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Marshal Enterprises Releases Another Free Game
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Wargame on Monday, April 30, 2012
![clip_image002[1]](http://warandgame.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/clip_image0021.jpg "clip_image002[1]")
Marshal Enterprises has now released its second free game in less than 90 days. La Bataille de Raszyn, which pits the Poles of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw against the Austrians on April 19, 1809, in a tight, tense battle for the survival of the Polish nation in Napoleonic Europe, is the second release in Marshal Enterprise’s Recession Series Games---a series which is free to the wargaming public because “everyone needs to save a buck”.
Released on Martin Luther King Day, January 16, 2012 as a follow-up to La Bataille d’Halle, released on Veterans Day in 2011, La Bataille de Raszyn can be accessed and downloaded by anyone by going to the Marshal Enterprises webpage, Labataille.me.
The webpage has easy to access instructions for all the color counters, color maps and charts and rules for this corps on korps battle between Polish Prince Josef Poniatowski and his Saxon allies and the Austrian Ferdinand d”Este ,with his multi-national Hapsburg army.
While most wargamers are familiar with Napoleon’s 1809 campaign in the Danube Valley against the Austrians led by Archduke Charles which culminated in La Bataille de Wagram. La Bataille de Raszyn is the key battle in one of the other major fronts in 1809---the Austrian invasion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in April 1809. Marshall Enterprises, with its tradition of exploring previously untouched battles, believes that the Polish- Austrian contest provides a unique experience for its wargaming public for a campaign unfortunately forgotten by both gamers and history.
Approximately 40,000 Austrians, including some of Austria’s best cavalry, face off against less than 20,000 Poles and Saxons, which despite their smaller numbers, are greatly supported by favorable terrain. La Bataille de Raszyn can easily be played in an afternoon between two players. Playtests proved the contest to be most competitive.
The Austrians had hoped to inspire the Poles to rise up against the less than two-year old Duchy of Warsaw, but instead, the Poles, with their usual ferocious devotion to Napoleon, fought the Austrians to a standstill, and not only defended the Duchy, but also invaded Austrian Galicia, a Polish speaking area that eventually became part of the Grand Duchy from 1809 to 1813.
In addition to several new terrain types, including waterway causeways and dykes, La Bataille de Raszyn, also features special rules which cover the language difficulties of Austria’s multi-national force and the problems Napoleon would have with the loyalties of his Saxon allies.
Marshal Enterprises is a creative consortium of game designers and cultural commentators who remain the surviving designers of the original La Bataille system. La Bataille d’Halle is also a free game and is available on the Labaille.me website.
For further information about this release, contact jgsoto@labataille.me .
Trafalgar - 21 October 1805
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Naval Battle on Thursday, February 2, 2012
COMBATANTS
British
• Total crews 21,456men: 18,134 seamen, 3,322 marines: 3-decker 'first rates': 3 x100 guns; 3-decker 'second rates': 4 x98 guns ; 2-decker 'third rates': 1 x80 guns , 16 x74 guns, 3 x64 guns; 4 frigates, 1 schooner, 1cutter
• Commander-in-Chief Vice Admiral Horatio, Viscount Nelson; second in command Rear Admiral Sir Cuthbert Collingwood
• 449 killed , 1,214 wounded
Franco-Spanish combined fleet (Allies)
• French: total crews c. 15,000; 2-decker 'third rates ': 4 x80 guns, 14 x74 guns; 5 frigates, 2 corvettes. Spanish: total crews 11,817; 4-decker 'first rate': 1 x130 guns ; 3-decker 'first rates': 2 x112 gun s, 1 x100 guns; 2-decker 'third rates': 2 x80 guns, 8 x74 guns, 1 x64 guns
• Commander-in-Chief: French fleet and combined fleet: Vice Admiral Pierre, Comte de Villeneuve;
Spanish fleet: Admiral Don Federico Gravina
• French : c.3,370 killed or drowned, 1,160 wounded, 5,000 taken prisoner, 2,500 taken prisoner but escaped in the storm after the battle; Spanish: 1,038 killed or drowned and 1,385 wounded, 3,000-4,000 prisoners, some of whom escaped in the storm after the battle, and all the wounded were returned by Collingwood.
