War and Game

When assessing German involvement in Spain two questions are paramount: to what extent did it ensure Franco's ultimate victory and what impact did it have on the weapons and tactics that the Wehrmacht deployed during World War 2? In the first days of the civil war, from August to November 1936, when the Condor Legion proper was organised, the commitment was seen as short-term and limited in scale. Yet the score or so of Luftwaffe transports sent to Spain enabled Franco's Army of Africa to reach the Spanish mainland. Its arrival did not guarantee a Nationalist victory but probably ensured that the rebellion would survive the initial chaos that surrounded it. Subsequently, the German commitment grew massively in response to the foreign aid dispatched to the Republic the Condor Legion was sent as were smaller numbers of army and naval personnel and vast quantities of supplies to fuel the Nationalist war effort. German ground, sea and air forces undertook combat missions but the value of the training they gave to the Nationalists, although less glamorous, was probably of equal if not greater value. Equally noteworthy was the contribution of the German officers who joined Franco's staff. After the failure to take Madrid in late 1936 and early 1937 they convinced him to nibble away successively at Republican territory-a strategy that prolonged the war but probably made victory more likely-and also played significant roles in the direction of the battles that followed the stalemate around the capital.

German military personnel undoubtedly played a major part in developing the skills of Franco's forces. The Condor Legion established various schools where Nationalists were taught anti-aircraft, aircraft maintenance, signals and flying techniques. In all, some 500 Spanish aircrew received flight instruction, while a further 60 or so were trained in Germany. On the ground, Gruppe Imker contained probably no more than 600 Germans but a network of bases was established across Spain to train Nationalist recruits in various military skills. These included officer schools, non-commissioned officer facilities and an infantry training school. Of equal importance were facilities where other German instructors taught artillery, mortar, and chemical warfare and signal techniques. Armour and anti-tank training was also undertaken near Madrid and Toledo, where recruits were taught on both German and captured Soviet tanks. Reports suggest that some 56,000 Nationalists soldiers were schooled by the various German detachments, thereby providing Franco with a large corps of well-trained and technically proficient soldiers. The North Sea Group, although the smallest of Germany's detachments, trained Nationalists in the use of torpedo-boats, communications and seamanship but the naval campaign during the civil war was of comparatively minor importance.

The Condor Legion played a major part spearheading many Nationalist victories. Its chief responsibilities were to gain air superiority, interdict the flow of supplies to the front, and support ground offensives-all roles that were successfully accomplished in Spain. By operating in these ways in Spain, the Legion undoubtedly gave the Nationalists air superiority over many battlefields from 1937 and eventually over all Spain. Its fighter pilots scored a little more than 300 confirmed kills, a not insignificant contribution to the battle for air superiority but one actually dwarfed by the Italians, who claimed 903, and one nearly matched by the Nationalists, who recorded 294 aerial victories.

The Legion's Kl88 bombers dropped some 21,000 tons of ordnance and the German pilots claimed to have sunk 60 vessels of all types. It is also clear that German instructors from Imker and Drohne were sent to the front and engaged in combat but the paucity of adequate armour on both sides meant that tanks never had more than localised significance in combat. Although used against Republican aircraft with success, being credited with 61 enemy aircraft shot down, the heavy 8.8 cm Flak batteries also performed well in support of Nationalist ground attacks and in the anti-tank role.

Spain confirmed Germany's faith in the evolving concept of Blitzkrieg that was based on the close co-operation between ground and air units but also effectively subordinated the latter to the needs of the former. Tactically, the Luftwaffe drew several lessons from the civil war that for good or bad influenced its performance during World War 2. Werner Molders developed the highly effective Rotte and Schwarm, loose two and four-aircraft formations of fighters that allowed them to fly at faster speeds and gave greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in combat. Germany's medium bombers proved inaccurate when attacking pinpoint targets, but this failure was seemingly offset by the success of the ground-attack and dive-bombing tactics developed by Wolfram von Richthofen. Losses of ground-attack aircraft and bombers were comparatively low because the Condor Legion had effectively gained the air superiority that allowed these types to operate at will over mostly short ranges with often little or no fighter escort. Luftwaffe strategists recognised to some degree that these circumstances might not apply in the future and partly addressed the potential problems by developing faster, more heavily armed bombers, boosting the firepower of the Bf 109 by adding a cannon, developing a long-range fighter, the Messerschmitt Bf 110, and giving generally greater emphasis to fighter production. Yet, as the Battle of Britain showed, the Luftwaffe's experiences in Spain did not prepare it to meet and defeat independently at long range an enemy equipped with modern fighters.

Spain was also something of a proving ground for Germany's untried tanks and evolving armoured tactics. Although the number of tanks in action was comparatively small and they saw limited service, several conclusions were reached that aided the development of Blitzkrieg. Akey moment came in early January 1937 when a Nationalist assault on Madrid led by German tanks was easily repulsed by Republican anti-tank guns.

Many foreign observers argued that tanks were far too easily destroyed by anti-tank guns and could only operate successfully in the infantry support role as a type of mobile artillery rather than as the spearhead of an offensive. Von Thoma and others drew different conclusions from the Madrid battle. They argued that the tanks had fought in much smaller numbers than appropriate for a leading role and that motorised infantry and anti-tank guns able to keep up with the armour and close air support to neutralise the enemy artillery were vital.

Finally, the PzKpfw I tanks, never seen as more than an interim design for training Germany's own armoured corps, were clearly too thinly armoured, under-gunned and under-powered to survive on the battlefield. Consequently, added emphasis was given to newer designs that overcame these weaknesses, although few were available for the Blitzkriegs of 1939 and 1940.