "Herman Göring" (3 LMGs)

* It should be noted that although the title "Fallshirm" was bestowed on the division, and later panzerkorps, there never was an airborne section within its structure.