This famous naval battle was fought off the southwest corner of Spain between a British fleet of 27 ships of the line commanded by Vice Admiral Horatio , Viscount Nelson, and a combined fleet of 18 French and 15 Spanish ships of the line under the command of the French Vice Admiral Pierre, Comte de Villeneuve.
Trafalgar was a consequence of the collapse of the Emperor Napoleon 's impracticable dreams of invading Britain in 1805. These failed at the first serious hurdle when Villeneuve 's combined Toulon and Cadiz fleet was repulsed from its intended junction with the Brest fleet by a waiting British squadron - under Admiral Calder off Ferrol on 22 July 1805 - and put back to Vigo and then to Cadiz. Napoleon decided instead to march eastward against the more accessible target of the Austrian and Russian armies.
The combined fleet at Cadiz was now to be used in the Mediterranean to protect the emperor's exposed Italian flank against British and Russian amphibious attack. Deciding that Villeneuve's indecisiveness would prevent him forcing his way past the blockading British fleet, Napoleon sent a new commander, Admiral Rosily, to take the fleet to Italy.
News of Rosily's impending arrival, and of the withdrawal of part of the watching British fleet for resupply at Gibraltar, encouraged Villeneuve to set aside his misgivings. He took his fleet to sea on 19-20 October, hoping to rescue his reputation by implementing the emperor's orders himself. As the combined fleet left harbour, a chain of frigates and battleships reported its movements back to Nelson, whose fleet was hovering beyond the horizon. Anticipating that it would be bound for the Mediterranean, he moved his fleet southeast to intercept it.
Preparations for battle
Nelson, the foremost admiral of the age, had taken command only three weeks before, but he had a clear idea of how he would fight. This was communicated to his captains over dinners at which he raised morale amongst his newly formed blockading fleet. He and Napoleon were unique in their time in always seeking battles of annihilation. A result of this sort would be impossible to achieve by traditional line-ahead manoeuvres in the short daylight hours of late October. Nelson's victorious encounters with the Spanish at Cape St Vincent in 1797, and with the French at the Nile in 1798, had revealed their poor gunnery. He decided to risk a head-on attack by two columns.
His own (12 of the line on the day) would cut the enemy centre, capture their admiral and hold back the enemy van from interfering in the decisive action, which would be achieved by focusing superior numbers (15 of the line under Collingwood) on overwhelming the enemy rear. To restrict the damage from a head-on attack against the enemy broadsides he looked to get in as quickly as possible, ordering his ships to carry full sail and extra studding sails until they reached the enemy line, instead of the normal fighting rig of topsails only (which avoided the mainsails being set alight by gun flashes). His largest first and second-rate battleships headed his columns since they were best able to absorb damage, had the weight to break up the enemy line, and carried most guns to take on the concentrated fire power until the ships behind arrived to help.
Villeneuve, who had been at the Nile, correctly foresaw that Nelson would not fight an orthodox line-against -line battle, but instead concentrate against part of his fleet. To counter this he formed a fast squadron of observation under the Spanish Admiral Gravina (Principe de Asturias) to act separately from the line of battle wherever it was needed, and instructed all his captains to join the action as soon as possible. He also urged boarding tactics to vitiate the superior British gunnery.
In the event, however, he was let down by his subordinates. Gravina tamely attached his ships to the rear of the line (where he saw that Collingwood was aiming), rather than using his freedom of action to manoeuvre against Collingwood's flank and disrupt his attack. Admiral Dumanoir (Formidable), commanding the allied van, allowed himself to be mesmerized by Nelson's initial feint towards the van before attacking the centre, and was consequently late in ordering his ships to turn back and support the centre, a movement further delayed by the very light wind which necessitated launching his ships' boats to tow them around .
