War and Game

In the strict definition of the term, an operational deception pertains to one’s actions and measures to deceive the enemy as to the time, place, and details of a planned major operation conducted as part of a maritime campaign or a major joint/combined operation with a limited strategic objective. A successful operational deception is aimed to protect the operational commander’s intent from the enemy’s intelligence-gathering sources and reinforce the enemy’s expectations and preconceptions about one’s force.

One’s actions might surprise the enemy if the deceiver creates an impression of routine activities by gradually conditioning the enemy to a certain repetitive pattern of behavior. This method was used by the Germans in preparing the operational redeployment of two battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest through the English Channel in February 1942 (Operation Cerberus). The Germans increased the intensity of their radar jamming over time so that the British became acclimated to it and did not realize that it had become so intense that British radar was almost useless.

The sound application of the principles of objective and unity of effort was one of the main reasons for the successful redeployment of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from 140 The operational idea naval base Brest, Brittany, to Kiel through the English Channel in February 1942 (Operation Cerberus). The entire operation was brilliantly planned and executed. The Germans achieved a complete surprise by timing the passage of their ships though the Strait of Dover during daylight and not during the night as the British believed. The Germans calculated that transit though the strait during the day would increase chances of success because the German ships would be better prepared to defend themselves against the expected massed attacks by the British aircraft and light force by using shipboard AA defenses and having fighter cover by the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. The alternative of passing the Strait of Dover during the night would require sailing out from Brest in the forenoon and steaming though the Channel during broad daylight and thereby giving ample warning time to the British. The Germans also maintained an extremely high degree of secrecy of the operation. Only Admiral Otto Ciliax, commander of the entire force, his chief of staff, all three commanding officers of the heavy ships and destroyer force commander knew about the details of the plan for the operation. They also used six code names for the operation to confuse British agents. The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe cooperated smoothly and almost flawlessly. In contrast, the British overestimated the flexibility of their air power while underestimating the high effectiveness of the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy virtually left the entire operation to the RAF, and the warships it provided were quite incapable of stopping the German ships. Moreover, cooperation among bomber, fighter, and coastal commands of the Royal Air Force (RAF) was quite poor.