Action
Collingwood - in his newly refitted, first-rate Royal Sovereign - was first to break through the allied line at about midday. Nelson headed his column through the centre in Victory at 12.45 pm and the battle then continued until about 4.30 pm. The first British ships into action took the bulk of casualties as they found themselves surrounded by enemy ships. Nelson himself was killed by a French sharpshooter, as were two captains in Collingwood's division.
However, as more British ships entered the newly opened gaps in the enemy line, so their superior gun drill and mutual fire support in a melee action proved their worth. French attempts to use boarding tactics were blasted to pieces by the British upper-deck heavy-calibre carronades (short guns). Two admirals were killed, as well as a commodore and six captains. Nine Spanish and eight French ships were captured (including Villeneuve and his flagship Bucentaure) and another French ship caught fire and exploded. Eleven limped back to Cadiz with the mortally wounded Gravina, and Dumanoir escaped northward with four of the van.
A savage storm followed the battle, lasting several days, while the British struggled to keep their own damaged ships and their captures afloat. In the end Collingwood saved all his own ships and four of his captures. During the storm, on 23 October, five of the allied survivors made a daring sortie from Cadiz and managed to rescue two captured vessels, but one of these was subsequently wrecked, as were three of the rescuers. All the remaining captures foundered or were wrecked on the adjacent coast, or destroyed by the British to avoid their recapture.
Total casualties on the British side were 449 killed and 1,214 wounded, and in the Franco-Spanish combined fleet 4,408 were killed or drowned and 2,545 wounded, many of these included among 7,000 prisoners. On 3 November Dumanoir's four fugitives were intercepted in the Bay of Biscay by Sir Richard Strachan as they tried to reach Rochefort, and all were captured, bringing the total loss of the combined fleet to 24 out of the 33 battleships engaged.
Significance of the battle
The annihilation battle that Nelson had sought was largely achieved - more ships of the line were taken than in any previous battle of the sailing era. But the immediate effects of Trafalgar were small. It prevented the combined fleet from interfering in Mediterranean operations, but those operations - the Russo-British invasion of Naples - were themselves invalidated by French victories at Ulm and Austerlitz. Trafalgar did not stop Napoleon's path into Europe, but it greatly set back any attempt to resume his westward ambitions. It gave the British breathing space to rebuild their deteriorating fleet and encouragement to continue the fight despite the defeat of their allies.
Napoleon sought to hide the British victory from the French people (his coldness to Villeneuve drove the latter to suicide when he returned on parole in 1806) and he was to rebuild his fleets, but he never rebuilt the confidence among their commanders and crews to take on the British navy successfully. Spain was the greatest loser. She never replaced her fleet, and the loss of her sea power contributed to the loss of her vulnerable American empire. Yet even Spain drew consolation from the valiant and prolonged resistance of their scratch, untrained crews to the murderous British onslaught. The stigma of subservience to the French was cast off and later generations saw this as the heroic, bloody birth of a new Spain - the start of the restoration of national honour that would lead to the Peninsular War and the ultimate rejection of French rule.
Trafalgar was the last great naval battle of the age of sail, and the benchmark by which all future naval battles were to be compared. The dead victor and his victory became immortalized in central London by Nelson's column in Trafalgar Square. Nelson left the British nation with a naval triumph that was a cornerstone to the prestige of the British navy and symbol of British naval mastery for another century, up to the battle of Jutland.
The Early Russian State
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Russia on Wednesday, February 1, 2012
The Invitation of the Varangians by Viktor Vasnetsov: Rurik and his
brothers Sineus and Truvor arrive in the lands of Ilmen Slavs.
Early medieval towns in Russia,
Scandinavia, and Byzantium.
The early Russian state emerged between A.D. 750 and 1000,
the result of a complex development process. Among the most important factors
in this process were the growth of an economy based on craft production and
long-distance trade and the rise of urban centers to facilitate the specialized
economy and the administration of the nascent state. These factors, in turn,
were related closely to connections and interrelationships among peoples living
in Russia, the Baltic Sea area, and the east during the eighth through tenth
centuries.
Primary historical evidence regarding the origin of the
Russian state is scarce, consisting mainly of a single record, the Russian
Primary Chronicle. It is thought that the chronicle was compiled in the
Monastery of the Caves near Kiev in about A.D. 1110. According to the chronicle
account, in the early ninth century northern Russia was divided politically
into diverse tribal principalities, all of which owed tribute to the Varangians
(Scandinavians). In 859 these principalities rose together against the
Varangians and drove them out of Russia. Without a central power, the Russian
peoples began to fight among themselves and eventually resolved to invite the
Varangians to return and rule over them. Three Varangian brothers accepted the
invitation. They moved to northern Russia with their kin and founded cities
from which to rule the area. The oldest brother was Rurik, who located himself
in Novgorod or Staraya Ladoga (depending on the particular codex consulted).
The two younger brothers also each established a city but died within a few
years, leaving Rurik the sole authority over northern Russia. In later years
Rurik’s successors expanded and consolidated Russian rule. In 882 Oleg, a
descendant of Rurik, established himself in Kiev and declared that city the
capital of Russia, which it remained until the eleventh century.
Although the Russian Primary Chronicle account has a
legendary feel to it, clearly serving to legitimize the rule of the Kievan
dynasty over early Russia, it does provides insight into how the early state
was formed. The document identifies several key factors in the formation of the
early Russian state: early towns, the diversity of peoples who inhabited them,
and their economic interrelationships. Archaeological research on the formation
of the early Russian state has investigated these key factors, providing a great
deal of information about the development of early towns as economic and
administrative centers and about the role of the Varangians and other early
peoples in the area. Most archaeologists currently believe that the
establishment of the early Russian state was a process, not an event, as the
Russian Primary Chronicle presents it. The process of state formation, as
revealed in the archaeological record, included the growth of a specialized
economy, urbanization, and increasing social stratification. State development
took place between A.D. 750 and 1000 in two primary phases. In the first phase,
between about A.D. 750 and 900, appeared such early towns as Staraya Ladoga and
Rurik Gorodishche, whose primary function was to facilitate a long-distance
economy. The focus of these early towns was on trade and craft production. They
had a multiethnic population, which only in later years was controlled by a
central administration. In the second phase, from about A.D. 900 to 1000, rose
such towns as Novgorod and Kiev, whose primary function was administration.
These later towns showed evidence of urban planning, the presence of a ruling
elite and a military, and a continuing interest in craft production and trade.
A.D. 750–900
The peoples who settled in northwest Russia before the
period of state formation belonged to Baltic and Finno-Ugric ethnic groups.
During the eighth century, Slavic peoples were expanding north and settling
along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, while at the same time
Scandinavians were moving south into that area. Organized into small tribal
principalities, these peoples coexisted in northern Russia. They lived in small
villages scattered across the landscape. Their economy was primarily agrarian,
with local exchange.
Between A.D. 750 and 900 the characteristic settlement
pattern and economy of northern Russia changed rapidly. A number of towns
appeared, including Staraya Ladoga, Rurik Gorodishche, and Gnezdovo. These
early towns were located at strategic points for facilitating and controlling
the growing trade across the Baltic and through Russia to the Far East. The
first towns in northern Russia were different from earlier settlements in two
significant ways: their population was more concentrated, and they had a
specialized economy focused on craft production rather than agriculture and on
long-distance rather than local trade. They also were notable for having a
multiethnic population, with individuals from several cultures living side by
side and engaging in the same economic activities.
A.D. 900–1000
By A.D. 900, many towns existed in Russia, including Staraya
Ladoga and Rurik Gorodishche. These early towns encouraged the development of a
novel specialized economy based on crafts and trade, fostered the interaction
of numerous ethnic groups, and depended upon a limited amount of urban
administration. Between A.D. 900 and 1000, a new kind of town arose in Russia,
which was associated closely with the development of an elite class and a
central government. As ethnic differences became less pronounced in urban
populations, social stratification became more prominent. Tenth-century towns,
such as Novgorod, increasingly served as administrative and economic centers
for their territories, encouraging interdependence among the urban and rural
settlements. The rise of Kiev in the late tenth century unified Russian towns
and their territories under one central administration and further increased
the social, political, and settlement hierarchy of early Russia. By A.D. 1000
Kiev effectively served as capital of the early Russian state.
WARS OF THE ROSES - Navy
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Medieval on Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Longbowmen and crossbowmen take aim at one another in this depiction of
a fifteenth-century naval battle. (Cotton Jul. E VI Art. 6 f. 18, British
Library)
During the WARS OF THE ROSES, England had no standing fleet,
and naval needs were met by indenting (contracting) with merchants and nobles
to supply ships and crews to perform a specified service for a specified time.
Not meant for voyaging in the open sea, civil war naval forces operated mainly
in the Narrow Seas (i.e., the English Channel), where they undertook to
intercept invaders, ward off coastal raiders, transport English armies, protect
English traders, and maintain communication and supply lines with CALAIS.
After Henry V’s death in 1422, the powerful but expensive
fleet that he had built to support military operations in FRANCE was disbanded.
Because Henry’s conquest of the Norman coast denied the French access to
Channel ports, the need for a large English navy seemed to disappear, and the
minority government of HENRY VI sold off ships and discharged experienced
ship’s masters. By the late 1450s, with Normandy lost and civil war looming,
Henry VI had no fleet and no money to build one. As a result, control of the
Channel fell to the house of YORK after 1456, thanks mainly to the piratical
activities of Richard NEVILLE, earl of Warwick. As captain of Calais, Warwick
appropriated wool revenues to build a fleet that plundered merchant vessels of
various nationalities. While Warwick’s piracy embroiled the Lancastrian
government with outraged foreign powers, it won the earl and the Yorkist cause
much popularity, especially in LONDON, where Warwick was seen as a bold
commander striking a much needed blow for English national pride. Warwick’s
naval success was also a PROPAGANDA windfall for the Yorkists, because it could
be profitably contrasted with Lancastrian ineffectiveness, especially in August
1457 when the government failed to prevent a French squadron under Pierre de
BRÉZÉ from sacking Sandwich. In 1460, Warwick defeated the royal fleet under
Henry HOLLAND, duke of Exeter, and also attacked Sandwich, where he destroyed a
squadron then under construction and captured the Lancastrian commander, Richard
WOODVILLE, Lord Rivers, in his bed. Unopposed in the Channel, Warwick crossed
to England in June; his popularity as a naval commander convinced London
authorities to admit the Yorkists and allowed Warwick to gather the army with
which he defeated and captured the king at the Battle of NORTHAMPTON in July.
In the spring of 1470, after the failure of his second coup
attempt against EDWARD IV, Warwick put to sea in the naval squadron he had
maintained during the 1460s. Denied entry to Calais, Warwick resumed
indiscriminate piracy in the Channel before landing in France, where he
concluded the ANGERS AGREEMENT with Queen MARGARET OF ANJOU. Now acting in the
Lancastrian interest, Warwick eluded the small royal fleet and landed in
England, where in October he restored the house of LANCASTER and forced Edward
IV to flee to BURGUNDY (see EDWARD IV, OVERTHROW OF). However, Edward, thanks
in part to anger generated by Warwick’s piracy, was by March 1471 able to
obtain shipping to England from the HANSEATIC LEAGUE, a German merchant
alliance with which his government had previously been at war.
After defeating Warwick and regaining the throne (see EDWARD
IV, RESTORATION OF), Edward began rebuilding the royal fleet by constructing
ships and gathering a new cadre of experienced ship’s masters. In the 1460s, he
had built the first English royal caravel, the Edward, and, after 1471, he
constructed fleets to support his invasions of France (1475) and SCOTLAND
(early 1480s). Although still meant to carry land troops to fight battles at
sea, caravels were smaller, faster vessels than Henry V’s high, bulky carracks,
and they foreshadowed the quick, agile vessels with which Elizabethan England
later defied the might of Spain. Despite these achievements, Edward still
desired a small, inexpensive navy, and he maintained his fleet largely to
protect trade and intercept invaders, a task that RICHARD III’s flotilla of
watching vessels failed to accomplish in August 1485 when Henry Tudor, earl of
Richmond, set sail for WALES.
After defeating and killing Richard at the Battle of
BOSWORTH FIELD, Richmond, now HENRY VII, continued the naval policy of Edward
IV, building new ships and establishing a naval base at Southampton. However,
he still indented for vessels when he took an army to defend BRITTANY in 1492,
and he, like his predecessor, lacked the naval strength to intercept the
invasion forces of such Yorkist pretenders as Lambert SIMNEL and Perkin
WARBECK, who both had to be defeated in land battles (see STOKE, BATTLE OF)
after their arrival in England.
Further Reading:
Rodger, N.A. M., The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1998).
General George Giffard
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Biography on Monday, January 30, 2012
General Sir George Giffard GCB DSO (1886–1964) was a British
military officer, who had a distinguished career in command of African troops
in World War I, rising to command an Army Group in South East Asia in World War
II.
Giffard served in World War II initially as Military Secretary
at the War Office and then, from 1940, as General Officer Commanding Palestine
& Trans-Jordan.
In 1941 he became Commander-in-Chief of West Africa Command.
While the Mediterranean was barred to British shipping by German and Italian
naval and air force units, West Africa was an important link in Allied lines of
communication to the Middle East and Far East. In addition to organising the
logistic infrastructure, Giffard's major achievement was the reorganisation of
the units of the Royal West African Frontier Force into two field infantry
divisions, capable of serving as independent forces in rough terrain.
Initially, this was in response to a potential threat from Vichy French forces
in Senegal and Niger. Later, these two divisions, 81st (West Africa) Division
and 82nd (West Africa) Division served with distinction in the Burma Campaign.
He was made General Officer Commanding Eastern Army, India
in August 1943. This army faced the Japanese army which had occupied Burma.
Several sources, notably Field Marshal William "Bill" Slim, testified
to his contribution to the improvement in morale and effectiveness in Eastern
Army during this period.
In 1943 he was appointed Commander in Chief of 11th Army
Group in Burma. His period of command here was less happy, mainly because of
difficulties with the US General Joseph Stilwell. The two men disliked each
other, and Stilwell held so many appointments that any working arrangement had
to be an awkward compromise. (As commander of the Northern Combat Area Command,
Stilwell was Giffard's subordinate, but as Deputy Supreme Commander of the
South East Asia Command, he was Giffard's superior.) Nevertheless, this period
was marked by the victories in the Arakan, and at Imphal and Kohima, to which
Giffard contributed greatly. Late in 1944, 11th Army Group was replaced by the
Allied HQ, ALFSEA and Giffard was replaced by General Oliver Leese.
He was also Aide-de-Camp General to the King from 1943 to
1946. He retired in 1946.
Several sources,
notably Field Marshal William "Bill" Slim, testified to his
contribution to the improvement in morale and effectiveness in Eastern Army
during this period.
Although General George Giffard would later have many
vociferous critics, and even Slim eventually backtracked on his initially favourable
estimate, at first he seemed like a breath of fresh air after Irwin.
The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall,
good-looking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically
and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in
either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the
very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked
publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste,
good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that
soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and
relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders
should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of
organisation and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to
victory.
The first weeks of December were anxious ones for him. It
did not help that the entire senior personnel of SEAC were in a state of flux,
largely because of Mountbatten’s megalomania. October was a key month for
‘Dickie’, as he saw the back not only of Stilwell (against whom he had
intrigued assiduously) but the three chiefs of staff who had ‘defied’ him. All
the problems basically arose from the fact that the creation of the post of
Supreme Commander, South-East Asia, was a nonsense that had never been properly
thought out and was simply one of Churchill’s ‘bright ideas’. Mountbatten, with
his vaulting ambition, always wanted to be a generalissimo, not a mere
committee chairman, in which case, as the chiefs of staff ruefully concluded,
what was the point of them and what was their role supposed to be? Either they
or the supreme commander were an unnecessary layer in the military hierarchy.
In land warfare the complex system would work only if the supreme commander,
the army commander and the general actually directing the campaign were all of
one mind. Mountbatten and Slim meshed perfectly, and Slim and Giffard collaborated
well because Giffard always gave his subordinate his head. But Mountbatten and
Giffard was an impossible mixture. Temperamentally poles apart, they seemed to
differ at every conceivable level. For Giffard fighting during the monsoon was
dangerously irresponsible, personal visits to buck up the men’s morale were
mere grandstanding, and Mountbatten’s entire style was personally and
aesthetically repugnant. Detesting Stilwell as he did, Giffard thought that
both Slim and the Supreme Commander deferred to him too much. Resenting the
entire system that had made him Mountbatten’s underling, and disliking the man
personally, Giffard habitually sided with the other commanders, Peirse and
Somerville, who both felt exactly as he did. Whatever Mountbatten proposed, the
trio opposed as if by reflex action. Sacked in May, Giffard was still in post
in October because of the difficulty of finding someone to replace him; a
general had to be found who was both competent and could put up with
Mountbatten, and this was never going to be easy. The obvious solution was for
Slim to take over Giffard’s role, but the Supreme Commander opposed this,
ostensibly because Slim was too valuable where he was. This argument might have
worked in March–June 1944 during Kohima-Imphal, and again after December when
Slim was engaged in CAPITAL, but had no validity whatever in the intervening
period. The suspicion arises that, consciously or unconsciously, Mountbatten
was jealous of Slim. Already in the habit of taking credit for the other man’s
achievements, Mountbatten may have felt that this would be impossible if Slim
was at the very nerve centre of power. The suspicion is enhanced by
Mountbatten’s refusal to have Slim in either Giffard’s job or that of Pownall,
as his chief of staff, when Pownall retired in the autumn.
Land Battle for Guadalcanal, (August 1942–February 1943) Part II
Posted by Mitch Williamson in WWII on Sunday, January 29, 2012
The lack of a harbor compounded U.S. supply problems, as did
Japanese aircraft attacks. Allied “coast watchers” on islands provided early
warning to U.S. forces of Japanese air and water movements down the so-called
Slot of the Solomons. The battle on Guadalcanal became a complex campaign of
attrition. The Japanese did not send their main fleet but rather vessels in
driblets. American land-based air power controlled the Slot during the day, but
the Japanese initially controlled it at night, as was evidenced in the 8 August
Battle of Savo Island. Concern over the vulnerability of the U.S. transports
led to their early removal on the afternoon of 9 August along with most of the
heavy guns, vehicles, construction equipment, and food intended for the Marines
ashore. The Japanese sent aircraft from Rabaul, while initially U.S. land-based
aircraft flying at long range from the New Hebrides provided air cover for the
Marines as fast destroyer transports finally brought in some supplies. American
possession of Henderson Field tipped the balance. U.S. air strength there
gradually increased to about 100 planes.
At night the so-called Tokyo Express—Japanese destroyers and
light cruisers—steamed down the Slot and into the sound to shell Marine
positions and to deliver supplies. The latter effort was haphazard and never
sufficient; often, drums filled with supplies were pushed off the ships to
drift to shore. One of the great what-ifs of the Pacific War was the failure of
the Japanese to exploit the temporary departure of the U.S. carrier task force
on 8 August by rushing in substantial reinforcements.
Actions ashore were marked by clashes between patrols of
both sides. Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao, who had arrived with his battalion on
Guadalacanal in early August, planned a large-scale attack that took little
account of U.S. Marine dispositions. His unit was effectively wiped out in the
21 August 1942 Battle of the Tenaru River. Ichiki’s men refused to surrender,
and they and their commander were killed in the fighting. Marine losses were 44
dead and 71 wounded; the Japanese lost at least 777 killed. From 12 to 14
September, strong Japanese forces attempted to seize U.S. Marine positions on
Lunga Ridge overlooking Henderson Field from the south. The Japanese left 600
dead; American casualties were 143 dead and wounded. Both sides continued
building up their strength ashore as naval and air battles raged over and off
Guadalcanal.
From 23 to 25 October, the Japanese launched strong land
attacks against Henderson Field. Fortunately for the Marine defenders, the
attacks were widely dispersed and uncoordinated. In these engagements, the
Japanese suffered 2,000 dead, while U.S. casualties were fewer than 300.
Immediately after halting this Japanese offensive, Vandegrift began a six week
effort to expand the defensive perimeter beyond which the Japanese could not
subject Henderson to artillery fire. Meanwhile, Admiral Kondo Nobutake’s
repositioning of vessels and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey’s instructions to
Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid to seek out the Japanese fleet resulted in the 26
October Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Fighting on land continued on Guadalcanal. On 8 December,
Vandegrift turned command of the island over to U.S. Army Major General
Alexander M. Patch, who organized his forces into the XIV Corps, including the
2nd Marine Division, replacing the veteran 1st Marine Division, which was
withdrawn, and the 25th Infantry Division. At the beginning of January 1943,
Patch commanded 58,000 men, whereas Japanese strength was then less than
20,000.
Ultimately, the Americans won the land struggle for
Guadalcanal thanks to superior supply capabilities and the failure of the
Japanese to throw sufficient resources into the battle. The Americans were now
well fed and well supplied, but the Japanese were desperate, losing many men to
sickness and simple starvation. At the end of December, Tokyo decided to
abandon Guadalcanal.
Meanwhile, on 10 January, Patch began an offensive to clear
the island of Japanese forces, mixing Army and Marine units as the situation
dictated. In a two-week battle, the Americans drove the Japanese from a heavily
fortified line west of Henderson Field. At the end of January, the Japanese
were forced from Tassafaronga toward Cape Esperance, where a small American
force landed to prevent them from escaping by sea. Dogged Japanese perseverance
and naval support, however, enabled some defenders to escape. The Japanese invested
in the struggle 24,600 men (20,800 troops and 3,800 naval personnel). In daring
night operations during 1–7 February 1943, Japanese destroyers evacuated 10,630
troops (9,800 army and 830 navy).
The United States committed 60,000 men to the fight for the
island; of these, the Marines lost 1,207 dead and the army 562. U.S. casualties
were far greater in the naval contests for Guadalcanal; the U.S. Navy and
Marines lost 4,911 and the Japanese at least 3,200. Counting land, sea, and air
casualties, the struggle for Guadalcanal had claimed 7,100 U.S. dead and
permanently missing. The Japanese advance had now been halted, and MacArthur
could begin the long and bloody return to the Philippine Islands.
References
Bergerud, Eric. Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific. New York:
Viking, 1996. Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the
Landmark Battle. New York: Random House, 1990. Hough, Frank O., Verle E.
Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw. History of Marine Corps Operation in World War II:
Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963.
Miller, John, Jr. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific:
Guadalcanal, the First Offensive. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1949. Mueller, Joseph N. Guadalcanal 1942: The Marines Strike Back. London:
Osprey, 1992. Tregaskis, Richard. Guadalcanal Diary. New York: Random House,
1943.
